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"The Church in Korea"

- Samuel Moffett

The Church in Korea

SAMUEL HUGH MOFFETT

When one writes about the church in Korea the temptation is strong to begin with statistics. They can be so impressive.

Statistics of church growth, for example. The Protestant community has doubled in every decade since 1940, and is still out-pacing the nation's population growth four to one (that is, a church growth rate of just under 10% annually compared to population growth of 2.2%). Roman Catholics since 1960, after a long period of comparatively slow growth, are now increasing at an even sharper percentage ratio than Protestants.

Or statistics of church membership. The government lists over four million Koreans as Christian, including some marginal cults not recognized by the churches. This is 13% of the population, a remarkably high percentage for Asia where the over-all ratio is only 3%.

Dip into almost any area of the national life, and startling Christian statistics come tumbling out. One-third of the men in the Korean armed forces are said to be Christian. Korea has the largest women's college in the world, a Christian college. Korea has more theological students than any other country in Asia, Africa or Latin America—perhaps more than any other country in the world outside the United States. The capital city, Seoul, has over 1500 Protestant churches.

There are other religions in Korea, of course. Buddhism, for example, claims to have even more followers than Christianity: 7,200,000 as compared with 4,300,000 Christians reported in the 1973 *Korea Annual*. But its claims are a little hollow despite evidences of some revival in recent years. All spot checks and samplings indicate that Christianity is the largest organized religious force in Korea today. What the statistics do not show, however, is the continuing power of a primitive animism (Shamanism) among the masses of the people (over 60%) who claim to have no religion.

There is a darker side to the statistics of Korean Christianity also. Closer examination of the swelling figures reveals the tragic facts of division and schism. Major denominational distinctions existed before, imported from the West, but only since the Korea War, during the decade of division from 1950 to 1960, have the Korean denominations themselves become so splintered, as the chart below will show. There are:

14 Presbyterian bodies	with	1,536,000	constituents.
1 Roman Catholic church	"	800,000	"
3 Methodist bodies	"	327,000	"
2 Holiness bodies	"	254,000	"

The author, a graduate of Princeton (B.D.) and Yale (Ph D.), is Professor of Church History at the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church of Korea in Seoul.

3 Baptist bodies	with	63,000	constituents.
6 Pentecostal groups	"	60,000	"
1 Anglican Church in Korea	"	30,000	"
2 Seventh Day Adventist bodies	"	28,000	"
1 Salvation Army	"	25,000	"

But the statistics of church schism notwithstanding, the raw data of Korean church growth and membership suggest something of the bursting vitality of a church so young that the first Korean Protestant to receive infant baptism died only last year.

The first Christians in Korea were Japanese. Some estimate that as many as 18,000 of the soldiers in Hideyoshi's invading armies were Catholic converts under such Catholic lords as "the chivalrous Christian *daimyo*" Konishi Yukinaga, who captured Seoul and Pyongyang. Such an introducing of the faith to Korea was not of a kind best calculated to win Korean converts, but it did at least bring the first Western missionary to touch Korean soil, the Jesuit Father Gregorio de Cespedes, who came briefly and ineffectively as chaplain with the Japanese armies in 1593.

Catholicism came to stay only when the Koreans themselves brought it in from China two hundred years later. The first Korean was baptized in Peking in 1784, returning to propagate the faith in his homeland. Missionary priests of the Société des Missions Etrangères de Paris followed, beginning in 1836, despite a government ban on the propagation of foreign religions. The church was decimated by great waves of persecution in 1801, 1839, 1846 and 1866. Nevertheless, at the end of "the Catholic century" in 1884 there were some 17,500 Roman Catholics in the country.

In that same year the first resident Protestant missionary, Dr. Horace Allen, M.D., reached Korea. He was not, however, the first to introduce Protestantism. This was done, as in the case of Catholicism earlier, by the Koreans. Eight years before Allen opened Korea to Protestant work, in 1876 a small group of Koreans had been converted by Scottish Presbyterians in Manchuria. They helped the missionaries with the first Korean translation of the New Testament, beginning with the publication of Matthew in 1881. As other gospels were published the Korean converts began crossing the Yalu to distribute the Scriptures secretly in Korea. One of them, So Sang-Yun, returned to his native village not far north of Seoul, converted most of the families, and gathered together a worshiping congregation of almost a hundred people a whole year before the first Protestant missionary arrived in 1884.

Early Protestant mission history was dominated by the Presbyterians and Methodists, and these are still the largest denominations. Methodists tended to emphasize education, and Presbyterians evangelism and church planting. Presbyterian strategy was shaped around the so-called Nevius Method, stressing church-wide Christian education in Bible classes for the entire church membership, and sturdy self-reliance for the young church—self-government, self-propagation and self-support. But to contrast the two denominations too sharply is to oversimplify and distort. Methodist evangelists spearheaded the nation-wide evangelistic crusade of 1909–10, the Million Movement. And Presbyterians, too, pioneered in education, as in Soongsil Col-

lege (now Soongjun University), and Yonsei University.

A strong strain of evangelical revivalism has been a marked feature of Korea's Protestant churches. The great Korean revival which reached its climax in 1907 was a spiritual explosion charged with "extraordinary manifestations of power." It touched off a massive ingathering of believers that increased the membership of the churches fourfold in five years, from 1903 to 1908.

In the same period new mission groups entering the country, such as the Salvation Army and the Oriental Missionary Society (which founded Korea's third largest denomination, the Holiness Church) reënforced the evangelistic and pietistic character of Korean Protestantism. Evangelism has been at the root of its rapid growth. In general, although mass evangelism has been effectively practiced in Korea, the major cutting edge of growth has been individual witness by lay Christians, and the natural channel of growth has been the family. The influence and witness of relatives is most often mentioned by new church members as the most important factor in their conversion.

The pietism of the Korean church, though it is too often tarnished with the kind of legalistic other-worldliness which that once-respectable word now connotes, has its strengths as well as its weaknesses. Protestants for the most part do not drink or smoke. This does lead some into misplaced pride and—what is far more dangerous—obscures for others the basis of Christian salvation. But at least it produces healthier Christians, and leaves them with more money to support the church, which they do with amazing zeal. The deeper strength of pietism, however, is spiritual. Nurtured by prayer, and supported by unwavering convictions, Korea's Christians have time and again found inner resources of spiritual power to meet, to endure and to survive some of the most intensive persecutions of modern times, first under the Japanese militarists and then under the communists.

But the same conservative pietism, it is charged, has also made Korean Christianity narrow and lacking in social concern. The criticism is only partly justified. On the one hand it is true that the Korean church rarely produces searching theological resolutions and sweeping manifestos on social and political issues. This probably indicates a lack of serious evangelical emphasis on social justice and the social implications of the gospel.

Nevertheless, the history of Korean Christianity is surprisingly full of political protest, social revolution and evangelical demonstration. The church's pervasive involvement in the Korean independence movement's protest against colonial injustices was denounced by the Japanese as suicidally radical. The Rev. Kiel Sun-Ju was more than Korea's foremost evangelist. He was also an organizer of the 1919 independence demonstrations and principal Christian signator of the Korean Declaration of Independence, for which he spent two years in jail. Of the 33 signers, 16 were Christians at a time when only 3% of the country was Christian.

The Christian educational revolution in Korea not only introduced modern education to the country, it was the opening wedge in the liberation of Korean women from the centuries-long impositions of Confucian tradition. Out of Korea's first school for women, started by the Methodists in 1886, has grown today's Ewha Women's University which ranks along with the co-educational Yonsei University, founded by Presbyterians, among the four most prestigious

schools in the country. This favored inner circle is now broadening to include a fifth school, the Jesuits' Sogang University.

There are today 11 Protestant colleges and universities, 85 Protestant high schools, 79 middle schools and innumerable Christian primary schools, all legally recognized as private schools but subject to Ministry of Education curriculum requirements. The most recent controversial issue in the Christian educational system is a proposal of the Ministry to forbid the teaching of Bible and religion in the private schools. A strong protest by the churches to the president himself may reverse the decision.

The medical revolution in Korea was also Christian. The first Protestant mission institution was a hospital, the gift of a grateful king to Dr. Allen, the first missionary, for saving a royal prince's life. Today there are 21 Protestant hospitals in operation and many smaller clinics. For years the only medical education in the country was at Severance's Medical College which grew out of Dr. Allen's first hospital. As late as 1954 the Korean government reported that more than a third of all Korea's licensed physicians were Severance graduates. Christian hospitals strongly emphasize family planning, supporting one of the most successful birth control programs in Asia outside Japan. Population increase is down to 2.2%, with a target of 2%. In 1961 it was 2.9%. Another Christian emphasis is rural medical service, as in the satellite-clinic plan of the Taegu Presbyterian Hospital, the village health program of the Chonju Medical Center, and the island experiment in low-cost medicine and community health program on Kojedo. But still only 6.5% of the rural population ever gets modern medical treatment, and the ever-increasing "brain drain" of Korean doctors and nurses to the U.S. and West Germany aggravates the situation.

Christian impact in the fine arts has been no less pervasive. Christians rescued from oblivion the Korean alphabet, key to the country's native culture. The publication of the Bible in *hangul* (the Korean alphabet) rather than in Chinese characters was the beginning of an indigenously Korean literary renaissance in which Christian novelists, poets and artists have played a part out of all proportion to their ratio in the population. The national anthem was written by a Christian. In Seoul last year a Korean Christian opera, *Esther*, played to packed houses in the city's largest auditorium. A Korean best-seller this year has been a book written in Korean for Koreans by a Western missionary, *Persimmons, Winter and Koreans* by Edward Poitras, who takes a sympathetically critical look at the country as seen through occidental eyes. The best-known translator and interpreter of classical Korean literature into Western languages is another missionary, the Anglican bishop of Taejon, the Rt. Rev. Richard Rutt.

When national independence was regained in 1945, Korean Christianity found itself confronted with far more complex problems of political responsibility than it had ever faced before. For the first time, Christians in Korea possessed political power.

Three of the first four presidents of the Republic have been Christians, and Christians have been prominent both in Cabinet posts and the parliamentary National Assembly. Their record, however, in national political life has been understandably mixed. It was considerably blemished by evidences of corruption in the later years of the Syngman Rhee regime. But history is clearing that doughty freedom-fighter and father-figure of many of the charges against him.

Older churches and more Christian cultures than Korea's have yet to solve satisfactorily all the problems of the Christian's involvement in politics, and non-Christian governments have been even less successful in combatting corruption. Intense biblical and theological study of the basic principles of Christian participation in government is a pressing need in the Korean church.

A related problem is that of the Christian in the military. Here the embarrassment is more of success than of failure. A Christian chaplains' corps in a non-Christian country would seem to be an anomaly, but Korea's armed forces have had an official Department of Chaplains since 1950. It was exclusively Christian until 1969 when a handful of Buddhist chaplains was belatedly added. At the end of 1972 there were 305 Protestant chaplains, 47 Catholics and 19 Buddhists. Since 1970, in what was probably an effort to use religion as an anti-communist morale-builder, the Korean government encouraged an "entire army make believer" movement which opened the door to an evangelistic campaign so successful that there have been mass baptisms of over 3,000 servicemen at a time. In two years more than 50,000 baptisms have been recorded, and the percentage of Christians in service has jumped from an estimated 16% five years ago to 33% today.

The pace and political background of the crusade have raised serious questions, but with few exceptions the instruction by the chaplains has been positively Christian, not negatively anti-communist, conversions have seemed to be real, and active follow-up continues as the draftees return to take important roles in their village churches.

Of considerable concern recently has been the role of the Christian *under* government as distinct from that of the Christian *in* government. It is a far more difficult problem than when the government was foreign and Japanese. Then Christian opposition could be nationalistically automatic. Opposition is no longer so easy. Now that the government is their own, the Korean Christian's concern for justice, protest against corruption, and defense of freedom sometimes conflict agonizingly with his patriotism, loyalty and obedience to the recognized powers of the state. A further deterrent to hasty protest is the deep hunger in the peninsula after years of savage troubles for stability and security and continued economic progress.

Nevertheless, when protests have had to be made, there have been Christians to make them. Sometimes it has been done by official statements, more often by silence which is in itself difficult, and sometimes by demonstrations. The Korean National Council of Churches has courageously championed freedom of the press. The most effective and decisive protest against municipal injustices was a demonstration led by a Christian pastor in one of the capital's worst satellite slum areas. It forced the city to make reforms and has revitalized a dead and forgotten resettlement ghetto into a pioneering model of suburban self-development, much of it organized around the church, such as home industry projects, Christian social service programs for street peddlers and bus girls, and day care for the children of working mothers.

A major drain on Korean church membership is the siren call of the cults. More than 240 "new religions" have been counted, and some of the largest are aggressively proselyting, semi-Christian sects like the 700,000-member (claimed) Olive Tree Church which combines faith healing with a thriving industrial complex built on believers-labor, or the 300,000-member

Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (*Tongil-kyo*) which worships a nationalistically Korean Messiah but has established "families" of foreigners as well in Japan and the United States.

The counter-thrust of the ecumenical movement is sadly weak by comparison. The Korean N.C.C. no longer represents a majority even of the established denominations, and Geneva's one-sided political and social pronouncements have not commended the W.C.C. to the Korean Christian mind. In one area, however, real progress has been registered. Relations between Korean Catholics and Protestants have never been better. For years the missions of both confessions have been coordinating their relief and much of their social service activities through the Korea Association of Voluntary Agencies. More recently they have cooperated in a joint new translation of the Bible. The New Testament has already been published, and the Old Testament is scheduled for completion in 1974.

The deepest division of all in Korea is the abyss that sunders north from south. Despite the dramatic resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea in 1972 for the first time since the Korea War, prospects for reconciliation are, humanly speaking, very dim. The Red Cross talks confirmed that there is, apparently, no organized church left in North Korea. Once the north was the center for Korea's greatest concentration of Christians. Communist persecution of the church, however, has been more severe than in either China or Russia. Asked by a South Korean reporter what was left of Christianity in the north, the Rev. Kang Ryang-Uk, whose close kinship to Premier Kim Il-Sung perhaps explains his survival as both a Christian minister and a high communist official, said that he knew of no church buildings or Christian meetings.

Nevertheless, undeterred by calamities and divisions and problems that would cripple lesser churches, Korea's buoyant Christians continue to multiply and spread. They support over forty Korean Protestant foreign missionaries (including wives), and six Catholic. Most are in Asia, but they have also sent missionaries to lands as distant as Ethiopia and Brazil. It may well be, as some Korean Christians are already saying, that if the missionary enthusiasm of the West declines, the little country of Korea will have the vitality and faith to take up the continuing challenge of world evangelization.

A final note about books on Korean Christianity may be in order, though only a few of many worthwhile volumes can be mentioned. The best comprehensive survey is Allen D. Clark's revised *History of the Church in Korea* (Seoul: Korean Christian Literature Society, 1971) which adds an analysis of the current situation and biographies of outstanding Korean Christians to his earlier work. The classic and irreplaceable record of the early period of Protestant missions is L. G. Paik's *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea 1832–1910* (Seoul: Yonsei University, 1971, a reprint of the 1929 edition). A less definitive but more inclusive survey of the Catholic church is J. C. Kim and J. J. Chung, *Catholic Korea: Yesterday and Now* (Seoul: Catholic Korea Publ. Co., 1964).

On specific, more limited subjects the following are important: Roy Shearer's *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), a documented history and analysis; "The New Religions of Korea", *Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic*

Society (Seoul: vol. 43, 1967), which includes chapters on the Olive Tree Movement and the *Tongil-kyo*; and W. N. Blair's *Gold in Korea* (Topeka: H. M. Ives, 1957, 3rd ed.) which contains first-hand reports of the great revival of 1907–08, and of the Shinto shrine issue.

PRAYER

I and my age are barren
Of prayer, impotent, dumb
Under heaven, knowing too well
The why, how, when and where,
But speechless in God's face
And presence; my age and I.

Like the athirst Christ, crossed,
Lacking wine, blood, to ask
Grace, or to praise, love, bless;
Tongue cracked, palate near burst,
Saliva slackened, and throat
Parched in the dust black noon;

Like the mariner, albatrossed
In tropics, sea-marooned
On his salt and endless island
Lacking wit, will, words, cursed
On the pitch hot deck, with dry
Lips dead, denying, denied,
Dying.

O water snakes,
Pity us in your beauty.
Move in our hearts some love
And spirit of praise, that we may
Drink deeply of your motion
And feel the blessed rain.
Move gently for our sakes;
Quicken our dry hearts; open
The way to God again.

Simon Baynes

Religious Policy and the Church in China

DONALD E. MACINNIS

Although the open practice of religion in China apparently ceased during the period of peak intensity of the Cultural Revolution beginning in August, 1966, there is no evidence that China's leaders made organized religion a particular target during that three-year ideological struggle. Religion is not mentioned in the 16-point *Decision* of the Central Committee which launched the Cultural Revolution in August, 1966; nor has Chairman Mao or any other leader spoken of religion in subsequent communiqués and directives. One concludes that China's religious believers, by 1966, were seen to be either thoroughly absorbed in the collective tasks of socialist nation-building, or too insignificant in numbers or influence to pose any challenge.

The Cultural Revolution, however, was far more than a political campaign or power struggle. The first of the 16 points in the 1966 *Decision* began: "The current great proletarian cultural revolution is a great revolution that touches people to their very souls. . . ." The goal was a massive shift in psycho-historical perceptions, a virtual spiritual conversion of China's millions. It appears that China's youth, mobilized into militant groups of Red Guards across the nation, over-responded to the summons to attack the remnant traces of bourgeois feudalism—the "four olds": old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. In a widespread and indiscriminate assault on every remaining sector of pre-revolutionary culture, Buddhist temples, Moslem mosques and Christian churches were closed by roving Red Guard groups. Religious scriptures and objects of all kinds were seized and destroyed, and clergy and believers were harassed. It is only in the past two or three years that visitors have seen Buddhist temples and monasteries, mosques and a few Christian churches once again open for use by believers.

Under the united front policy, which enlisted all social, cultural and ethnic minority groups in joint endeavor toward common national goals, China's leaders have held consistently to a stated policy of freedom of religions belief within the context of patriotic service in socialist nation-building. The deputy director of the United Front Work Department in 1958 said:

> Ideological differences on the question of God are intolerable. The policy on freedom of religious belief tolerates such differences and facilitates the correct handling of such contradictions among the people. The policy on freedom of religious belief, therefore, is a long-term basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party and the state to cope with the religious problem.

However, religious believers, like all other citizens of China, are expected to participate fully in the nation's tasks:

The author served the Methodist Church in university teaching in China and Taiwan before coming to be the first director of the China Program/NCCCUSA and editor of *China Notes*. He is the author of *Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China: A Documentary History*, New York: MacMillan Co., 1972, and is presently working on a second book for Macmillan, *The Maoist Vision for New Man and New Society*.

Study Paper, Second Draft August, 1973

FROM ALL THE WORLD . . . (IN)TO ALL THE WORLD
or
"Mission on Six Continents"
or
"Partnership in Mission on Six Continents".

Here are some un-tame ideas on the future of mission. The ideas come out of life in Korea for two decades, and much study on how to "liberate" mission in the freedom Christ wants to give his world-wide Church in this day of pluralism and open-ness.

The challenge is to servanthood and co-workership with transnational and transcultural participation on all six continents of the world. The result will be a faithful dialoguing and "multiloguing" partnership at new depths of commitment to evangelism and self-development, i.e. to a fuller Gospel. In all this, the Spirit of our Lord Jesus Christ desires to equip the Church for ministry and mission locally and world-wide. In short, here is a study paper on "A Developing Vision of an Open Ecumenical Exchange."

1. The Aim, both of policy and work, is to deliver, with integrity, the saving knowledge of the Gospel of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ."

United Presbyterians put it thus:

> "The supreme and controlling aim of the Christian mission to the world is to make the Lord Jesus Christ known to all men as their divine and only Savior, and to persuade them to become His disciples and responsible members of His Church, in which Christians of all lands share in evangelizing the world and in permeating all of life with the spirit and truth of Christ."

The Bangkok Conference on "Salvation Today" puts it thus in their "Affirmation on Salvation Today:"

> "To the individual he (Jesus) comes with power to liberate him from every evil and sin, from every power in heaven and earth and from every threat of life or death . . . To the world he comes as the Lord of the universe with deep compassion for the poor and hungry, to liberate the powerless and oppressed. He also comes to the powerful and the oppressor with mercy and judgment."

2. The Framework, both of policy and work, embodies two concepts:
a. "From all the world . . . (in)to all the world." To use Korea as an illustration, the best thing that can happen is for expatriate missionary co-workers coming to Korea to come from all areas of the world (bringing the warmth of how the Gospel permeates their culture), and then continue to expect Korea to be sending out its best missionary co-workers all over the world. This is a flow movement. Two areas should be stressed on the in-

coming group: first, they come on Korea's invitation; second, their constituency should stress "Asian-ness" and "Black-ness."

b. Transnational. This concept stresses the ability to bridge two or more nations in your understanding of life. It also means the word "international" and even "national" are dead words for the space age when we see this earth as one planet. This enlarged understanding of a growing world culture is as old as John 3:16 - - "God so loved the world . . ." To overstress my nation, whether as a missionary co-worker, or as a national, is to invert the Christian motif, "life for others." Transnational is a secular word for an ecclesiastical term, Ecumenical Mission, which is the "Mission of the whole Chruch to all men in the entire world."

This framework emphasizes a much needed modus operandi: function first, form later; but always in mission together in every continent. It is the function of all the Chruch to become partners in ecumenical mission.

3. A "dream" beyond today. I am convinced that good planning for the next phase of partnership demands not only an appraisal of the present methods in use in this day in mission, but also a preview of what may be in store for the mid-70's and early 80's.

I basically feel there are strong merits in the new partnership plan of the Presbyterian Chruch of Korea (where three overseas Churches are partners in mission). I am becoming aware that perhaps in a few years we need to be more broadly related to the whole Chruch in Korea, the idea of what might be called "the fifth era" in Korea. The four ecumenical eras to date have been called:

The Mission Era
The Chruch-Mission Cooperation Era
The Integration Era
The Partnership Era.

I have not found a good caption to give to a future era for the mid 70's, but for now I'd call it either: "From all the world . . . (In)to all the world - The Korea Team," or "Mission on Six Continents - The Korea Team." I visualize this as a much smaller number of missionary co-workers, consisting first of a group staying at least ten years, who know the language and would probably work quite similarly to the present partnership set up within the mainstream of Presbyterianism. These people would be - to use baseball language - the manager and the coaches. Then the rest of the team would be specialists on shorter contracts asked by educational institutions, the Korean government, ecumenical agencies, other denominations, and perhaps partially or totally paid by Korea.

It might well include specialists by then on Roman Catholic and Protestant relations. I think the posture of our Program Agency, United Presbyterian Chruch in the U.S.A., is such that we must not allow ourselves to get into any strait jacket in any nation, and I believe we are ready to venture in some brand new pioneering ventures.

I would also hope that personnel who know both Korea and Japan might play a role on this Korea team to develop better understanding between these two nations and churches. By then, dialogue and multilogue with Red China and North Korea should be operational.

The "dream" can become reality if the Church is sensitive to total non-selfish mission opportunities and challenges, and makes sure each expatriate has a job description accurate and meaningful for his gifts. Many of the new breed of missionary co-workers may well be part of a team ministry including specialists from many disciplines, thus permitting a deeper sweep of the Spirit in this pluralistic day.

4. The focus of Scriptural motivation. All policy and all work of the Church in mission focuses on the Scriptures. For the phrase, From All the World. . . (In)to All the World, the Bible says:

> "Now there were dwelling in Jerusalem . . . devout men from every nation." (Acts 2:5)
>
> "You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth. (Acts 1:8)

In boedience to Christ we labor togcther to bring His Gospel to the whole world by activating the Church in all six continents to participate as a sending-receiving agency of God's reconcilation in Christ Jesus.

Stanton R. Wilson
Representative in Korea
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
Cent'l P.O. Box 1125
Seoul, Korea 100

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1973

OBSERVATIONS BY THE GENERAL DIRECTOR
OF THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE MISSION

KLEF does in many ways come close to representing what TEAM would want in churches it would bring into being. It is:

A. Fundamental in doctrine
B. Premillenial
C. Immersionist
D. Evangelistic
E. Concerned about discipling
F. Church centered
G. Alert to spiritual dangers
H. Gifted with vision and leadership
I. Self-supporting
J. Self-Propagating
K. Self-governing

KLEF is in closer agreement with TEAM doctrinally, in its vision and in its spiritual standards than most other churches in Korea.

It represents a strong reactionary movement and as is generally true where reaction exists, it can go to the extremes in its reaction. It does react against:

A. Shallow evangelism and teaching
B. Confusion of Gospel terminology which weakens understanding of the message.
C. The dependence on church membership, good works, law observance, etc., for salvation.
D. Infant baptism
E. Elevation of the clergy
F. Strong teaching on predestination
G. Undue emphasis on finances
H. Receiving foreign support

KLEF's experience is similar to that of other spiritual awakenings where cold, orthodox, nominal Christian churches exist. This was the experience of zinzindorf, Finney, Moody, Franson and others. There were in some instances methods which were effective, never-the-less, stirred up strong reaction - (witness Moody's and Franson's open invitations to receive Christ and "after meetings" which were held).

KLEF leaders believe whole-heartedly that they are doing a necessary work for God. They admit errors of judgment and performance. They believe Korea needs to be confronted with a Gospel of salvation by grace apart from works. Their reactions against some good things which church people are doing such as tithing, praying, observing the ten commandments is a reaction on a dependence on these works for salvation.

Believing in their work as they do, KLEF looks at TEAM as having the potential to further their spiritual movement through radio as at present and potentially through the other ministries. They express surprise that TEAM would seem to be aiding groups that do not have a clear salvation message and thus distort the Gospel.

Dr. mortinson
August, 1973

Allen Clark
Spring - 1973

Evangelism Up-to-Date

Three years ago, when revising my History of the Church in Korea, to bring it up to date after ten years, I had several interviews with Rev. Lee Kwon-Chan, then head of the Department of Evangelism of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Korea. Since then, he has officially retired, but is still as actively engaged in this work as ever, holding forth from a desk at the HLKY Christian radio station. So I went to interview him again. He told me he had a list of some 45 different aspects of evangelism to talk about. Some were repetitions of what he had given me before, some were new. All of them were interesting. Here is the gist of the conversation. Go see him, sometime.

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1. Evangelism in the armed forces. This is the greatest evangelistic opening, at the present time. (See Korea Calling Feb, May and July 1972) In 1960, those in the armed forces calling themselves Christians were 6.2%; in 1972, this had risen to 10.2%. Today, it is more than 30% and it is hoped that this will go up to 50% by 1975 and to 100% by 1980.

The reasons for this are as follows: First, the conviction of the top army commander that the most effective means of combatting Communism is the Christian Gospel. More than a political system, Communism is a system of ideas, a sort of enthusiastic anti-religion. The only system of ideas which is able to compete with the fanaticism of Communism is the Christian faith.

Second, the President of Korea has said on several occasions that what we need is new men. This cannot be accomplished by legal fiat, only by changing the attitudes by which men live.

With such ideas in mind, we begin with the army. If the top officers attend services, the lower officers will follow and the men in the ranks will do likewise.

The past two years, there have been frequesnt reports of mass baptismal services in different places, running from one hundred or less up to over three thousand in a single service. The question is frequently asked: Are these men really

converted Christians? Or is it a sort of mass hysteria or a fiat order to baptize so many men, regardless? Such things have happened before in the history of the Christian Church. When these mass baptisms happen, not once or twice, but month after month and in a variety of places, can they possibly be real? What kind of personal preparation went into getting them ready for these affairs? If rushed through in large numbers, isn't it probable that they will likewise defect in equally large numbers? In that case, what have you really accomplished? What possible meaning is there in all this?

These are sound questions, but the fears are over-done, fortunately. Testaments have been secured in numbers that make it possible to give one to each man who wants one. A Bible correspondence course has been used with the men, and only after a man has completed this study is he considered eligible for baptism. The chaplains talk personally with each man before encouraging him to come for baptism. It would appear that every effort is made to make sure that the men know what they are doing.

When Dr. Han Kyung-Chik and Mr. Lee have preached to the men at the Nonsan and other induction centers, the large response on the part of the men has been amazing. The numbers are not in tens or hundreds, but over a thousand at a single meeting. And not one single time, but over and over again. Furthermore, it is well to bear in mind that a new group of inductees comes in every six weeks. The possibilities are tremendous; the opportunity challenging. Every young man who is not sick or crippled is liable to this service.

Then, going to the other end of the military service, we come to the Home Reserves, the army alumni who continue their periodic training after completing their formal military service. What about them? This is the latest area of outreach. A special committee has been organized, with Dr. George L.Paik as chairman and Dr. Han Kyung-Chik as active head, to enlist chaplains to work with these reserves. These reserve chaplains are called "hyong-mok", as against the "kun-mok" chaplains who have been working with the men in active

service since 1950. There are about 380 of these latter, but 500 are needed. Local churches are ~~xxxxxx~~ being urged to help with the follow-up on the reserves, to conserve the results of what the regular chaplains have been doing.

2. Student evangelism Next after the men in the armed forces, the most fruitful and most urgent area for evangelism is among the students of the nation, from Junior high school up through college. These are the boys who will presently be going into the army. If they can be led to Christ before going into service, the work of the chaplains will be that much easier, for the boys will bring with them a basic understanding of what the Gospel is and what their own relation to Christ should be.

Many of us are involved in work with small groups of students, here and there, but we often forget just how large this field really is. If half the nation is under twenty years of age, then half of that half are within the age-group here being discussed. Bible study groups on numerous campuses and in many homes are doing basic ~~xxx~~ work for Christ, but more remains to be done.

3. Industrial evangelism The population of Seoul grew from 1.75 million in 1959 to 6.1 million in 1973. Quadrupled! Not all of these are working in factories, but it was the possibility of factory jobs which brought a great many of these people to the city. Other cities have grown proportionately. Some of the ~~xxxxxx~~ factories are large, some are quite small. Some are well-run, many are very poorly run. Some owners have a real Christian concern for their employees, many are concerned mainly for their own profits. In this situation, the only group with a message to meet the needs of the day is the Christian Church. Jesus Christ regarded every man whom he met as a person, a potential child of God, one who, through salvation in Christ, could become a channel through whom the Holy Spirit could work to transform the society around us. If industrial Korea is to avoid the evils of industrial society in other lands, it is the Christian Church which must learn to speak and to act for Jesus. More is being done than is often realized, but it is a new area of Christian service and progress goes slowly.

4. Rural evangelism. This is a traditional area of Christian witness. With the "Sae Ma-ul" (New Village) Movement sponsored by the government to improve rural life, the Church can work with this to make it more than mere physical and material improvement. The local church should lead in everything of value along this line, making it clear that they are doing it for Jesus' sake. It was Jesus of whom it was said that "he went around doing good."

The relation of the small rural church to the big city churches as a source of supply for new members is not often realized. A substantial proportion of those in any city church originally came from the country. Further, it is usually the brightest, most promising of the young people in a rural church who move off to the city. It is important that the rural church remember its responsibility for these who are moving to the city. Until they have established themselves in some city church, as many of them do, they are still the pastoral responsibility of the rural home church.

As soon as it is know that young Mr. Kim is moving to the city, the pastor should get his address and keep in touch with him as he moves. People from the village church go to the city to shop or to visit every few days or weeks. They should make it a point to visit their recent neighbor while in town. If Mr. Kim gets a job in a factory, the name of the factory should be sent to the industrial evangelism worker. The latter will then get in touch with a Christian worker in the same factory, for there are Christians in nearly every factory, urging him to look up the young man, talk with him and take him to church with him. The name should be given to the pastor of the church, who is then urged to call on the young man and tie him into the life of the congregation.

Then the industrial evangelism worker should talk with Mr. Kim. While he was in the rural church, he probably tithed. Now he has a job, he may be urged to continue his tithing, giving half to his new city church and sending half to his rural home church, thereby helping the little village church.

5. Hospital evangelism This will immediately bring to the reader's mind a

picture of Christian hospitals like Severance or the Chonju, Kwangju, Taegu or Pusan hospitals. All of these have men and women evangelists on their staffs, to talk with the patients individually, call in the homes, have services with the hospital staff and so on. These we tend to take for granted.

There are, however, many other hospitals, ranging from the large Seoul National University hospital and the Red Cross Hospital in Seoul down to many very small hospitals. These have no direct connection with the Christian Church, but there are Christians among their staff doctors and nurses and the management, even though not actually Christian, tend to welcome this sort of work. They cannot offer a salary, but if a local church handles the financial angle, they will be glad to allow visiting work to be done with their patients and staff.

6. Evangelism of the Police This is on a volunteer basis, but there are some 450 chaplains who are working full or part-time with the staff (and families of staff) of police stations. They usually hold two or three short services weekly. They are often asked to speak at the staff meetings at the police stations. The local police are the most visible representatives of the government and it is important that they should know what the Church stands are and should be given a chance to accept the Christian Gospel for themselves and for their families.

7. Prison evangelism Out of the thirteen major prisons and reformatories, there are prison chaplains in nine of these institutions. More would be accepted if available. Some of the prisoners are in for long terms, but most of them are in for only a year or so. This means a constant turn-over. It is important that these men (and women) be led to Christ, else they are likely to run afoul of the law soon after getting out and will be back in prison again. There is also help to be given, for Jesus' sake, to help them in their adjustment back into society, finding them jobs and getting them accepted, and helping them to lead a new life, with the Lord's help.

8. Urban evangelism This is not the same as Industrial evangelism. This is

evangelism of the owners of store and businesses and of the clerks who work in these offices and stores. The work is "chik-jang chundo" and stresses witness within the local business community. This can often best be done by those who are themselves in similar businesses.

9. "Scavengers" This label is not a very good one, but serves to designate the young men who go about the city with huge baskets hanging from their shoulders, collecting waste paper from the streets and alleys. This they take to one of about a dozen collecting centers, where it is sorted and sold for re-cycling. With this, they support themselves. There are about 1800 of them. Evangelistic work is being done with about 1100 of them. The city police have a dozen places where these young men may sleep. Since their work is that of scavengers, they tend to think of themselves as such and society around them considers them likewise. Several years ago, a Christian committee was formed to work with them. Many of them are illiterate, most of them have had only a minimum of education (though there a few who have had some college work). Night classes are held for them and medical treatment is arranged for those who need it. Much has been accomplished in improving the attitude and behaviour of the fellows and, by the same token, their acceptance by society. At least one young man from this background plans to go to seminary to prepare himself to work with this group.

10. Drivers of taxis, trucks and buses. See the Oct '72 Korea Calling article on the Christian Taxi-drivers' Fellowship. This particular group meets monthly at the Saimoonan Presbyterian Church. There are similar groups in several other cities. Work is also being done with bus and truck drivers, making contacts through the places where they stop for lunch. Many of the drivers have radios in their cabs or trucks and can be encouraged to listen to Christian broadcasts from HLKX or HLKY.

11. Work with Bus Girls. Making use of the places where they eat and rest.

12. Work with Prostitutes See July '63, July '65, Nov.'66, Mar '67 and Mar-April '71 issues of Korea Calling. This work takes two forms: prevention

and rehabilitation. The work of the House of Grace anf that at the Main Seoul railway station should be better known. Similar work is carried on in other places. Prevention is mainly in meeting trains coming into the city and offering to help young girls who have come to find work and are vague about where to go. Many of these are beguiled into a life they never bargained for and are afterwards helped by Christian counselors. The rehabilitation work beings to bear on a tragic situation the only power which can set a young woman free from this life--the power of Christ. Many have been helped to a new, clean life.

13. Workingmen's Boarding Houses There are 13 of these in Seoul and some in other cities. These are places where a laboring man can get a place to sleep for 50 won a night. Christian work is being carried on in these places.

14. Tea-room evangelism This is not the same thing as a "coffee house ministry", which is another effective form of witness. In this particular case, a city church arranges with a tea-room for the loan of the place on Sunday morning at 11 A.M. Church members are urged to invite their friends to come there with them for a cup of tea. The owner is delighted to be able to sell some 50 or 60 cups of tea at a time of day when he would ordinarily not have much business. The Christians and their friends come together here and order their tea and the conversation turns to spiritual things. After a bit, they tell their friends that they are going to have a little song service and invite them to join them . There is a ten-minute sermon included in the program. Later, literature is distributed before drifting away or going on to their regular church services.

15-16. Barber and Beauty-shop Workers This is called "ch'im-t'u ohundo" (~~insertion~~ permeation evangelism). The point is that a worker is trained in barbering and "inserted" into a barber-shop, where he talks with the customers about the Gospel--where do you live, is there any church near you, do your children go to it,etc. Young women are also trained as beauty-shop workers and "inserted" into a beauty shop, where they talk with their clients about Christ. In a friendless city, this personal interest makes an impression and word

begins to get around that in such-and-such a barber shop or beauty shop, they are really interested in you as a person, and the number of customers begins to pick up--which makes the boss happy.

17. Now shifting to method in evangelism. There is home visitation. Christians are urged to call in each home in their neighborhood and to invite people to special meetings.

18. Insert a worker in a factory. Get him a job there and then start him witnessing to those who work alongside of him in the factory. They do not start by preaching but by showing themselves friendly. Later, they can tell them about the things that makes life happy for them and then invite them to go to church with them.

19. Counseling Counseling centers have been started in different places. There are many who need such help and the love of Christ is the best solution for their problems.

20. Calling Churches have been used to a semi-annual "bai-sim-bang" (great calling) when they make a concentrated visitation of every home related to the congregation. In addition to this, calling should be done when any problem arises by the church officers, not only by the pastor. By this means, people will come to see that the church cares about them and will be attracted to the Gospel.

21. Personal evangelism Talking with people one-by-one about the Gospel and their own need of salvation.

22. Public meetings For big meetings like the Graham meetings, one member can take specific responsibility for two or three new people, to call and talk with them.

23. Special meetings aimed at the intelligensia. These often begin with lectures on general subjects and move on to the Gospel.

24. Pulpit evangelism It should not be forgotten that every sermon should have something in it to challenge a new person who may be present to accept Christ.

25. "No-bang chundo"--literally wandering the roads. Talking with people one meets, perhaps distributing tracts.

26. Evangelism in Parks and other places where people are loafing and hav e time to give to anything that can catch their interest. It is not only the ancient Athenians who are interested in hearing about "some new thing."

27. Group evangelism, especially in colleges, Bible study groups, English Bible classes. Small-group evangelism would come in here, where people are invited to attend groups meeting in homes.

28. Literature evangelism Use of loan libraries of Christian books; use of Christian books, magazines, tracts, etc .

29. Billboard evangelism. Along the highways, billboards are appearing, advertising gas companies, plywood, banks, etc. There is no reason why this could not be made a medium for evangelism, doing it with a verse of Scripture attractively presented. It should be brief and repeated for cumulative effect.

30. Radio evangelism both through the Christian radio stations, HLKX and the Christian radio network of HLKY, but also on commercial stations.

31. Mass-communications Use of a speaker on a trunk, or a mobile unit going around from one market-place to another.

32. Audio-visual Use of Christian films, slides, flannel-board messages, and the use of Christian drama.

33. Modern style evangelism and follow-up

1. Who to pray for? Seek specific guidance in prayer as to who to witness to. Not someone far off; begin with the family, neighbors, your place of work, friends. Think in terms of leading one person to Christ this year.
2. By service and by love make friends with that person for Christ. If he is poor, help him with food or clothing. Avoid any appearance of using the person in any selfish way.
3. Don't start out with any mention of going to church, until he mentions it. When he wants to go to church, take him with you.
4. For six months, take the responsibility for guidance. Call on him and take him to church with you. This will give you a chance to talk with

him about the Gospel along the way.

Explain to him how to worship--this is all new to him--and what the Gospel is.

After church, take him home with you, explaining the sermon on the way, for a new person often does not understand what has been said.

In the course of six months, there will be 25 Sundays of continued training. At the end of this time, he should be ready to have the pastor examine him and accept him as a catechumen.

35. When his faith is firm, turn him over to the church Session.

34. Preach not by talk but by practical Christian living, the quality of your Christian life, showing Christian love in sacrifice and service.

35. Layment Laymen's movement Train all members to witness to others, not only the official church worker. God's call is to every Christian, not to the paid workers only. The pastor should train them to witness and lead them in doing it. A 200-member church should be a church of 200 witnesses. If each of the present two or three million Christians did this, each one win one, the results would be tremendous. Japan is pressing this.

36. One-to-one witness

37. Work for one (Hana-ui undong) Jesus says that there is joy over one sinner, over one sheep that was found, one coin, one son. Work for one, not for huge numbers.

38. Like fishing The fisherman goes where the most fish are; where the most valuable fish are--in our case, the soldiers and the students.

39. T'ong-pal sik (a weir used for fishing) How to get people to come to the Gospel. A fisherman stretched a weir across the stream to keep the fish from getting away. Personal interest will accomplish this.

40. "Tai-ku-ri sik" At sea, long nets are stretched between two boats and dragged along to pull in the fish from far away. In our case, this would be by the use of special services and calling from house to house.

41. "Kauk-kwan sik" At night, the fishermen sometimes put a light under the boat to attract the fish. They also carry torches on the boat for the same purpose. In evangelism, this can be the use of a famous name to attract people to come. In Japan, the use of Dr. Han Kyung-Chik's name to attract people to a meeting.

42. Im T'ong-sik In the country, a double net is used to lead the fish in until they cannot get out. Our problem is to lead people on to a definite decision so that they don't drop out later.

Problems: how to get them to come in

how to make them stay, once they are in

how to give them a really interesting church life, not boring.

Find out what skills the new person has and put them to use.

If an electrician, ask him to take charge of the church electric system. Then announce that he is serving the church in this way and also mention that those who need such help may get him to help them, also.

43. Special service for barbers One pastor holds a special Thursday service for the barbers in the church area. He talks first with the heads of the local barber's association and gets their friendship. Then on the barbers' day off, there is a special service for them to which many of the barbers come.

1973

AN ACTION REPORT
FOR
THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON SALVATION
AT BANGKOK (Dec. 29-Jan. 8, 1973)

by
Chul-Ha Han
Dean of the Graduate School, Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Seoul, Korea

In the instruction sheet of CWME/72/10 for "Action Reports at Bangkok", an action report is defined as follow:

> ACTION-REPORTS ARE ATTEMPTS BY CHRISTIANS INVOLVED IN A SITUATION, TO EXPLAIN WHY THEY HAVE ACTED IN PARTICULAR WAYS, WHAT THEY HAVE DONE AND WHAT THEY HAVE LEARNT IN THE PROCESS.

Again, in the Conference Brochure the relevant sentence to this report reads as follow:

> ONE ACTION-REPORT MAY PRESENT THE PROFILE OF AN ASIAN CHURCH WHERE NUMERICAL GROWTH IS CLEARLY OBSERVABLE. (p. 31)

In order to meet these requirements I have decided to reflect on how and why I have participated in founding of three congregations. I have chosen these cases because they examplify pretty well the characteristics of the Korean Church and seem to show us a future direction of our mission.

1). WHY DID I ACT IN THAT PARTICULAR WAY? Why did I start those churches? The Chun Ha San Church was started during my refugee life in Pusan during the Korean War. The Yung Am Church was founded right after my return to Seoul from refugee life. It is now a community of 600. The Sang Do Je-Il Church began after my return from five years' study in the United States. It is now also a community of 600. This third one came simply from my habit of starting a new church, when I have no church to preach on Sundays. In starting the first one, I had two reasons.

First, there was no church where I was living as a refugee for one and half years. I was overwhelmed with fear that should the people in the valley die without hearing the good news I would be held responsible for it. Certainly the blame should be one me a Christian who failed to preach to people who have never heard.

Secondly, I dreamed a dream, of people there leading a peaceful life around a church. This may reflect my longing for peace during war time. To my thinking, however, the focus of peoples' lives should be around the church and their Sunday worship.

Thirdly, to me as to Paul at Corinth (Acts 18:10), came Gods word, "I have much people in this city" (Acts 18:10). Whenever I started a church I had these visions.

2). WHAT DID I DO? I first persuaded a few friends that we should start a church. We all brought our families and started Sunday worship service in one of our houses, then in a rented room, then in a temporary building, and so on. At the same time we started a children's Sunday School.

3). WHAT I HAVE LEARNT IN THE PROCESS. Much grace was experienced by all the congregation. If they were well-to-do, they enjoyed the fellowship and friendships of church life. If they were poor and in trouble, they were comforted and encouraged and helped by their fellow believers. The congregations also looked beyond themselves to develope benevolent activities for the needy people outside the church.

4). IDEOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS.

First, Religious Presuppositions: Korean Christians believe that they are chosen by the grace of God to be saved from the world and cleansed by the Blood for pure lives, to glorify God and to serve in the world. Therefore they live in eschatological hope and dedicate their lives to God's works.

Second, National Political Presuppositions:

i). from the introduction of Protestant Christianity into Korea until the end of the World War II, Christians constituted the major force for national modernization and liberation. At pulpits the well-being of the Western people was taken as illustration of the benefits of Christianity.

ii). After the division of the country and the communists' occupation of the North, the Church was stanchly anti-communist throughout the Syung-Man Rhee regime, because the major portion of Christians consisted of North Korean refugees.

iii). Since Park Chung-Hee's military coup, the Church has stood for democracy cause. In this nation Christian people will be the liberating force from all kinds of dictatorship and bureaucracy.

iv). Since the time of the Student Revolution in 1960, the people have experienced rapid social change, and sociological consciousness has gradually developed also in Christian thinking. The Christian Academy has taken an important role in introducing sociological problems into the thinking of Christian as well as of non-Christian intellectuals.

v). As the South-North Korean dialogues progress, stimulated by Nixon's visit to Peking, the problems of social justice become of central importance, and the churches' role in society has been much stressed.

5). CONCLUSIONS. From the above description of the manner of existence of the Korean Church, the following conclusions may be derived.

First, the Church is established upon individuals. Therefore the basic power of life in the Church is motivated by individual piety. Therefore numerical growth is a basic measure of the spiritual power of the Church

However, second, the Church has never been politically neutral. Since Christianity came to Korea, the Church stood fore front of the national history. She has been always the indicative of the direction of the national history. This historical significance of the existence of the Church is one of the most important determinant factors for church growth. The church growth statistics prove this fact. When Christianity was considered to be able to meet the national needs, the Church grew greatly. Therefore the Church must constantly reflect upon the historical meaning of her existence. Rather, Christian must reinteret the meaning of her existence in the light of history and restructure her existence towards that role.

Community Membership of the Presbyterian church of Korea
(After the division of the two major bodies)

	1957	1967	1972
	550,853 divided in 1959	Tong Hap 545,123 Hap Tong 523,901	Tong Hap Tong Hap 876,216 Hap Tong 590,870
Total	550,853	1,069,024	1,467,086

(Table 1)

Sunday Worship Service attendance and number of Baptism

Church \ Year		1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Yung Am church	attendance	7			120	135	123	130
	adult		3	7	14	13	13	8
	children		3	2	2	2	1	

Church \ Year		61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72
Yung Am Church	attendance	130	140	225	250	269		245	340	336	340	340	340
	adudt	23	10	15	15	11	18	8	21	23	12	26	27
	children	6	1	6	6	6	4	5	7	3		7	4
Sang Do Church (Started 1960)	attendance	60	67				191	221	257	285	220	227	230
	adult	3	5	8	17	16	14	19	18	21	8	13	25
	children				3	2	4	7	4	5	12	4	3
Dong An	attendance					117	210	270	320	400	400	400	550

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

COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICANT MEMBERSHIP OF THE PRESBYTERIAN OF KOREA (includes the Korean Presbyery of Manchuria)

June 1973 (No. 22)

NEWSLETTER

(SEOUL. KOREA)

KOREA FRIEND

Newsletter "*KOREA FRIEND*" is published monthly and distributed to 127 countries by the Korea Social Communication Research Institute, a non-profit, non-political, civic organization, as pert of its international social communication service.

Basic Data about Korea

1. **Population**
   Total: 45, 465, 654
   The Republic of Korea: 31, 465, 654
2. **Area**
   Total : 220, 848km² (The area is about the same as Italy's)
   The Republic of Korea: 98, 477km²
3. **Language**
   Korean (The 24-letter Korean phonetic alphabet called Hangul)
4. **Economy**
   The Korean industry is in the process of transformation into the heavy chemical industry. The agriculture, forestry and fishery industry employs 50.7% of work force; mining and manufacturing, 14.2%; social overhead capital and other services, 35.1%.
5. **Cities**
   Seoul (capital), 5, 850, 925
   Pusan, 1, 943, 958

Miss Korea 1973, Kim Yang-ju is seated along with runnerups who were crowned in a pageant contest. They are (from left) Miss Kim [illegible]kyong, Miss Kim Mae-ja, Miss Kim, Miss Park Shin-hwa, Miss Ahn Sun-yong and Miss Y[illegible]e-sook.

Pohang Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., to be dedicated in July 1973, will be capable of producing annually 1,030,000 tons. Its production capacity will be increased to 2,600,000 tons in 1976, when the current expansion project is completed. The iron-steel mill will have 10 plants by 1981. The mill has a paid-in capital of 115,800 million won.

President: Park Tae-joon

News Highlights of Korea

Annual Presidential Breakfast Prayer

Some 500 celebrities gathered at the plush Chosun Hotel on the morning of May 1 and had the sixth annual presidential breakfast prayer. President Park Chung Hee was among the attendants. Rev. Kang Shin-myong of the Saemunhan Presbyterian Church prayed that the gathering he a moment of receiving God's blessing for leaders of Korea.

The Reverend offered a prayer for the Chief Executive and other state leaders that they will be endowed with "wisdom, ahility and courage in leading the people, protecting the national sovereignty and fostering international friendship." Several others joined the Reverend in prayer for the President.

President Park (second from right) attends the annual presidential prayer breakfast.

Costa Rican President Jose Figueres and 17 other foreign leaders sent the special messages to the breakfast prayer. The annual event was officiated at by Rep. Yun In-shik of the ruling Democratic Republican Party. A choir of the Soodo Women's Teachers College sang at the presidential prayer.

Billy Graham Conducts Crusade in Korea


Billy Graham addresses a huge crowd at Seoul's Yoido Plaza.

The American evangelist, Billy Graham conducted a "Crusade" in Seoul from May 30 to June 3. Appearing before what he called the largest crowd ever assembled by a preacher anywhere in the world, Graham told half a million persons to "give your lives to Christ." The Billy Graham Crusade Committee, headed by Dr. Han Kyong-jik (former pastor of the Yongnak Presbyterian Church), has made preparations for Graham's five-day stint in Seoul. The Crusade Committee sponsored similar convention in Pusan and other major cities in Korea.

In Seoul, Graham drew some 1,100,000 persons on the last day service. It was by far the largest audience Graham has ever preached to, more than double the 200,000 he drew in Rio de Janeiro several years ago. Flanked by a 6,000-voice choir and aided by the inspiring translation of Rev. Billy Kim, Graham's message was essentially the same as he's given throughout his 26-year career as an evangelist.

Red Cross Talks in Seoul Hit Snag

South and north Korean Red Cross delegates met again in Seoul last month in an effort to pave the way for the possible reunion of dispersed families. Their talks were centered around Agenda Item No. 1 which is highlighted with tracing whereabouts of the dispersed families.

Chief KNRC delegate Lee Bum-sok told a press conference that there are no barriers in the Republic standing in the way of successful implementation of the campaign and expressed his hope that the north side will stop clamoring for political slogans in carrying out humanitarian mission. The two sides agreed to hold the next meeting in Pyongyang, north Korea on July 11. The 59-member northern delegation returned to Pyongyang on May 11.


Lee Bum-suk (right) and Kim Tae-hee (center).

National Progress Since 1961 Revolution

From the economic standpoint, the 1961 Revolution was a starting point for development of the national economy. While pushing the two five-year plans, the national economy achieved an annual growth rate of 9.9 per cent and the gross national product jumped 250 per cent in the 1960s.

In a nutshell, the Korean economy made great strides in the basic industry, expansion of social overhead, drastic increase in export and breaking ground for agricultural development. On the backdrop of this achievement, Korea aims at achieving per capita income of $1,000, increasing the annual export to $10 billion and building heavy chemical industries by early 1980s.

The national economy expanded at an annual rate of 9.9 per cent throughout the last decade, tripling per capita industrial production and boosting commodity exports fortyfold since 1962. The economic growth rate is twice the annual average of 4.8 per cent achieved by the developing countries throughout the same period in which Korea's economic performance also doubled the growth goal of five per cent for the developing countries set by the United Nations for the "Development Decade."

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

	Unit	1961	1972
Per Capita GNP	$	95	302
Industrial Structure	%	100.0	100.0
Agriculture, Forestry	%	40.2	28.7
Manufacturing & Mining	%	15.2	24.3
Social Overhead & Others	%	44.6	47.0
Export	$1 million	40.9	1,644.8
Schools	Number	6,458	9,146
Expressway	*km*	—	655
Iron & Steel Products	1,000 tons	86.9	1,807.1
Electricity	1,000*kw*	367	3,871
Coal	1,000 tons	5,884	12,403
Oil	1,000 *kl*	770	13,655

Pilgrimage to Nat'l Treasure (No.14)

Built in the early Yi Dynasty period, the Yongsan Hall is part of the structures in Unhaesa Temple in Yongchon-kun, Kyongsang Namdo. The hall is constructed on the stone foundation and its architectural technique leads one to presume that the structure was built much earlier.


Yongsan-jon

Distinguished Koreans Abroad

Dr. Son Song-won, a professor at Slippery Rock State College, has been appointed as an adviser to the President's Economic Council of the United States. Dr. Son, 28, studied at the Florida State University and the Graduate School of Wayne University.

☆ ☆ ☆

Kim Yong-gi, 46, won the gold award at the French painting exhibition, "Le Salon," held in Paris recently. The exhibition was held as part of commemorative programs for the 300th anniversary of "Le Salon." Kim, a staff at the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation branch office in Paris, has been drawing painting during his off-duty hours.


Kim Yong-gi

☆ ☆ ☆

Tenor Paeng Ja-yu has signed a contract with the Canadian National Opera. Paeng is the first Asian to become the regular member of the Canadian Opera. He was one of the three new faces selected from among 82 aspirants.

Korea wins Top in Asian Goodwill Games

From May 11 to May 13, athletes from 10 Asian countries competed in the first goodwill games in Seoul Stadium. Host Korea captured top honors followed by the Japanese and the Republic of China teams.

—Whole Truth, Nothing but the Truth—

Yi Bong-su, 45, is the man who is proud of being the 40th generation of his family who settled in Jinkwan-ri, Kyonggi-do, 1,000 years ago. During this period, his ancestors never left the village and lived in the farmland which now attracts the eyes of real estate speculators. Yi claims he is in possession of various rare documents including family history.

Yi estimates his house was built 200 years ago and most of family utensils are of cultural significance. As an Oriental gesture of paying homage to ancestors, Yi feels it is imperative for him to live with the earth on which his ancestors lived. Every ounce of soil is printed with the ancestors' feet, Yi believes.

So he is determined to preserve the 200-year-old house and the land.

Grand Children's Park Opens on May 5


The opening of the Grand Children's Park.

Millions of children were entertained on the 51st Children's Day, May 5. In Seoul, the multimillion won Grand Children's Park was opened in a colorful ceremony which was attended by 10,000 children including foreign pupils and the first family. President Park Chung Hee said that the children are hope and master of tomorrow and encouraged them to become healthy and good citizens. The children's park was constructed at a cost of 1,100 million won.

Elsewhere in the country, schools and social organizations sponsored similar commemorative ceremonies for children.

Visitors From Abroad


President Park receives Martinez.

Roberto Martinez, Honduras ambassador to the United Nations, visited President Park Chung Hee on April 24.

New Book in English

FOLK TALES FROM KOREA by Zong In-sob. Published by Hollym Corporation, Seoul. $5.50.

New Chairman

Kim Kyung-rae, managing editor of the Kyunghyang Daily News and a founder of the Korea Social Communication Research Institute, was elected as Chairman of this Institute on May 25.

Today's Korea

When my father came to Seoul in 1890, it was a sleepy town of 150,000 people. Today, with six million, it is one of the ten largest cities in the world, with all the problems of a metropolis, but friendly and beautiful in its circle of mountains.

I was born, however, in Pyongyang in what is now north Korea. That city has changed too. Then it was called the city of churches. Today it is communist, without a single church left.

I do not believe this country will remain divided. There is only one Korea. Old enmities must die and new understandings emerge with freedom and justice and friendship for all. This is the change Korea needs most today. It cannot be unilateral; it must be global. Which is why Korea needs friends like you around the world.

Samuel Hugh Moffett

Samuel Hugh Moffett
Associate President
Presbyterian Theological Seminary

Int'l Seminar on Tropical Medicine

Tropical medicine experts from 18 countries took up public health problems at a seminar sponsored by the Yonsei University and the Southeast Asian Tropical Medicine-Public Health Commission. The seven-day seminar was attended by 57 experts.

Seminar Takes Up Nixon Doctrine

Prof. Harold Hinton of Georgia University and Prof. Eugene V. Rostow of Yale University took part in an international seminar which was sponsored by the Korea University Asiatic Research Center in Seoul. Complementary to each other, each speaker's presentation stressed different aspects of the relations between the Soviet Union, China and the United States. Rostow asserted that he would not advocate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. On the current talks between south and north Korea, both scholars said that they were hopeful of reduced hostility at least in terms of "human interest," but that it was still unclear what relation might develop as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Shipbuilding Industry Faces Hike in Export

With the government's ambitious plan to expand the maritime transport capacity, the shipbuilding industry is getting in brisk. By 1980, the government plans to build nine shipyards which will construct ships on foreign orders. As of April 30, the nation's shipbuilding firms received orders for 33 ships valued at $256,690,000. By the end of May 31, the amount is expected to rise to the $500 million level.

Refined Sugar Exports Surpass Annual Target

By the end of April, the country's sugar industry exported $2 million worth of refined sugar, surpassing the 1973 target. Indonesia bought 10,450 tons ($2,304,400) and Sudan imported 4,000 tons ($900,000). By the end of 1973, the export amount is expected to reach $5 million.

The export of medical products hit 43 per cent of the annual target of $10 million by the end of April.

KOREA FRIEND

KOREA SOCIAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE

C.P.O. BOX 5831
Seoul, 100
Korea
Phone: 22-2853 · 28-9152

AIR MAIL

Cheju-do Features Modern Tourist Facilities

Currently under a 10-year development plan, Cheju-do features modern tourist facilities. It is only about one hour from Seoul by airplane. The island is the largest of hundreds of islands that dot the narrow stretch of sea between Korea and Japan. The most fantastic geographical feature is Mt. Halla. At 1952 meters, it is the home of some 1,700 kinds of plants, over 300 species of birds and 541 species of insects. The mountain is a favorite hiking spot with its natural zoological and botanical garden. Referred to as the island of "Samda" or three famous things ——wind, stones and women, the island attracted 280,000 tourists in 1972.

How do you say it in Korean?

What is your name?	My name is Kim Kap-tol.
Tangshin-ui irum-un muoshimnikka?	Kim Kap-tol imnida.
당신의 이름은 무엇입니까?	김 갑돌 입니다.

This spot of scenic interest in Cheju City is called the "rock of dragon." Legend says that a dragon became the seaside rock when it failed to oscend to the Heaven.

93d Congress
1st Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES: NOVEMBER 1972

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 18, 1973

NOTE.—Sections of this committee print, originally classified secret, have been deleted at the suggestion of tbe Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency. Deleted material ia indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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TAP-ASIA
33A, Chancery Lane
SINGAPORE 11.

THEOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME - ASIA

REPORT ON THE ASIAN SCHOOLS FOR ADVANCED STUDIES (ACAS) OF LWF

Date : February 20--21, 1973

Place : YMCA Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand

Attendence : Dr Hsiao Ching-fen, Tainan Theological College, Tainan
Dean C H Clark, St Andrew's Theological Seminary, Manila
Dr John Hamlin, Thailand Theological Seminary, Chiang Mai
Dr Bong Rin Ro, Discipleship Training Centre, Singapore
Dr Martin Wang, Trinity Theological College, Singapore
U Kyaw Than, East Asia Christian Conference, Bangkok
Dr Ivy Chou. South East Asia Secretary, T.E.F
Bishop Fisher, Malaysia
Dr Kosuke Koyama, Association of Theological Schools in S E Asia(Chairman
Dr Martin Kretzmann, President of LWF

Absent : Dr Emerito Nacpil, Union Theological Seminary, Manila
President, Lutheran Church of the Philippines
Dr L Oracion, Silliman Divinity School, Dumaguete City

Background of the Consultation : Dr Ji Won Yong, Asia Secretary of LWF, has been studying for three years the possibility of establishing ACAS in Asia and made specific suggestions to the Commission on Theological Education in LWF. Dr Martin Kretzmann, President of LWF, was assigned by the Commission of Studies on Theological Education to further investigate the matter and to arrange for four separate meetings in four different parts of Asia; Tokyo, Hong Kong, Djakarta and Bangkok. The Bangkok meeting was the last of the four consultations and Dr Kretzmann requested Dr Koyama, who is the dean of the S E Asia Graduate School of Theology(SEAGST), to arrange the consultation. I was invited to attend the meeting to represent the work of TAP-Asia in S E Asia.

Dr Martin Kretzmann's Introductory Remarks

Dr Kretzmann started his talk by introducing Dr Ji's evaluation of theological education in Asia. There are three areas in theological education, according to Dr Ji, which need special attention.

1 Creative Theological Thinking : The Asian Church in general including the Lutheran church has repeated the past traditional teaching of the Scriptures without proper "contextualisation" to our modern societies. Therefore there need be new creative thought in theological education.

2 Theological Faculties : Western oriented theological education with Western missionaries as well as Western material is often not relevant to Asia. The graduate programme with a Lutheran emphasis must therefore be introduced in Asia to produce qualified Asian theologians.

3 Research Programme : In order to keep the church alive the research programme is necessary to study the conditions of the existing church and introduce some new ways of reviving the church through the research programme.

REPORTS OF THE THREE PREVIOUS CONSULTATIONS

A Tokyo

Place : Japan Lutheran Theological College

Dr Yoshiro Ishida organised this meeting for Dr Kretzmann by inviting the Japanese colleagues as well as Korean representatives. Rev Ji Won-Sam (Director of Lutheran Church in Korea) and Dr Kin Yong-Ok of Methodist Theological Seminary in Seoul attended. There was a local Korean consultation with 15 key theological leaders representing various programmes. It was convened prior to the Tokyo consultation and a 5-page report and recommendations were submitted to Dr Kretzmann.

B Hong Kong

Dr Andrew Hsieh from Lutheran Theological Seminary in Hong Kong organised a meeting by inviting theological leaders such as Dr Paul W Newman of Chung Chi Theological College, Dr Philip Chang and Dr Philip Teng. There was opposition from the Conservative Evangelical Group under the leadership of Dr Philip Teng on the issue of theological differences. The Association for the Promotion of Chinese Theological Education in Hong Hong (APCTE) is planning to establish the Chinese School of Theology (CGST) and expressed that it would not cooperate with ACAS.

Referring to the theological orthodoxy among the Chinese churches in Asia, one of the participants at the meeting mentioned, "We must realise that there is still strong 'John Sung's Theology' among the Chinese churches, and it is difficult to break that tradition."

C Djakarta

Originally this meeting included India, but later on she was not included for vast theological differences. Dr Soritua A E Nababan, the organiser, invited theological leaders from Indonesia. There was a good representation from the Normansen University in North Sumatra. The Indonesian leaders stressed several important points :

1 There is no need for degree offering advanced theological centre in Indonesia because of the existence of SEAGST. They rather prefer to have ICAS (Indonesian Centre for Asia Studies) which is a research and study institute.

2 They want to work in close relation with organisations of theological Schools in S E Asia.

3 The Church in Indonesia by and large lives in a glass cage apart from society. The church must break away from the past tradition and be more involved in society.

4 They refuse to accept any superimposition coming from the outside. All the programmes must be based upon national leadership.

Conclusion : From these consultations Dr Kretzmann gave three points of summary.

1 These leaders are very much concerned that any new programme must be based on local situations. Dictation by superimposition will not be accepted as someone said, "We are not going to have a Geneva Programme."

2 Whatever developments that arise from these consultations must have local means of becoming part of the structure. Control outside the local leadership is not accepted.

3 The separate Lutheran programme is not possible and not practical. The research institutes to introduce theological change in Asia must be locally based. These institutions should work through the existing structures, that is, the Association of Theological Schools in S E Asia (ATSSEA) and the S E Asia Graduate School of Theology (SEAGST).

Bangkok Consultation

The Bangkok Consultation was carefully arranged by Dr Koyama by bringing in his own colleagues of SEAGST. Throughout the meeting it was very obvious that strong protest against the new theological programme outside his existing structure was voiced.

Emphasis on Ecumenical Spirit

Several of the Asian leaders present at the meeting expressed their concern for establishing ACAS independently outside SEAGST. [illegible].

Mr U Kyaw Than of EACC in Bangkok emphatically expressed the importance of ecumenical cooperation in theological education. He mentioned that there are four theological organisations in Asia under EACC : they are in N E Asia, S E Asia, India (Pakistan, Ceylon) and Australia & New Zealand respectively. Any new programme must be initiated by the local body. The Lutheran constituency is small in Asia. The proposed ACAS is by no means understood as the way of implementing the need. It should be considered as one of the possible ways of meeting the concern.

Then he referred to the six-point proposition for ACAS which Dr Ji outlined in his Progress Report on ACAS Feasibility Study (105 pages) :

a) We are not thinking to establish a new institution, but hope to utilize the existing facilities and programs, with minimum structure and organisation.

b) As to the meaning of "advanced" studies, we are envisaging various phases of the program. Degree program is only one of them.

c) It is not to add an exclusively Lutheran program, in faculty, students, the content of the program.

d) It is a search for a program that really works and thus realistic in the light of the situation and relations among the churches today.

e) ACAS proposal is a Lutheran sponsored program to help through financial and consultative aid the development of the leadership training programs of LWF constituent churches to higher level in various phases of the program. On the other hand, with same intensity it hopes to serve other churches in non denominational basis.

f) The "Centre" is not to mean in the sense of an establishment oriented-centre, but it should be understood as a program-oriented-centre. (Pg 86).

Mr U Kyaw Than said that even these six points can be met within the existing structure.

Dr Koyama reiterated Mr U Kyaw Than's points of ecumenical cooperation and local initiation. He said that SEAGST is a local body and has many locally qualified staff and thus a new Lutheran graduate school is not needed. At the present time there are approximately 700-800 students enrolled for the BD program in ATSSEA and 50 for Th M in SEAGST. The doctoral programme has already started this year with one area covering Critical Asian Principles which involves three areas of study :
1 Cultural History of S E Asia 2 Construction and integration theology
3 Doctoral dissertation.

He stated that the ACAS programme which Dr Ji outlined is what the SEAGST already has. Therefore LWF must avoid duplication.

Dr Martin Wang of Trinity Theological College in Singapore supported Dr Koyama and Mr U Kyaw Than's proposal that ACAS should cooperate with SEAGST. He said that ACAS is a duplication and it polaries the whole of theological education.

Dr John Hamlin of Thailand Theological Seminary feels that if LWF starts another centre independently, it may bring a schismatic movement within the Lutheran churches in Asia.

Dr. Hsiao Ching-fen of Tainan Theological College also gave his consent that there are today many Bible schools and colleges in Taiwan which are merely surviving; therefore, the present theological programme is adequate.

TAP-Asia's CATS

After listening to various speakers, I was at last asked by Dr Koyama to give the development of CATS in Asia. First, I explained the background of TAP-Asia and its purpose for evangelical theological education. Then I reported that Union Biblical Seminary in Yeotmal, India, already started the Theological Research and Communication Institute (TRACI) with three students this year and the CATS in Seoul, Korea will open in the spring of 1974.

Dr Kretzmann's Replies

After Dr Kretzmann patiently listened to the reiterated oppositions of these theological leaders to the independent ACAS programme, he made several comments.

1) He reviewed Dr Ji's proposal on the need of research centres in Asia.

2) He became convinced that any programmes introduced by LWF must be locally based and locally controlled.

3) He conceded to the challenges of these ecumenical brethrens and promised that he would not recommend any new independent ACAS.

4) Nevertheless, he feels that there may be a need for Lutheran research programmes which will strengthen the Lutheran schools in Asia. IN this area LWF and SEAGST must find ways to implement ecumenical cooperation. Dr Kretzmann also explained that if LWF works only through SEAGST then there will be the problem of raising funds from Lutheran churches on the grassroot level because SEAGST is already getting its financial subsidy from the theological foundations such as Theological Education Fund (TEF) and Foundation for Theological Education in S E Asia (FTE).

Dr Kretzmann then presented a Lutheran research programme with a diagram which Dr Newman of Chung Chi College in Hong Kong introduced.

* Although the new programme must work through the existing structure he suggested that this relationship between the existing theological organisation in Asia and LWF be discussed at the 5th EAGST conference in Singapore, June 6-12, 1973.

through financial
training programs
s phases of the program.
ve other churches in

rc. (Pg 86).



CODE

APAS - LWF Program for Advanced Studies
RSC- Regional Study Centres
CUHK - China University of H K
SEAGST - S E Asia Graduate Schools of Theology
RCSTR - Regional Centre Specialising in Theological Revenue
LTS - Lutheran Theological Seminary in Tokyo
CTS - Concordia Theological Seminary in Korea

Since ATSSEA, according to Dr Newman, has not developed the research study programme in great detail, LWF can make a positive contribution in this field. The APAS of LWF in Hong Kong will become the major centre in Asia. The diagram shows an overlapping area in the centre (Z). This represents the ecumenical cooperation among the ecumenical graduate schools. In other words, Dr Newman still agrees to Dr Ji's idea of having the Lutheran research centre.

Please notice here that Dr Ji's original plan for ACAS with a degree programme has been dropped and the content of conversation was on the research centre rather than on ACAS.

Conclusion : After one long tedious day of discussion on the relationship between ACAS and SEAGST, both sides agreed that the SEAGST leaders would caucus themselves in order to make some specific suggestions for mutual cooperation with LWF. Consequently the SEAGST group came out with 7-point proposal.

1) LWF would subsidise financially the newly started doctoral programme.
2) SEAGST & LWF would cooperate to sponsor social-cultural study institutes to promote fellowship among the faculties.
3) LWF would subsidise travel grants for graduate students and faculty members.
4) LWF would grant money to add the second regional professorship to the existing one, Dr Peter Gowing, who is teaching at Trinity Theological College at the present time.
5) Both LWF & SEAGST would promote TEE.
6) Both LWF & SEAGST would sponsor workshops on pedagogical methodology for theological lectures.
7) Both would practise exchange professorship among Lutherans and non-Lutherans from the West to Asia and within Asia itself.

MY PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND EVALUATION

1) These ecumenical leaders of both SEAGST &LWF are determined to further develop their post graduate theological study programmes in Asia under their ecumenical umbrella.

2) Dr Ji Won Yong's original plan of ACAS which would establish independent Lutheran post-graduate centres apart from the existing SEAGST is severely criticised by the SEAGST leaders, particularly at the last two consultations in Djakarta and Bangkok.

3) Consequently the area of interest and cooperation between the two ecumenical groups is on the research programmes.

4) The Geneva financed and controlled study programmes are not accepted in Asia, and any programme must be locally based and managed.

5) The substance of the 7-point proposal is that SEAGST wants to receive subsidy from LWF to finance essentially its own post-graduate theological programmes in Asia.

6) After conversing with the Lutheran leaders I came to feel that LWF may start at least one Lutheran research centre. APAS in Hong Kong possibly will develop into the degree programme. For other proposed research centres there will be cooperation between these two groups.

7) The SEAGST leaders expressed their interest and concern in our TAP-Asia's CATS and the TAP-Asia's movement as a whole.

I went mainly as an observer from TAP-Asia to get information on the recent development of graduate theological programme in Asia. It was my first experience to meet the ecumenical theological leaders in a consultation.

Sincerely yours,

Bong Ro

For Bong Ro
S E Asia Coordinator

p.s. I also visited Chiangmai for three days for three main reasons :

1) to take pictures for TEE filmstrip, "TEE Could be the Answer", which will be released in March, 1973.

2) to visit two main theological schools in Thailand, Thailand Theological Seminary & Christian Service Training Centre.

3) to observe the cassette tape ministry of the Voice of Peace in Chiangmai

In Bangkok I also attended the Asia wide Christian Missionary Alliance Conference and met key Asian and missionary leaders.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The following report, originally classified Secret, was sent to all Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 17. At the same time, the Chairman of the Committee wrote the Secretary of State asking him to designate a responsible official to coordinate a review of the report on behalf of the Executive Branch together with the Committee staff in order to recommend what material warranted deletion in the interest of national security. Representatives of the State Department, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency began to review the report for that purpose on January 17 and concluded their review on January 26. Certain deletions were suggested and made. They are so indicated by the notation "deleted." The Committee then decided at its meeting in executive session on February 6 that the report should be made public.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

JANUARY 17, 1973.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: At the Committee's request, we spent the period November 2 to November 18 in Korea and the Philippines in order to report on the general situation in those countries as it relates to United States interests and programs. In the 2 week period before our departure, we were briefed extensively by the State Department; the Agency for International Development; the Central Intelligence Agency; and DIA, ISA and the JCS in the Defense Department. En route to the Far East, we spent 2 days at the Headquarters of U.S. Forces in the Pacific where we met with Admiral Noel Gayler and members of his staff.

During our visit to Korea, we met with Ambassador Habib and General Donald V. Bennett, Commander in Chief, United States forces in Korea, and American civilian and military officials; the Foreign and Defense Ministers; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Korean military leaders; senior officials of the Korean Presidential Staff, Central Intelligence Agency and Economic Planning Board; and private citizens, journalists and foreign diplomats. While in Korea we visited a number of U.S.-Korean military installations and commands.

In the Philippines, we met with President Ferdinand E. Marcos (at his request), Ambassador Byroade and senior American civilian and military officials; the Executive Secretary of the Philippine Government and the Secretaries of Defense and Finance; the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and senior military officers; members of the Philippine Congress and Philippine political figures; American and Philippine journalists; and foreign diplomats and private citizens. We also visited Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base.

Our report on this visit to Korea and the Philippines, in which we have followed our usual practice of avoiding direct attribution, is attached.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN.
RICHARD M. MOOSE.

KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES: NOVEMBER 1972

I. The Background to Martial Law in Korea and the Philippines

Martial law was declared in the Philippines on September 23 and in Korea on October 17. In both countries, the declaration of martial law was soon followed by other steps designed to abolish the direct election of the President, to perpetuate the President in office and to eliminate any significant restraints on the executive by the legislative branch.

Martial law came as a surprise to U.S. officials in both Manila and Seoul, although it had been obvious to observers for some time that President Park and President Marcos intended to stay in power even though both were serving their last terms under the constitutional provisions then in force and even though President Marcos had announced that he had no intention of not retiring when his term expired in 1973. In both capitals, there had been rumors of impending coups from within, and contingency plans for declaring martial law were known to exist. President Marcos had been talking about declaring martial law since 1971. Most foreign observers to whom we talked said, however, that they had thought that the two Presidents would stop short of assuming full power which, in both cases, turned out to involve not only declaring martial law but using it to effect fundamental constitutional changes which permanently concentrate virtually unrestrained authority in the head of government.

* * *

President Marcos signed Proclamation 1081, placing the Philippines under martial law, on September 21 and announced it on September 23. In his public statement at the time martial law was proclaimed, he said that the nation was "imperilled by the danger of a violent overthrow, insurrection and rebellion" justifying the imposition of martial law under Article VII of the Constitution. He went on to say that "there is no doubt in everybody's mind that a state of rebellion exists in the Philippines" and referred to the Supreme Court decision of December 11, 1971, in which such a finding had been made. He said that the danger had become graver since the Court's decision, the national and local governments had become paralyzed, the productive sectors of the economy had ground to a halt, the judiciary had become unable to administer justice, tension and anxiety in Manila had reached a point where the citizens were compelled to stay at home, and lawlessness and criminality had escalated beyond the capability of the local police and civilian authorities. The President then referred to battles between Philippine government forces and "subversives" in a number of locations and to the activities of the Communist Party and the Maoist New Peoples' Army

in the Province of Isabela where "they are now in control of 33 municipalities out of 37." He also referred to the "violent disorder" in Mindanao and Sulu as a result of the activities of Muslim dissidents.

Proclamation 1081 began by referring to the threat from "lawless elements who are moved by a common or similar ideological conviction, design, strategy and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power . . . and (who) are actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion . . . (to) supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government . . . and whose political, social, economic, legal and moral precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs." Subsequent paragraphs referred to the New Peoples' Army and other communist organizations. There was no mention in either the President's statement or in Proclamation 1081 of any threat from the right.

On September 19, two days before the Proclamation was signed, an executive session of the Philippine National Security Council had been briefed on internal security. Security conditions were reportedly described at that meeting as between "normal" and "Internal Defense Condition No. 1." (the worst or most unstable security condition is No. 3.)

One high Philippine government official told us that the real reason President Marcos had declared martial law was that he had uncovered a plot from the right to assassinate him and that the key figures in the plot were Vice President Lopez and Sergio Osmena, Jr. (President Marcos' opponent in the last Presidential race who, at the time this report was written, was reported to be in hiding in the United States). The official said that three Americans had been involved in the plot: one had been captured in the Philippines and had confessed and another had been questioned by the FBI in the United States. He said that despite strong feelings within the Army that the conspirators should be brought to trial, there had been no public mention of the plot because it extended into the highest circles of the Government and the army and would undermine public confidence in the military at a time when that confidence was essential. He said that he would provide us with a paper which would document what he had just told us.

The paper wove a web of four distinct but allegedly related plots with the common objective of seizing power: a communist conspiracy, a Muslim independence movement, a Christian Socialist Movement and a "rightist revolution and coup d'etat." The paragraphs in the paper relating to an alleged role by Americans said, in summary:

A. Shortly after the election of 1969, a group composed mostly of retired Philippine colonels and generals organized to form a revolutionary junta which would, first, discredit President Marcos so that his liquidation would be welcomed by the people and then kill him and overthrow the Government. The group was headed by Eleuterio Adevoso, an official of the opposition Liberal Party. The group recruited among, and infiltrated into, the Armed Forces and all government agencies, maintained liaison with the New People's Army and initiated and financed demonstrations and strikes by leftist student and labor groups.

B. Adevoso informed the junta during one of their conferences that he, Sergio Osmena, Jr. and "someone in the U.S. Embassy staff" had conferred regarding the take-over plans, and in a subsequent meeting Adevoso informed the junta that "Washington authorities had been briefed and that they showed great interest about the junta movement."

C. Part of the take-over plan was to designate Vice President Lopez as a caretaker during the transition period. This plan was approved by Osmena "and apparently by the Liberal Party and their alleged American supporters, particularly Larry Tractman and company."

D. On June 20, 1972, Larry Tractman and a second American, Robert Pineus, brought a third American—August McCormick Lehman, Jr.—to Manila. (Lehman is the American the Philippine official said had been captured and had confessed.) Tractman introduced Lehman to Osmena as a professional killer. On Osmena's instructions, Lehman manufactured several silencers and was flown to Cebu where he test fired a rifle with silencer on the Osmena farm in company with Osmena's son. Lehman also helped adapt a Volkswagen truck, making it soundproof and arranging that a sniper inside could fire a rifle through a hole in the back of the van which was covered with a WHO insignia. The van would be parked near the Pasig River so that the President could be shot while on the golf course.

E. Lehman also ordered an oxygen tank to be prepared to be used by Scuba divers to plant bombs to explode the Presidential boat landing as the President passed. And he set up a booby trap with a Bangalore mine to protect the room where the firearms to be used to kill the President were stored and subsequently discovered.

F. Lehman had "revealed" that the final execution of the assassination plot was to be coordinated with Vice President Lopez. The expenses were borne by Osmena, Tractman and Eduardo Figueras, former candidate for mayor of Manila.

G. On September 30, the "Legal Attache" of the American Embassy revealed (to Philippine security officers) that Lehman had been arrested in Kansas City on October 16, 1971, for carrying a concealed weapon; that Lehman was known to have been associated with criminals in New York, New Jersey, and Tennessee; and that on or about June 17, 1972, he had left New York to "make a hit" on an unknown person, possibly abroad.

H. According to FBI records, Robert Pincus stated that he and Lehman left the United States about June 19 for Japan, that he knew Lehman was a "hit man" for a union in Tennessee and had "hit" several people, that Lehman had agreed to pay him $5,000 per month plus expenses, that after two days in Japan they flew to the Philippines, that on July 24 he (Pineus) had received a threatening telephone call in his Manila hotel room warning him to leave and that he had left the next day.

I. The FBI information on Tractman was that he had been convicted of smuggling and conspiracy in 1950 and that he had been a controversial figure in Philippine politics before the elections of 1969 when he had been closely identified with Osmena.

We then talked with Embassy officials and were told that:

A. They had no knowledge of a plot such as that described to us but did have some information concerning the Americans allegedly involved.

B. Philippine authorities first acknowledged that they were holding Lehman on November 15, even though they had probably been holding him for some time. [Deleted.]

C. [Deleted.]

D. On September 23, the day martial law was proclaimed, U.S. military authorities at the Clark and Subic Bases had been asked to take special measures to insure that Lehman did not slip out of the country on a military transport because he had "possibly been involved as a hired killer in an assassination plot."

The story seems worth telling in such detail, first of all, because a high Philippine official considered it sufficiently important to spend an hour talking to us about it and, secondly, because it conveys some of the atmosphere of violence, paranoia and surrealistic intrigue which one senses in the Philippines. [Deleted.]

That there were plots to assassinate high officials, including the President himself, seems clear. Certainly, the atmosphere in the Philippines was conducive to crimes of violence of all sorts. There had been a series of bombings of public buildings, demonstrations in which students had been killed and an increase in kidnappings. The insurgent strength on the left was growing, but we met no outside observer who considered it a real or near threat to the Government. Curiously, though, the incident that was supposed at the time martial law was declared to be the last straw—the attempt to kill the Secretary of Defense—was regarded as somewhat dubious by most observers. It was practically never mentioned to us by Philippine officials in discussing the reasons for martial law, and the few times it was mentioned it seemed to occur as an after-thought and to be accompanied by what appeared to be a certain embarassment. [Deleted.] The fact of the matter is that the attempt against the Secretary of Defense occurred on the evening of September 22, the day before the declaration of martial law was announced but, as it turned out, the day after the declaration had been signed.

Was a rightist assassination plot really the reason martial law was declared? None of the foreign or Philippine observers to whom we talked alluded to the possibility of such a vast plot masterminded from the right. At the same time, both official and private observers believe that those Filipinos with large financial interests, particularly the enormously wealthy—the "oligarchs" as they are called, view the prospect of President Marcos' continued rule as a serious threat and that it would not be out of character for some among them to seek his assassination. The allegation of American involvement in an assassination plot, and the professed suspicion that the American Government might have been involved, could of course be used by Philippine officials to counteract the reports, which were circulating in Manila, that the United States had supported the declaration of martial law. It was also suggested to us that because the Government's initial rationale involving a leftist plot had been greeted with such skepticism, the Government might now be seeking to justify its actions on grounds less likely to be rejected by liberal critics abroad.

* * *

Three weeks after martial law was declared in the Philippines, President Park took a similar step in Korea. In his declaration of October 17 announcing the imposition of martial law, the President

began by referring to the "profound changes" that had occurred in the international situation and the need to guard "against the possibility that the interests of the third or smaller countries might be sacrificed for the relaxation of tension between big powers." He then discussed the importance of the North-South talks as a means of avoiding another war and achieving reunification. He said that in order to proceed effectively with these talks there must be "a readjustment of our political institutions" because "disorder and inefficiency are still rampant around us" and because "the political circles in our country are obsessed with factional strife and discord." What was needed, he continued, was "a series of revitalizing reforms" which could not be achieved by ordinary means but only by extraordinary measures including the suspension of certain articles of the constitution, the dissolution of the national assembly, the suspension of the activities of all political parties, and new amendments to the constitution affirmed by a national referendum.

Obviously no one except President Park himself is in position to say whether a desire for greater power or his perception of Korean interests, or some mixture of the two, best explains his actions. Most experienced observers to whom we talked proceeded from the assumption that President Park intended all along to stay in power as long as possible. (His current term would have expired in 1975, and he would not have been able to succeed himself under the constitutional provisions that applied at the time martial law was declared.) They also said that President Park's actions since late 1969 and early 1970 reflected the interaction of his desire to retain power and his belief that changing international conditions necessitated action by *him* to protect South Korea's interests.

In particular President Park was said to have felt increasingly, beginning with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, that Korea would not be able to rely on the United States in the future as it had in the past. Many believe that this feeling intensified as U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam, as the new U.S. policy toward China was revealed, and as President Park concluded that U.S. interest in Asia in particular, and in foreign affairs generally, was decreasing. His response to this new, uncertain and somewhat threatening environment was an effort to put Korea's domestic political situation in order—"to clean up democracy," as one foreign observer put it—so that he could do what he thought best. And on the international scene he began an effort to start a dialogue with North Korea in order, at a minimum, to reduce the likelihood of war.

Since August, 1971, the talks with the North which President Park sought have developed more rapidly than most observers thought possible, and we were told by everyone with whom we talked that they enjoyed broad popular support in South Korea except among the armed forces. As the contacts progressed from one stage to another, however, President Park tightened his internal control first through a declaration of emergency and then by declaring martial law. The question that arises then is why was it necessary to impose martial law if the talks were so popular in the South?

This question is difficult to answer because it goes to the heart of the internal dynamics of President Park's support. Although official Americans were reluctant to discuss it, a few well placed observers,

both American and Korean, told us that they had little doubt that martial law came about as a result of pressure on President Park from senior officers of the Korean Army. The latter, it is said, had become increasingly concerned at what they considered to be the permissive nature of Korean society and politics, the pace of the North-South talks and the role of Korean CIA Chief Lee Hu-Rak in conducting the talks, and increasingly fearful that in a permissive political environment the talks might lead to a reduction of South Korea's military forces or a lowering of South Korean defenses. It is impossible to know how serious the Army's concern over these issues was, or in what manner it was expressed, but some observers were convinced that martial law was, in effect, the Army's price for going ahead with the North-South talks.

Extensive preparations were made for the declaration of martial law and the constitutional changes. We were told by some of those involved that Blue House experts studied the Indonesian and French constitutions as well as U.S. official, Congressional and public reactions to past coups in Greece, Vietnam and Thailand. We were also told that President Park's desire to move increased after Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Peking. Both American and Korean observers said that the coincidence of the U.S. elections, the distraction of a seemingly decisive and final phase of the Vietnam negotiations and the fact that the U.S. Congress was not in session seemed to present an excellent opportunity for President Park to make his move without attracting undue public or official attention in the United States.

Although the Secretary and Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs made "representations" to the Korean Ambassador in Washington concerning President Park's actions, the only public statement by the United States Government came in the form of a comment by a State Department press officer on October 17 in which he said that "we were not consulted about the decision and quite obviously are not associated with it" and implied, although less directly, that we saw no need for it. That press statement was reproduced in Seoul as a USIS news release and distributed to the USIS mailing list of Korean public opinion leaders. According to Korean sources, it reached a small circle of people, and since October 17 there have been no further U.S. statements on the subject. Thus, at the time of our visit most Koreans did not know what the U.S. reaction had been, although American officials if asked were replying that the United States had not been aware of the decision, was not consulted about it and was not associated with it.

As far as we could determine, there has been no change in the character of U.S.-Korean relations. They appeared to be as warm and cordial as before. Koreans with whom we spoke who did not approve of President Park's actions expressed strong disappointment at what they considered to be U.S. acquiescence in these actions.

As of the time this report was prepared, there had been no official U.S. comment of any kind on the declaration of martial law in the Philippines. The press guidance prepared for the Department of State spokesman immediately after martial law was declared contained only one substantive comment which was that if asked whether the United States had been informed before the declaration of martial law he was to say that we were not informed in advance. On all other

questions—whether we considered martial law justified, whether we had given the Philippine Government our views, how serious the communist threat was or what we thought President Marcos hoped to accomplish—the press spokesman was instructed to answer simply "no comment."

II. Korea: The Political Situation

With martial law in effect at the time of our visit, we found political life in Korea frozen. The Assembly had been dissolved, an action not provided for in the constitution, and there were tanks (provided by the United States under the Military Assistance Program) in front of the National Assembly building, government ministries, newspaper offices and universities. Most of the universities—those with potentially active student bodies—were closed and the Korean CIA had, we were told, intensified its efforts to insure that the student body was neutralized, a task in which they are said to have become proficient through the use of bribes, intimidation and occasional arrests. The press was under strict censorship. Political parties had been dissolved. The Korean CIA was, we were told, omnipresent. (The Korean CIA is estimated to be an organization of 3,000 people. Considered to be the best intelligence service in Asia, it operates both internally and abroad—including in the United States. Its primary role is to keep the Korean population in line, and its power is virtually unchallenged in the Government.) Opposition politicians, most of whom were said to be under constant surveillance by the Korean CIA at the time of our visit, and journalists were lying low and were unwilling to see us despite extensive efforts by the Embassy to arrange appointments on our behalf. One experienced foreign observer, summarizing the situation, said that the repression of civil liberties was worse than at any time since the days of Syngman Rhee.

Even before the imposition of martial law, the press had been severely restricted. We were told that a Korean CIA man had been assigned to, and given a desk in the office of, each newspaper, radio and TV station. Editors were expected to follow self-censorship, using guidelines which CIA representatives had laid down in meetings with the senior staff of the media. Journalists who violated these guidelines were picked up and held overnight. After martial law was imposed, self-censorship was abolished and newspapers were required to carry their actual make-up to Army censors at City Hall. Some journalists were imprisoned and a few reportedly beaten after a headline was changed. The foreign press was also censored with offending stories cut out before the newspaper or magazine was distributed. *Time*, *Newsweek* and various Japanese publications were censored in this way both before and during our visit. Koreans thus had no way of knowing what foreigners thought of the governmental changes taking place. One known exception to the ban on publishing foreign reactions was the Government's release of excerpts from a recent *Washington Post* editorial which, while not blessing the coup, did interpret it as a reaction to changing U.S. policy in Asia.

Martial law was viewed by most not as an end in itself but as a means of insuring that there would be no resistance to the alteration of Korea's system of government. Most observers thought that it

would be lifted as soon as the new constitution was approved in light of the fact that the new constitution gives the President the same powers he exercised under martial law. (The referendum approving the constitution was held November 29 and martial law was lifted on December 13). While the declaration itself was legally within the President's constitutional powers (although practically no one outside the Government appeared to believe that sufficient ground for such action existed), the dissolution of the Assembly and the suspension of the constitution were not. Similarly, the process by which the new constitution was drawn up was entirely extra-legal. And the referendum was held under regulations which prohibited any political activity or discussion of the new constitution, other than officially sponsored "explanations." As late as 2 weeks before the referendum it appeared that few Koreans outside the Government had any concept of the provisions of the new constitution.

The major features of the new constitution, described by the Government with great redundancy and with every propaganda instrument available to it as the "Revitalizing Reforms," are:

A. The preamble mentions "the historic mission of the peaceful unification of the fatherland," thus supporting President Park's argument that there should be a constiutional basis for the North-South talks which the old constitution did not provide.

B. Basic individual rights—freedom of speech, press, assembly and association; freedom from arrest, detention, search, seizure, interrogation and punishment; freedom of residence and occupation—are now each specifically qualified by the addition of the clause "except as provided by law." (The old constitution provided that the rights of others "may be restricted by law only in cases deemed necessary for the maintenance of order and public welfare" but that in such cases "the essential substance of wishes and rights shall not be infringed.")

C. The President is elected not by popular vote but by a new body: the National Council for Reunification. The Council has 2,359 members who serve for 6 years. Eligibility for nomination to the Council is to be determined by law, but members may not be affiliated with any political party or belong to the National Assembly.

D. The President is elected for a 6-year term, and the constitution specifies no limit on the number of terms he may serve.

E. The President is given a wide range of new powers including, most importantly, the power to dissolve the Assembly. He may also take "necessary emergency measures" in the "whole range of state affairs, including internal affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, economic, financial and judicial affairs" in time of "national calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis and in case the national security or the public safety and order is seriously threatened" or anticipated. He can, in these circumstances, "temporarily suspend the freedom and rights of the people." More than one-half of the members of the National Assembly may recommend to the President that these emergency measures be lifted, and he shall comply with this request "unless there are any special circumstances and reasons."

F. The President is also authorized to proclaim martial law under certain circumstances but must lift it if more than one-half of the members of the National Assembly so request.

G. Two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly are to be elected in direct local elections and one-third nominated *en bloc* by the President and confirmed by the Council for Reunification (a procedure which virtually insures the President a large automatic majority). The National Assembly may not convene for more than 90 days a year in regular session and 60 days in extraordinary session. The Assembly's power to inspect ministries or demand documents has been eliminated.

H. Judges are to be appointed by the President on recommendation of the Chief Justice who is, in turn, selected by the President and confirmed by the Assembly.

I. A nine-member Constitution Committee is established consisting of three members appointed by the President, three by the Assembly and three by the Chief Justice. It examines the constitutionality of laws (formerly decided by the Supreme Court) and may dissolve political parties whose purposes or activities it considers are "contrary to the basic democratic order or endanger the existence of the state."

The euphemism usually employed by Korean officials to describe the concentration of power under the new constitution in President Park's hands is "the institutionalization of authority." The American Embassy was apparently not consulted in advance about the constitutional changes although their general outlines were known; in fact, they had been reported in the American press prior to the official announcement.

Apparently, the United States did not undertake to offer advice to President Park on these changes in the constitution. One explanation given for this attitude was that the United States had no leverage over President Park. Another was that it would be unwise for the United States to become involved in any way in the new constitution as would have been the case—indirectly, at least—had we attempted to have changes made. In this connection it is significant to note that at the moment when the constitutional changes were being decided upon, and when such approaches to President Park might have been made if it had been deemed wise to do so, the United States was using all the leverage it had for another purpose: to try to persuade the Koreans to give their F–5 aircraft to South Vietnam as part of the crash build-up of Saigon's forces in anticipation of a Vietnam cease-fire.

What is the popular reaction to martial law, the proposed new constitution and all that is involved in terms of President Park's increased power and his prospects for staying in office as long as he wishes? At the time of our visit public approval for the North-South talks seemed to have resulted in tacit acceptance of the rationale for martial law and the re-writing of the constitution. On the other hand it should be noted that, as of mid-November, very few Koreans knew the exact nature of the changes and any discussion of them was forbidden under threat of stiff prison sentences. The most knowledgeable Korean and foreign observers with whom we met said that those Koreans outside the Government who did know the full extent of the changes did not like them. These observers said that while Koreans who were opposed to the changes agreed on the need for a strong government, they did not accept the need for martial law. Indeed, it was pointed out to us that President Park handled the far more serious security situation in 1968 involving episodes such as the attack on the Blue House, the capture

of the Pueblo and the landing of 200 North Korean guerrillas on the coast without declaring even a national emergency, much less martial law.

We were also reminded of the fact that on December 6, 1971, President Park had declared a state of national emergency in view of what he described as the changing international situation resulting from President Nixon's visit to China, the seating of China in the United Nations and the threat from North Korea. This declaration did not suspend constitutional processes and was, in effect, only a policy statement. Three weeks later, however, at President Park's urging, the National Assembly approved the National Emergency Measures Law which, according to the Embassy, gave President Park power to control by decree virtually every element of national life that he and his advisers considered related to the "emergency." President Park did not avail himself of his full powers under this law and, in fact, by the time martial law was declared in October 1972 many of the measures initially taken under the emergency powers had been relaxed.

Thus, it appeared to knowledgeable observers that since the Assembly had given President Park all the powers he had requested, and more than he had used, the explanation for the declaration of martial law was to be found simply in his determination to consolidate his power which would, at the same time, insure the support of the military and free him of the burden of having to deal with political parties and the legislature. Many of these observers believe that Koreans, in general, do not object to the government party's staying in power but that they are opposed to permanent rule by President Park. These observers doubted that either the Assembly or the people would freely have approved a constitutional change permitting him to do so. They believe that President Park was concerned over problems within his own party organization and at the fact that in the last elections in May 1971, his party had won only 49% of the popular vote, compared to the opposition party's 44%, and had lost all of the cities including Seoul where the opposition had won all but one of the 19 districts.

For the moment, these observers said, President Park was enjoying a certain popularity as a result of his policy of reconciliation with the North. Furthermore there was a feeling of futility as far as opposing him was concerned. We were told that opposition leaders considered it impossible to expect change by peaceful means and expected Park to remain as President for a long time because the population was intimidated and coerced and there was no visible group which could form the base for resistance; the students were infiltrated by the Korean CIA (last October when there were demonstrations, some students were bought off, others intimidated and a hard core of 175 were arrested, had their deferments lifted and were drafted); the assembly would not be able to challenge the President's power, because under the new constitution there was no way for them to do so; and the intellectuals who opposed President Park had no way of speaking out, for the media were closed to them and there were no signs of any relaxation of these particular controls. (Virtually the only way in which leading intellectuals could publicly register their disapproval was by declining to appear on government-sponsored radio and television discussions of the merits of the new constitutional "reforms.") We were also told that even the business community had been intimidated through gov-

ernment threats to call or refuse loans (although it was our impression that in general the business community has little problem with the new procedures; one American businessman told us that the Korean CIA was "very business oriented.")

The Army was said still to be nervous about the talks but nevertheless had lined up solidily in support of the President and was expeoted to continue to do so unless there was a sustained economic crisis, unless the President was forced to use violent repressive measures on the population over a long period of time, unless the Army did not receive sufficient equipment or unless the North-South talks produced results that the Army considered disadvantageous to South Korea. It would appear, then, that President Park must produce enough in the way of results in the talks to justify the continuation of authoritarian rule without going so far as to alarm the military.

III. Korea: The North-South Talks

The contacts between North and South Korea had their genesis in a public statement by President Park on August 15, 1970, in which he indicated his willingness to work with the North for reunification provided the North would first renounce the use of force. One year later, on August 12, 1971, the President of the South Korean Red Cross Society proposed to his North Korean counterpart that joint efforts be started to reunite separated families. On August 14, 1971, the North Korean Red Cross Society accepted and proposed holding the first meeting on August 20 with Red Cross "liaison personnel."

The first meeting of liaison personnel was held at Panmunjom on August 20 and the second on August 26. At that meeting, the South Korean representative proposed opening "preliminary meetings" of Red Cross "representatives" on September 28. At the third meeting of liaison personnel on August 30, the North Koreans proposed holding the first preliminary meeting on September 20. At the fourth meeting of liaison personnel, on September 3, the South Koreans accepted.

The first preliminary meeting of North and South Korean Red Cross representatives then took place on September 20, 1971, at which it was agreed to establish permanent liaison offices in Panmunjom with direct telephone lines between them. The second meeting was held on September 29 and the third on October 6 at which it was decided to hold "full scale" Red Cross talks in Seoul and Pyongyang on an alternating basis. Preliminary meetings continued virtually every week at which an opening date for the full scale talks was discussed.

Meanwhile, a separate channel of communication was opened up in private discussions between the two sides in the spring of 1972. On July 4, the North and South Korean Governments issued a joint communique, simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang, announcing that meetings had been held in Pyongyang earlier in the year on May 2–5 and in Seoul on May 29-June 1. Lee Hu-rak, Director of the CIA, had represented South Korea at both meetings. The communique stated that the two sides had made "great progress in promoting mutual understanding" and had agreed that unification should be achieved through peaceful means, by their own efforts and without outside interference, not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations, to "carry out various exchanges in many fields," to install

a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang, and to establish a South-North Coordinating Committee chaired by Lee Hu-rak for South Korea and Kim Young Joo of the North Korean Organization and Guidance Department.

On August 11, 1972, at their 25th preliminary meeting, Red Cross representatives of North and South Korea agreed to hold their first full scale talks in Pyongyang on August 30 and in Seoul on September 13. The third meeting in this series was held October 23.

Meanwhile, on October 12, the first meeting of the South-North Coordinating Committee, established by the July 4 communique, was held at Panmunjom. A second meeting followed in Pyongyang November 2–4. A communique issued at the conclusion of the second meeting called for an end to slandering or defaming and said that the two sides had agreed to discontinue all propaganda broadcasts by radio and by loudspeaker across the DMZ and to cease scattering leaflets.

The Red Cross talks thus became the vehicle for organizing the more important political talks of the South-North Coordinating Committee. The North-South talks are expected to continue at both levels. According to a knowledgeable South Korean official to whom we talked, the agenda of the Red Cross talks includes tracing and reuniting families and exchanging mail. Korean CIA officials, describing the Coordinating Committee talks to us, said that [deleted].

In briefing us on the South-North Coordinating Committee talks, Korean CIA officials said that [deleted].

One well informed senior South Korean officials told us that he thought the North needed to begin the talks because of their economic situation. He said that the North felt that they had been cheated by the Soviets in terms of economic assistance compared to the aid South Korea had received from the United States. Eventually, he thought, North Korea wanted the talks to produce negotiated balanced force reductions: Premier Kim Il Sung had long proposed reducing the armed forces to 100,000 on each side. But, he said, the Red Cross talks would make little progress until the Coordinating Committee itself made progress.

Why are the talks taking place and what are the objectives of the two parties, both of whom obviously see an advantage in the talks? Those observers with whom we talked did not see reunification as a real goal, much less as an attainable objective. Both Premier Kim Il Sung and President Park want reunification but each under his own leadership. Unlike the leaders of the two Germanies, neither was said to be willing to accept the evolution of a "two Koreas" solution. But the North—which has tried a full scale armed attack, harassment along the DMZ (in 1968 there were 542 incidents along the DMZ and 182 South Koreans were killed; in 1972 there was only one incident and no fatalities), the infiltration of terrorist groups (the most notorious of which had been assigned to assassinate President Park in 1968) and a propaganda campaign to sow dissension in the South—may now be willing to try to see what results a softer policy may produce. After all, the imposition of martial law in the South, the attendant repression and the new authoritarian constitution were all rationalized by President Park on the ground that they were necessary in order to bargain with the North from a position of unity and strength, so that if

the President is taken at his word the talks have already produced a significant political reaction. The talks also represented an about-face for North Korean policy, paving the way for a far different and more involved role in the world than that of a bellicose and isolated regime. Finally, the South Koreans may well be right in saying that the North hopes that a relaxation of tensions can be translated into a less expensive defense establishment. Some South Koreans have the same hope with regard to their own defense budget but, given the sensitivity of the South Korean military, this possible result of the talks is seldom discussed.

Another common interest which some observers believe the two Koreas have in the talks is the dissatisfaction which each has with its respective ally or, in the case of the North, allies. Both Seoul and Pyongyang have some basis for feeling that their individual interests are no longer accorded as high a priority by their great power sponsors as in the past. Accordingly, each is somewhat mistrustful of its allies, or at least less willing to see its security rest so largely in the hands of others. Therefore, these observers reason, both Seoul and Pyongyang may be genuinely interested in exploring the parameters of their common interests. (It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the North has also recently made changes in its constitution.)

For the South, the talks also serve other purposes. They signal an independent South Korean policy, but one in tune with the shifting alignments between the major communist and non-communist powers, insuring that South Korea will not be an odd man out in Asia. As noted earlier, the talks have, at least momentarily, increased President Park's popularity with his countrymen for, although there is some uneasiness about the talks within the Army which is the result of an almost psychotic fear of the North, the Koreans are a homogenous people with a strong nationalistic sense.

The talks also eliminate a potential rallying point for President Park's critics. (In the 1971 election campaign, the opposition called for a free debate on the issue of unification and North-South exchanges; the government party, it is interesting to recall, dismissed the opposition's proposal for North-South exchanges as untimely, sentimental and evidence of communist sympathies). Furthermore, the reduction of tensions between North and South Korea can only redound to President Park's advantage. And the talks provide a convenient rationale, or rationalization as many would say, for the President's recent actions and for maintaining himself in office indefinitely with greatly increased power; indeed opposition leader Kim Dae Jung said in a speech on July 13, shortly after the July 4 communique was issued, that he was for the communique in principle but was apprehensive that President Park might try to use the talks as an excuse to perpetuate his political power. The talks also serve a useful purpose in President Park's dealings with the United States since they have a critical bearing on every major issue involving the two countries, including such questions as the handling of the Korean question at the United Nations, the amount of economic and military aid, force levels and military command relationships.

The first of these may well be a major issue in the U.N. General Assembly this year. For several years prior to 1971 the United States was able to use its influence in the General Assembly to restrict the in-

vitation to the two Koreas to participate in debate on the Korean item by a condition that both would accept the competence of the U.N. to consider the Korean problem. North Korea had always rejected the idea of U.N. competence so that only the South Koreans were seated when the First Committee, and subsequently the Assembly, considered the "Korean item." The Soviet Union and its allies regularly sought an unconditional invitation. When this effort failed, as it did each year, the Soviets and their allies then would propose, again without success, first to have the report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) rejected, then to have UNCURK dissolved and finally to obtain a vote calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces in Korea under the U.N. flag. Over the years, as new nations from the neutral bloc entered the U.N., it became increasingly difficult to retain support for a conditional invitation. In 1971 and 1972 the United States and Korea decided to resort to the procedural device of seeking to postpone debate on the Korean item until the following year.

During the debate preceding the vote on this procedural motion at the General Assembly session in the fall of 1972, the United States argued that consideration of the Korean item at that time might jeopardize the progress of North-South talks. By a vote of 70–35 (with 42 abstentions), the Assembly agreed to put aside the question until 1973.

The entry into the U.N. of China, a participant in the Korean War, has changed the character of the Korean debate, and South Korea and the United States are thus faced with a difficult decision regarding the U.N. presence. The U.N. military presence could, if necessary, be protected by the U.S. veto since Security Council action would be required to dissolve the U.N. Command. If, however, the General Assembly should vote to terminate the U.N. presence in Korea, the United States might be placed in a politically embarrassing position.

During our visit we received no indication of any change in Seoul's attitude toward the United Nations. Officials of the Foreign Ministry appeared as determined as ever to do what they could to isolate North Korea in the international community. While discussing the North-South talks with Korean CIA officials, we asked whether [delete].

Progress in the North-South talks is an important element in the U.S.-Korean position in the United Nations this fall, but the Korean officials we talked to were uncommunicative about their progress. Having surprised us by declaring martial law, however, the Korean Government could conceivably alter their position regarding the U.N. presence with little warning to the United States, although it is considered more likely that they will continue to seek postponement of U.N. action on Korea. Such a decision would mean a continuing U.S. diplomatic effort on Korea's behalf in the United Nations.

American officials believe that the talks with the North were made possible by President Nixon's trip to China, past U.S. support for Korea at the U.N., the increase in military assistance under the Five Year Modernization Plan and the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea. Some of them acknowledged, however, that the initiative in U.S.-Korean relations may rest with the Koreans as long as U.S. policy is tied to the talks and the Koreans control what happens in the talks and even what is known about them. Some observers with whom we

talked expressed concern at this possibility and said that they hoped that the United States would make its own early decisions regarding what it would like to see happen in Korea rather than allow such matters as command arrangements, U.S. troop levels and the U.N. presence to depend so largely on Korean actions.

In the past, the South Koreans have clung tenaciously to every aspect of the U.N. presence, both military and political, as a means of reinforcing their security, emphasizing their Government's legitimacy and sharpening the contrast between them and the North Koreans. Conversely, the removal of the U.N. presence including U.S. forces, has been and continues to be a principal objective of the North. The South Koreans are also well aware that a desire to reduce its forces in Korea is one of the principal reasons the United States has been encouraging a North-South dialogue since at least 1970. That being so, the argument that one can negotiate with a dangerous adversary only from a position of strength—an argument not unfamiliar in the United States itself in recent years—is at the same time an argument against U.S. troop reductions and for continued and undiminshed military and economic support and a defense against American criticism of President Park's extra constitutional actions. After all, the Koreans say, if the United States is willing to bargain only from strength, and if we did not reduce our forces in Europe so that our West German allies could negotiate from strength with East Germany, can we do any less for our Korean allies? President Park obviously hopes that we cannot. .

IV. Korea: The Economic Situation

Korea can negotiate from a position of economic strength, despite a slow-down in the past year. Over the past decade Korea has frequently been cited as an outstanding economic success story which one Korean official told us he ascribed to "will, strong leadership, stability and foreign assistance," the last of these factors—according to Korean figures—totalling well over $19 billion in government and private transactions. According to Korean Government figures, GNP per capita rose 11.7% annually between 1966 and 1971 and more than doubled between 1963 and 1971.

During the last quarter of 1971, an economic slowdown began due to a number of factors including the revaluation of the yen and the devaluation of the dollar, the American recession, the 10% surcharge on imports imposed by the United States, the withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. military personnel from Korea, lower Korean earnings from Vietnam and the textile quota agreement with the United States. The slowdown continued in the first half of 1972. Real growth of GNP fell to 5.7% in the first half of 1972, compared to 15.1% during the first half of 1971, and there was an acute recession in the construction industry. Contributing to the economic slowdown were overexpansion in construction and related industries, increasing restraints on bank lending and the restriction of imports by the Korean Government.

Despite this slowdown, however, there was a significant improvement in Korea's balance of payments position during the first half of 1972. The deficit on the net current account dropped from $419.7 million in the first 6 months of 1971 to $280.6 million in the first 6 months of 1972, resulting in an increase of $30 million in foreign

exchange reserves. (Foreign exchange holdings totalled $610.5 million on August 31, 1972.) Korea's estimated global trade balance in 1972 will be negative in the amount of $895 million, although it is estimated that Korea will have a positive trade balance with the United States of $102 million.

Korea's principal recent economic problems have been:

A. Significant inflation. During the period 1966–1971, the wholesale price index rose 8% annually, and the Seoul consumer price index 11.5% annually, while in the first 6 months of 1972 the wholesale price index increased 7.2% and the Seoul consumer price index 8.3%. The won has thus steadily depreciated relative to the dollar. The Korean Economic Planning Board ascribed the inflation to four factors: the continuous depreciation of the currency and the devaluation of the exchange rate, high grain prices which have encouraged more farming, high utility rates and an increase in liquidity.

B. A low domestic saving ratio. The domestic saving ratio has ranged in recent years from 14.2% to 16.4% of GNP, a low rate compared to other rapidly developing ecouomies. Korea has thus had to rely heavily on foreign saving for 35% to 44% of its investment.

C. A heavy debt burden. At the end of 1971, total external debt outstanding of more than one year maturity amounted to $2.6 billion. According to Embassy estimates, payments of principal and interest in 1971 will amount to between $327 and $369 million (Korean foreign exchange earnings in 1971 are estimated at $1.6 billion); will increase to a high in 1977 of around $750 million (when foreign exchange earnings are expected to be above $4.1 billion); and will then decline so that by 1990 debt service payments should be at a level of about $134 million provided there is no additional foreign debt incurred after 1976.

D. Adverse external developments. The textile quota agreement with the United States is expected to result in a net loss of $325 million in Korean exports over the next 5 years, as 50% of Korea's exports have been to the United States and 50% of these exports were textiles.

E. A large curb market. When a decree was issued in August 1972 requiring the registration of private debts it turned out that 83.6% of the money supply was in private hands and only 16% in banks.

In 1972, Korea began a Third Five Year Plan in which exports, the rural sector and heavy and chemical industries are the major priorities. The goals of the Plan include an 8.6% growth of GNP and rapid expansion of the mining and manufacturing sectors; investment of $15.7 billion at 1970 prices (a goal that has since been increased by 1.9%) with 79.2% of this investment to be supplied from domestic sources and $3.8 billion from foreign sources (including $1.5 billion in U.S. military assistance under the Five Year Modernization Plan); an increase in exports to $3.5 billion; self-sufficiency in rice by 1976; and a decline in population growth to 1.5% in 1976 (from 2.7% annually in the period 1960–66 and 1.7% in 1971).

The problems the Korean Government faces in meeting the goals set forth in the Third Five Year Plan include the ability of the private sector to generate sufficient savings to meet projected investment levels, the possibility of additional foreign restrictions on Korean ex-

ports and the need to increase defense expenditures. In connection with the last of these factors, we were told at the Economic Planning Board that while defense expenditures constituted 4.5% of GNP in 1971, by 1976 they will constitute around 5%, a level that is considered too high by the Board but which was said to be necessary to compensate for the FY 1972 Military Assistance Program reductions and the 10% deposit requirement.

On August 3, 1972, an Emergency Presidential Decree, issued under the emergency powers legislation the day after the National Assembly adjourned, ordered a number of steps designed to stabilize prices and combat the recession. These included stabilizing the exchange rate at 400 won to the dollar, restraining the increase in the wholesale price index to 3% yearly, lowering the prime bank interest rate from 19% to 15.5%, converting short term loans to lower interest long term loans and liberalizing tax investment credits and retained earnings taxes.

For American businessmen, the slowdown in Korea's rate of growth has meant reduced opportunities for sales of U.S. products to Korean firms because of slackness in demand and increased competition in the U.S. market from Korean firms as they intensify their efforts to expand exports. Wheat, raw cotton and rice, mainly under P.L. 480 programs, continue to dominate imports from U.S. (over 40% in 1972). A larger Japanese role in development assistance to Korea will increase Korea's reliance on Japan as a source of imports.

Major Korean exports to the United States are, in order, textile garments (because of the bilateral textile limitation agreement with the United States, effective October 1, 1971, the U.S. share of Korean textile exports has declined in 1972 by 16.3%), plywood, electrical machinery, wigs, iron and steel plates and sheet and footwear.

The United States and Japan dominate Korea's external economic relations. In 1971, these two countries accounted for 74% of Korea's exports (24.5% to Japan and 49.8% to the U.S.) and 68% of her imports (39% from Japan and 28.3% from the U.S.). In the first 6 months of 1972, Korean imports from the United States dropped 13.4% while imports increased overall 14.8%. Incidentally, of the $324.4 million worth of Korean imports from the U.S. in the first 6 months of 1972, $160.2 million were funded by Korean foreign exchange (a drop of 22% compared to the first 6 months of 1971) and $164.2 million by U.S. loans and aid. Of the $447.2 million worth of Korean imports from Japan, $314.8 million were funded by Korean foreign exchange (a drop of only 2.4% compared to the first 6 months of 1971) and only $132.4 million by Japanese loans and aid. Until 1970, around 40% of all Korean imports from the United States were financed with official aid funds. In 1971, this figure dropped to 28.6%. In the case of Japan, aid financed imports have been in the 5% to 10% range. Thus, Korea has used its own free foreign exchange to finance about two-thirds of its imports from Japan but less than one-half of its imports from the U.S.

Out of a total foreign equity investment in Korea of $268.65 million (on an approval basis) as of the end of 1971, the U.S. accounted for $154.9 million—or 57.7%—and Japan for $84.6 million—or 31.5%. (The next largest source of foreign investments was Panama at $9.5 million.) In 1971, the Korean Government approved U.S. investments

totaling $28.2 million. Although the U.S. has held a significant lead in total investment, in 2 of the last 3 years Japan has led the United States in total investment.

U.S. investment efforts have been concentrated in large projects and Japanese investment in small and medium size industries. According to the Embassy's economic section, among the factors adversely influencing major Japanese investment in Korea are "concern arising from Chou En-Lai's 'four principles'" which stated that no firms trading with or investing in Taiwan or the Republic of Korea would be permitted to trade with the People's Republic of China and "skepticism about the investment climate in Korea on the part of Japanese investors."

In addition to the traditional sources of foreign exchange, the Koreans have, since 1966, earned a total of $950 million from various arrangements related to Vietnam. These earnings reached a high of $195.7 million in 1969. In the first 9 months of 1972, they totalled $65.2 million—$14.9 million in remittances from military personnel, $12.2 million in services contracts, $10.3 million in military commodity procurement, $9.7 million in commercial exports, $9.5 million in U.S. dollar payments for the pay and allowances of Korean civilian and military personnel, $3.8 million in civilian personnel remittances (there were 2,407 Korean technicians working for U.S. organizations in Vietnam—incuding AID—and for Korean companies as of September 30, 1972; in 1966, there were 15,500), $2.5 million for death and disability gratuities and $2.3 million for construction contracts.

V. Korea: Foreign Assistance

From 1949 through FY 1971, total U.S. economic assistance to Korea—in loans, grants, population grants and P.L. 480—was $4,269 billion. In FY 1972, assistance totalled $192.56 million—$26.5 million in loans, $3.1 million in grants, $436,000 in population grants, $151.2 million in P.L. 480 Title I and $11.3 million in P.L. 480 Title II. The planned total for FY 1973 is $212.4 million. Of this total, $25 million is planned for loans (in the field of agricultural development), $2.4 million in grants (for technical assistance projects in educational development, training, private enterprise, agricultural research and the like), $492,000 in population grants, $282.5 million in P.L. 480 Title I and $3.02 million in P.L. 480 Title II.

The description of the amounts and purposes of various loans and grants in the Congressional Presentation Document is out of date. For example, the Document mentions using $823,000 in technical assistance funds for an agricultural planning project but AID now intends to deduct the research component which would reduce the size of the grant; some $800,000 in the family planning program earmarked for advisers to work with ministries will not be used; $254,000 for technical advisers to modernize money and capital markets will not be used because the International Executive Service Corps will do the job; and $201,000 to begin a project to expand the use of technology and scientific innovation has been reduced to $160,000.

On a calendar year basis, Korean Government officials calculate that they received $179 million in P.L. 480 in calendar year 1971 and that they will receive $204 million in calendar year 1972. They had

asked for a $50 million increase in 1972 because of government-stimulated high wheat consumption aimed at reducing rice imports (wheat consumption was half a million tons in 1967, rose to a million tons by 1970 and will be two million tons in 1973). The United States offered a $25 million advance against subsequent year P.L. 480 programs. Korean Government officials are apparently under the impression that this advance was to offset their loss of earnings as a result of the bilateral textile agreement because when the agreement was signed the United States undertook what the Koreans now regard as a promise to provide such offsets in the form of development loans and P.L. 480. According to U.S. officials, however, this particular advance was made in response to a Korean request for commodities to be used to generate local capital which would be lent to business firms in distress.

The other economic assistance donor country is Japan. In accordance with the Settlement of Property and Claims Agreement arising out of World War II claims, Japan agreed to grant Korea $300 million, to lend $200 million and to approve $300 million in private loans during the period 1966–1975. Through 1971, grants have totalled $177.4 million and authorized loans $112.8 million. In 1971, Japanese loans and grants under the agreement totalled $31.8 million. In addition, the Japanese Government has agreed to provide a $300 million commodity loan during 1972–1973 (agreements have been concluded for $100 million to date) and, at some point in the future, a $20 million loan for a telecommunications project, an $80 million loan for the village development movement, a $20 million loan for the promotion of export industries and a $135 million loan for the expansion of an iron and steel plant. The Japanese have already lent $80 million for the development of the Seoul subway and $90 million for four heavy machinery projects. Korea has also received $347.5 million from the IBRD, $87 million from IDA. $9.5 million from the IFC and has signed loan agreements with the Asian Development Bank totalling $152.2 million (additional Asian Development Bank loans totalling $41.5 million are currently being negotiated). Comparatively small amounts have been received from the UNDP, UNICEF, WFP (The World Food Program) and WHO.

AID personnel totalled 554 Americans in 1960. The total declined to 149 by 1965, rose to 205 in 1967 and has declined steadily since. As of June 1972, there were 55 AID personnel in Korea—47 direct hire and eight contract personnel.

VI. Korea: The U.S. Military Presence

The assigned strength of U.S. forces in Korea, as of the time of our visit, was about 42,000—[deleted] Army, [deleted] Air Force, and [deleted] Navy and Marine Corps personnel. These forces are stationed in some 40 camps, airfields and other installations which span the length and breadth of the country and which comprise a total area of almost 400,000 acres (a few years ago the United States held roughly 800,000 acres). About half of these military installations have fewer than 600 military personnel assigned and about half a dozen have between 1,000 and 4,000 personnel. Only one installation—the Osan Air Base, with about [deleted] U.S. personnel—has more than 4,000.

The senior U.S. military representative in Korea, who at the time of our visit was General Donald V. Bennett, USA, heads a highly complex U.S.-Korean-United Nations military structure with three overlapping commands. He is Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC); Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKorea); and Commander, Eighth United States Army.

The United Nations Command (UNC) was created by the United States in response to a Security Council Resolution in 1950 calling on the United States to establish a command in Korea covering all U.N. forces. Subsequently, the Koreans placed all their forces under the operational control of the UNC Commander who in turn is directly responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, as Commander, UNC, General Bennett has operational control over all Korean armed forces (except the Capital Security Command) and whatever U.N. forces exist at any given moment (at present an Honor Guard numbering less than 50 men and a purely symbolic Thai Air Force detachment of about 30 men in Japan), but he has no U.S. forces under his operational control in his U.N. capacity. Before General Bennett as Commander UNC could commit or use any U.S. forces (including the Eighth Army of which he is Commander), those forces would have to be released to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President.

In his second capacity, as Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKorea), General Bennett has only a planning and coordinating function and has no operational control over any forces. As COMUSKorea, General Bennett reports to CINCPAC in Hawaii which exercises operational control over all U.S. forces in the Korean area through the CINCPAC service component commanders for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

As Commander, Eighth United States Army, General Bennett is Army component commander reporting to himself as CINCUNC for U.N. purposes and to himself as COMUSKorea in planning and coordinating matters but all the while under the operational control of the CINCPAC Army component commander in Hawaii.

The roles of other U.S. service commanders in Korea are also complex. For example, the senior U.S. Air Force officer, as Commander Air Force Korea (COMAFK), is subordinate to COMUSKorea. He has, however, no U.S. forces assigned to him in this capacity but does have operational control over the Korean Air Force. At the same time, though, he is also Commander of the U.S. 314th Air Division and as such is subordinate to the 5th U.S. Air Force in Japan.

While the U.S. military has a rationale for these arrangements, the obvious effect is a proliferation of commands and a top-heavy staff structure. The arrangement also has the effect of involving practically the entire U.S. military establishment in any military matter affecting Korea.

The principal U.S. ground force in Korea is the Army's Second Division which is presently manned at less than normal divisional strength. The Second Division is part of the I Corps Group, a joint Korean-U.S. command, whose primary mission is to defend the Republic of Korea, in the sector assigned, and the city of Seoul. Corps Group headquarters are at Uijongbu, 9 miles north of Seoul. The I Corps Group sector is bounded on the north by the DMZ, on the east by the Chorwon Valley, and from there southwest along the

Imjin River and cross the Han River estuary and the Kimpo Peninsula. The Corps group defends 30 miles along the DMZ and 37 miles along the demilitarized Han River estuary, although the only U.S. force actually deployed along the DMZ is one rifle company which is assigned an area about 500 meters wide astride the access road to the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. The Corps Group has, in ground units, [deleted] divisions, [deleted] brigades and a [deleted]. All of these units are Korean except for the U.S. Second Division; a Royal Thai Company which had been under the operational control of the Second Division was withdrawn by the Thai Government on June 23. The I Corps Group artillery are now all Korean units; they were U.S. units before December 1970. And the 1102nd Combat Engineer Group is also completely Korean after the inactivation on June 1 of the 36th U.S. Engineer Group. One of the two Signal Corps battalions is, however, still American although it is only about [deleted] the size of a normal U.S. Signal Corps battalion. [Deleted.] On July 1, 1971, the I Corps Group Headquarters became a combined headquarters. A U.S. General is commander, with both the U.S. and Korean forces under his command. and a Korean General is Deputy Commander. Half of the staff positions are held by Americans and half by Koreans.

The other significant U.S. ground elements in Korea are [deleted] Sergeant and Honest John missiles and [deleted] battalions of eight-inch howitzers. Both of these missile systems were designed primarily to deliver tactical nuclear explosives.

The U.S.-Korea Mutual Security Treaty refers to actions to be taken "in accordance with . . . constitutional processes" in the event of an attack against the South. As a practical matter, the inclusion of the U.S. Second Division in the Corps Group defending the DMZ, and the positioning of a U.S. rifle company on the DMZ, are regarded by both Americans and Koreans as constituting a "trip wire" insuring automatic American involvement in the event of a North Korean attack. Although the Second Division is assigned a "reserve" role in the event of hostilities, senior U.S. commanders acknowledged to us that as a practical matter there would be no way for them to stay out of the fighting.

The Koreans consider that the certainty of immediate U.S. involvement is further guaranteed by the command arrangements which place all Korean forces under U.S. operational control and by the continued U.N. presence in Korea. Since the North-South talks may mean that the U.N. presence may have a limited future, the command and "trip wire" arrangements have assumed more importance than ever to the Koreans.

As far as future force levels are concerned, at the fifth annual U.S.-Korean Consultative Meeting in Colorado Springs in June 1972 Secretary of Defense Laird stated that there would be no reductions in FY 1973. Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 24, 1972, he said: "We do not anticipate a further reduction in Fiscal 1973." That is considered, by both American and Korean officials with whom we talked, to be the only commitment the U.S. has made, other than a commitment to "consult" before making any reductions. [Deleted.] Some consideration has been given to keeping the Second Division in Korea as a Pacific theatre reserve (the undermanned 25th

Division in Hawaii is the only other Army division in the theatre), but this does not appear likely; in fact, a recent Army proposal to strengthen the Second Division was rejected. [Deleted.]

We spoke with virtually no U.S. officials—and certainly no senior official—who did not expect the United States to maintain a military presence in Korea for the foreseeable future. Similarly there was almost universal agreement that the U.S.-Korea Mutual Security Treaty should be maintained. In addition to the emotional attachment arising from the loss of 33,000 American lives in the Korean war and the more practical considerations arising from the enormous U.S. public and private investment in Korea, senior officials of the executive branch, both military and civilian, regard the maintenance of the U.S. commitment to and presence in Korea as essential to the stability of North Asia. Many observers believe that if the United States were to leave Korea, or appeared to be leaving, the North Koreans might react or the Japanese might feel compelled to increase significantly their own defense establishment, a decision that would obviously not only have far reaching domestic repercussions in Japan but also profound effects on Chinese and Soviet relations with Japan.

For their part, the Japanese Government clearly favors a continued U.S. presence in Korea. An indication of the strategic importance which the Japanese attach to the Korean peninsula is the fact that [deleted]. The Japanese Government has said, in a public statement, that an armed attack against South Korea would seriously affect the security of Japan and that as a consequence the Japanese Government would decide "positively and promptly" on a request for the use of bases and facilities in Japan by U.S. forces involved in meeting the attack. That statement of policy and intention, made by Prime Minister Sato in Washington on November 21, 1969, is regarded by officials of both Governments as consistent with the requirements for prior U.S. consultation before Japanese bases are used for active military operations while providing at the same time advance assurance that the bases will be available.

VII. Korea: The Military Balance

According to senior U.S. officers in the U.N. Command, the comparison between North and South Korean forces is as follows:

	South Korea	North Korea
Army, Navy, Air Force	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]
Total Forces	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]
Militia, Homeland Defense Reserves	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimates total South Korean forces at [deleted] and total North Korean forces at [deleted], yielding a South Korean superiority of only [deleted] compared to a superiority of [deleted] according to U.S. figures. The South Koreans also include an estimate of North Korean militia at

[deleted] million, not [deleted], and say that this force is equipped with crew-served weapons.

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense argues that, even assuming no increase in North Korean military equipment, after the Five Year Modernization Plan is completed North Korean forces will still be superior in numbers of [deleted]. Thus, they argue, U.S. forces must be retained to redress the balance and the modernization plan must be completed.

It is the imbalance between the North and South Korean Air Forces that is the factor most often cited by Korean and by some U.S. military authorities as most significant. According to U.S. estimates, the comparison of jet fighter aircraft is approximately 200 for the South and over 500 for the North. A more specific breakdown of the two air forces follows:

	Air Force	
	South Korea	North Korea
Fighters	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]
Bombers		
Transports		
Helicopters		
Total	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]
Pilots	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]

U.S. Air Force officers in Korea argue that the disparity in fighters and bombers is more than compensated for by the shelter program, since shelters and not planes then become targets in case of a surprise attack. [Deleted.]

It is also significant that a large proportion of the jet fighters on both sides are obsolescent. A comparison of the numbers of the more modern fighters shows a much closer balance. At least, that was the case before the U.S. persuaded the South Koreans to send [deleted] F–5As to Vietnam (a subject discussed more fully below). The above chart is also somewhat misleading with respect to bombers. A large number of the North Korean bombers are obsolescent subsonic IL–28s. On the other hand, the North Koreans do have approximately [deleted] SU–7s which the Soviets gave them after the United States provided the South Koreans with F–4s capable of deep penetration offensive operations.

The comparison shown above also does not take into account the U.S. Air Force strength in Korea. There are now 94 tactical and support U.S. aircraft assigned to Korea of which [deleted] are F–4Ds.

A senior Korean defense official told us that in his view the North Koreans could attack any time and wage rapid war in a limited area without Chinese or Soviet help. The view of our defense officials is that [deleted]. Korean defense officials also said that since 1967, when the North Koreans completed their defenses, they have gathered equipment for offensive operations, their basic objective had not changed and they were capable of sustained operations for [deleted] months without external help. U.S. military officers in South Korea contend that North Korean capability is limited because of their complete reliance on support from other countries and that Soviet or Chinese

support is a prerequisite for any serious military attack. They do not think, however, that the South Koreans could fight on their own or defend against a major North Korean attack for an extended period without external assistance.

It is not too surprising to find that U.S. and Korean assessments differ most markedly over the question of the enemy's intentions. The South Koreans appear to believe that an all-out surprise attack from the North cannot be ruled out. [Deleted.]

Each year at the annual U.S.-Korean Security discussions the net assessments of the two countries are discussed. The Korean description of last year's discussion is indicative of the differences and of the Korean proficiency in the artful phrasing of military estimates. According to the Koreans, the U.S. and Korean sides agreed that [deleted] a formulation that did not [deleted].

One common factor which severely limits the capacity of both sides to go to war on their own is their very limited reserves of petroleum and ammunition amounting to approximately [deleted] days worth of supply on both sides. Furthermore, neither side has a logistics system capable of supporting sustained operations. Some Sonth Koreans believe that the United States has deliberately limited their supplies in order to insure that the South does not strike out on its own against the North.

VIII. Korea: U.S. Military Assistance

In the period 1949–1971, South Korea received $5.01 billion (in terms of obligations and authorizations) in U.S. military assistance loans and grants. Between FY 1964 and FY 1970, U.S. military grant aid to Korea was well below the level of $200 million a year except in FY 1968—the year of the "Pueblo" and "Blue House" assassination attempt incidents. FY 1971 marked the beginning of the Five Year Modernization Plan. the funding for which began with a $150 million supplementary request tacked on to the supplementary military assistance legislation which contained the authorization for the resumption of military assistance to Cambodia. (At the time, Senate scrutiny concentrated on the question of assistance to Cambodia, and the supplementary appropriation for Korea, which contributed the first installment on what was to be a $1.5 billion program, was ignored.)

The origins of the Five Year Modernization Plan are somewhat unclear. According to MAAG officials in Korea, early in 1970 a list was drawn up by the Koreans indicating what they felt they needed based on their assessment of the threat, their capability and the expectation of the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Korea. A similar list was drawn up by U.S. officials in Korea pursuant to an instruction from CINCPAC to study a modernization plan of between $1 billion and $1.5 billion. When completed, the Korean list was valued at about $4 billion.

A joint Korean-U.S. Committee was formed and came up with an agreed list (now known as the "Kinds and Quantities List") which, when costed out, added up to $1.5 billion consisting of $1.25 in expenditures against new obligated authority and $.25 in excess defense articles. The list has been reviewed annually in the light of Congressional authorizations and appropriations and there has been some

juggling as priorities have shifted, certain items that were expected to be excess have not materialized and prices have changed.

The Five Year Modernization Plan was formulated at the same time that the decision to witbdraw 20,000 American forces from Korea was about to be implemented. The official U.S. position is that tbe Modernization Plan was not compensation for tlie 20,000 man force reduction but that it was simply a question of deciding what the Koreans needed to make them capable of meeting the threat from the North in light of the U.S. withdrawal. Whether or not the Plan was compensation for the withdrawal of 20,000 forces, both Korean and U.S. officials to wbom we talked agreed that force reduction was certainly in the forefront of the thinking of both the Koreans and tbe Americans when the Plan was originally discussed early in 1970.

Of the $1.5 billion, [deleted] million is for "O" or operating costs, [deleted] million is for "I" or investment costs, [deleted] million is for long supply and excess equipment and [deleted] million is for PCH and T (packing, crating, handling and transportation costs) and for the support costs of the MAAG. By service, the Korean army will receive [deleted] million, the Air Force [deleted] million, the Navy [deleted] million and the Marines [deleted] million.

The planned levels for the Military Assistance Program, to complete the $1.5 billion Modernization Plan, were $290 million in FY 1971 and $239.4 million in FY 1972. Because of cuts in appropriations, however, $1.8 million was unfunded in 1971 and $84.3 million was unfunded in 1972. Asuming that tbe full $235 million requested for FY 1973 is eventually funded, approximately $570 million will thus be required in FY 1974 and FY 1975 to complete the Plan on schedule. U.S. officials in Korea believe that if the $235 million in Fiscal Year 1973 and the $570 million in Fiscal Years 1974 and 1975 is provided, the United States could end all military assistance to Korea by the end of FY 1975 except for a few loose ends. On the other hand, they said, if the full amount is not obtained the Koreans will expect that the shortfall will simply be moved back to future years. Furthermore, because operating costs are more or less fixed costs, reductions in military assistance appropriations result in cutting "I" costs—investment costs for new equipment. These costs then increase the longer these investment expenditures are delayed. The Five-Year Modernization Plan would then not only drag out beyond FY 1975 but would require additional funds beyond the $1.5 billion.

Because of these funding and procurement problems and because we and the Koreans look at the "Kinds and Quantities" list differently, the Five Year Modernization Plan may become a troublesome issue in Korean-U.S. relations. Our impression was that the Koreans think they have a commitment to supply them with every item on the list, even though U.S. officials assert that they had been careful to explain that this was not so, while many in the MAAG regard the transaction as a "value undertsanding" under which we would go down the list buying or giving equipment until we had spent $1.5 billion.

Another incipient difficulty concerns the 10% deposit requirement. Beginning in FY 1973, Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that recipients of military assistance deposit local currency in the amount of 10% of the fair value of excess defense articles and grant military assistance to defray official U.S. costs. The Koreans

maintain that they are unable to pay the amount now due (perhaps $5 million) and have asked for and received a delay in billing. Some in the Korean Government take the position that they would rather see a cut in military assistance than make the full deposit.

The Embassy, while pointing out that the deposit represents both an added budgetary cost as well as a loss of foreign exchange earnings to the Koreans, apparently does not believe the requirement will seriously affect Korea's economic growth. A recent Embassy study pointed out, for example, that the foreign exchange cost to Korea of the deposit requirement would result in no more than a potential 0.1% reduction in Korea's GNP growth rate during the period 1974–1976. At the same time, the deposits have an immediate beneficial effect for the United States by reducing the dollar outflow required for official purchases of won to finance U.S. expenditures in Korea.

In FY 1971 and 1972, the Koreans received excess defense articles under the normal excess program with an acquisition cost of $92.3 million and a legal value of $30.7 million. The estimate for FY 1973 deliveries is between $30 million and $50 million. All of these totals are applied against the Five Year Modernization Plan totals. Also credited against the Plan is the excess equipment provided under Section 3 of P.L. 91–652 (the Cambodian Supplemental Authorization law) which authorized the President, until June 30, 1972, to transfer to Korea defense articles belonging to U.S. forces in Korea. A total of $278.7 million worth of equipment (at acquisition cost), with a legal value of $92.9 million, has been transferred to the Korean armed forces, almost all of it to the army, in FY 1971 and FY 1972. This equipment included [deleted] Hawks and [deleted] Honest John missiles, [deleted] vehicles and trailers, [deleted] weapons, [deleted] army aircraft, [deleted] tanks, [deleted] personnel and cargo carriers, and [deleted] items of communication equipment.

Under Section 502 of P.L. 91–441, Korean forces returning from Vietnam have been allowed to retain some of the equipment issued to them under the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. This equipment was credited toward the goals of the Five Year Modernization Plan. It has totalled $8.6 million representing one-third of the acquisition cost, and has included [deleted] vehicles, [deleted] weapons and [deleted] items of communication equipment.

These totals will be further increased when the remaining 40,000 Korean troops are returned from Vietnam. The quantity and types of equipment which they will be allowed to bring with them is apparently a subject for negotiation. The Koreans naturally hope to bring back as much as possible, but before arriving in Korea we were told by American military officers that the Koreans would be allowed to retain regimental equipment for only two of the six regiments still in Vietnam and that the rest of their regimental equipment would be turned over to the South Vietnamese for which the Koreans would be recompensed.

The Koreans have also recently obtained U.S. agreement to pay them $5.1 million to cover 60 days "severance pay" when the Korean troops return from Vietnam despite the fact that the Brown letter does not provide for severance pay and despite the precedent set when the first Korean troops were withdrawn without severance pay. Apparently still unsettled is a Korean claim for $8.2 million for veterans' pay and

allowances which the United States was unable to pay in FY 1971 as a result of a "technical error" which occurred in the handling of that year's Defense Authorization bill.

As their part of the Five Year Modernization Plan, the Koreans agreed to take over a large part of the "O and M," or operating and maintenance, costs of their armed forces. This assumption of a greater share of O and M costs is what is known as the "MAP Transfer Program," meaning a transfer of recurring costs from the Military Assistance Program to the Korean defense budget. An equivalent program was suspended in FY 1963, because of the economic situation in Korea, and suspended again between FY 1966 and FY 1970 under the provisions of the Brown agreements as part of the *quid pro quo* for the dispatch of Korean forces to Vietnam. The program was resumed in FY 1971 with the Koreans assuming $20 million in additional annual "O and M" costs. In FY 1972, that amount increased another $20 million annually, and the Koreans have agreed to increase it further to $50 million annually in FY 1973, 1974 and 1975.

In the period FY 1971–1975, then, the Koreans will absorb $210 million in "O and M" costs for ammunition, spare parts, POL and other commodities. While some American and Korean officials argued that the Koreans cannot at this time afford to absorb more of their own "O and M" costs, the only available statistical analysis of this problem does not support that view. That study, by the Embassy, indicated that even if U.S. support for "O and M" were terminated this fiscal year, the resulting percentage reduction in Korean GNP would be less than .4 percent by 1975.

Nevertheless, as an inducement to the Koreans to enter into the new transfer program, the United States agreed to offset a portion of the cost in the form of P.L. 480 grants and loans to total $125 million over 5 years. Through FY 1973 the Koreans will receive approximately $60 million in such grants, offsetting more than half of the "O and M" costs absorbed by them during the corresponding period and, in fact, resulting in a windfall of $28 million foreign exchange equivalent to the Koreans, an amount representing the difference between the total of the offsets and the much smaller foreign exchange component of the "O and M" costs being absorbed by the Korean Government.

While we were informed in great detail about the transfer program by both U.S. and Korean officials, and always told what a fine thing it was that the Koreans were willing to shoulder more of their own defense burden, the existence of the simultaneous offset program in the form of P.L. 480 grants was never mentioned. We first learned of it at the Korean Ministry of Defense. When we sought to discuss it with the Embassy officer responsible for following the P.L. 480 program, he first disclaimed any knowledge of the offset arrangement, then wrote out the entire 5 year offset schedule, and finally, before giving us the chart, carefully tore off the figures for FY 1974 and FY 1975 so as not to violate the Executive Branch prohibition against disclosing future year planning to the Congress.

The Korean defense budget was 24.3% of the national budget in 1971, 24.5% in 1972 and will be 26.7% in 1973. These percentages are higher than those in the Congressional Presentation Document because they are based on total budget figures, including supplementary budgets, as presented to the National Assembly.

During our November visit, the Koreans were asked to send to South Vietnam the F–5 aircraft provided them under the Military Assistance Program in connection with the reinforcement of the South Vietnamese immediately before the then anticipated peace agreement. After much high level discussion, the Koreans agreed to provide [deleted] F–5A's; despite heavy pressure they refused to agree to send more than [deleted]. While we were in Korea, the planes were flown to Clark Air Base by Korean pilots, the markings were then changed and American pilots flew them to Vietnam. In return, the Koreans were leased [deleted] F–4's, which were flown to Korea from Clark. The agreement provided for the termination of the lease on return of the F–5A's or on provision of F–4E's in their stead as part of the Five Year Modernization Plan. The F–4's are "bailed," or rented, to the Korean Air Force at a cost for 2 years of $13 million. According to the agreement, these F–4's will be returned to the U.S. Air Force at some point. [deleted] At the time of our visit, the Koreans were under the impression that they would have to meet these costs out of their own funds, a prospect which for obvious reasons did not please them. Since then, it has been decided that the $13 million bailment fee will be taken out of the Korean Military Assistance Program.

Another future problem in the Korean Military Assistance Program has to do with the development and production of a Coastal Interdiction and Patrol Craft (CPIC) much desired by the Koreans. When the Korean need arose there was no such craft in the U.S. inventory, but the U.S. Navy thought it might be interested in one. On the strength of the Navy's interest, Military Assistance Program funds were spent on research and development for the boat, it also being understood that the Korean Military Assistance Program would be reimbursed by the U.S. Navy. It now develops that the Navy is in a budget squeeze and does not want the CPIC. Thus the Military Assistance Program is stuck with the research and development costs. There is a question of the legality of such a reimbursement from Military Assistance Program funds, and meanwhile costs have escalated, production schedules have fallen further behind and we are trying to convince the Koreans that they do not need the boats anyway.

The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates total Soviet military aid to North Korea in the period 1954 through 1972 at [deleted] billion and total Chinese aid at [deleted] (only about [deleted] percent of the total of U.S. security assistance to South Korea during the same period). In 1967 Soviet aid was estimated at [deleted] and in 1968 at [deleted]. Since then, it has been at the far lower level of [deleted] a year. Chinese military assistance has increased from an annual level of between [deleted] and [deleted] million through 1969 to [deleted] in 1970, [deleted] in 1971 and [deleted] in 1972, the first year in which the Chinese provided more military assistance than the Soviets. Although the Chinese have given the North Koreans grant aid, North Korea has paid for all Soviet aid and, according to the DIA, [deleted].

The MAAG organization in Korea has been sharply reduced in the past 4 years. It had an authorized strength of 1,890 in July 1968 which was reduced to 592 as of July 1, 1972. About half of these per-

sonnel are in MAAG Headquarters. The rest are divided into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force sections.

IX. The Philippines: The Political Situation

At the time of our visit to Manila in late November, the Philippines under martial law presented a marked contrast to Korea. Many of the surface manifestations were similar—most newspapers had been closed and those that were published (one paper that existed before martial law, which is 100% pro-government, a new newspaper owned by a government supporter and one conservative weekly magazine) were observing a *de facto* censorship; many radio and television stations were still closed (they were all closed down when martial law was declared but about a third had reopened, although they had confined themselves to bland, non-political programs); government representatives had taken over the operation of public utilities; and political party activity was proscribed.

But the atmosphere seemed more benign even though, in contrast to Korea, thousands of people, including about 20 political leaders, had been "detained" in camps. (The most frequent estimate we heard was that about 2,000 people had been detained; government officials told us that 45% of those detained were from the left, 50% from the right and 5% from the middle.) The army was not in evidence; there were no troops or tanks to be seen in downtown Manila. The universities were open. The Congress had not been disolved, although it had no role to play under martial law. Opposition politicians and journalists were willing to see us and the general atmosphere was free of intimidation or fear, for there is no organization in the Philippines like the Korean CIA. In fact, most people to whom we talked, including members of the opposition and the press, approved of martial law because they felt that, although it was highly doubtful that the overthrow of the Government was imminent, the situation was certainly deteriorating. The prevailing view seemed to be that the strong measures President Marcos had taken gave the Philippines a last chance to save the country from its own excesses—that is, from increasing lawlessness, accelerating corruption, an irresponsible press and political dissidence.

Everyone to whom we talked said that there was no doubt that the measures taken under martial law to reduce crime and violence were widely approved of by the people. It would appear that for the moment the campaign is producing significant results. An assessment given us at the Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary (the national police force which, as a part of the Armed Forces of the Pilippines, is the element charged with administering material law), stated that:

A. Before martial law the weekly crime average had been 1,818 cases, and 80% of the crimes had been committed with the use of firearms. By early November, 7 weeks after martial law had been imposed, the weekly crime average was down to 918 with only 30% of the cases committed with the use of firearms.

B. Since the imposition of martial law, 435,174 unlicensed firearms and licensed high-powered weapons had been captured or surrendered—an average of 10,000 a day compared to 3 a day before martial law was declared.

C. Private armed groups, "especially those organized and led by prominent figures in the society," had been disbanded most of their leaders had been arrested and most of their firearms surrendered. These and other measures taken under martial law, including stepped up Philippine Constabulary operations, had, we were told, disrupted the insurgent groups but had by no means destroyed them. Few insurgent leaders had been detained, although the various communist groups were lying low.

There are four Muslim secession groups and two Communist Parties, each with a number of subordinate insurgent groups, in the Philippines. The four Muslim groups are the Ansar El Islam established in 1969 with an estimated 2,000 members;* the Mindanao Independence Movement, established in 1968 with 2,000 members; the Moro National Liberation Front, patterned after the Palestinian Liberation Front; and the Sabah Revolutionary Movement with an estimated 5,000 members. The two Communist Parties are the Communist Party of the Philippines (or CPP), a Soviet oriented party established in 1930, and the Communist Party of the Philippines—Marxist-Leninist (or CPP/ML), a Maoist Party established in 1968.

The Soviet oriented CPP has three subordinate insurgent groups: the HMB, the remnants of the old Huks, which is the military wing of the Party and is estimated to have 250 members; the MPKP, the Party's student front with an estimated membership of 10,000; and the MASAKA, the Party's farmer organization with a membership estimated at 5,000.

The Maoist CPP/ML has 7 subordinate groups: the Nationalist Youth (or KM), the Party's student front, with an estimated membership of 15,000; the League of Editors for a Democratic Society (or LEADS) with 1,000 members; the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (or MAN), a general Party front organization with 5,000 members; the movement for a Democratic Philippines (or MDP), a coordinating arm of about 48 small groups with 10,000 members; the New Peoples Army (or NPA), the military wing of the Party with 1,200 to 1,500 members; the SDK, a Party front group with 10,000 members; and the Student Alliance for National Democracy (or STAND), a youth front organization with 5,000 members.

Philippine military officials told us that they estimated total communist insurgent strength, in all groups, at [deleted]** armed regulars ([deleted] in the NPA), [deleted] supporters and a mass base of [deleted]. Five years ago, they said, there were only [deleted] active workers, [deleted] supporters and a mass base of [deleted]. The largest growth in communist insurgent strength took place between 1968 and 1969 when the CPP/ML was established, and the KM expanded from [deleted] members in 1965 to [deleted] by mid-1972.

To date, knowledgeable observers doubt that any of the insurgent groups has received significant support from foreign sources. The Muslim separatists are said by some observers to have received money and arms from the Libyan Government and occasional encouragement from officials of the Government of Sabah. In neither instance, however, is there evidence that the aid involved was substantial. The Philippine

*All membership figures are U.S. Government estimates.
**Deletion made because figures were provided in confidential briefing by Philippine authorities.

Government has recently given extensive publicity to its discovery and capture of a shipment of arms unloaded from the motor vessel Karagantan in Palanan, Isabela, which it alleges was destined for the New Peoples Army. While the Philippine Government cited this alleged shipment of arms as evidence of "outside support" for the insurgents and as one of the reasons it was necessary to declare martial law, at the time of our visit knowledgeable foreign observers felt that the Government had yet to produce convincing evidence as to the source of the arms.

For the moment both American and Philippine officials believe that the constabulary and the rest of the armed forces can contain the insurgent threat. On the other hand, many observers believe that the armed forces would find it difficult to contend simultaneously with a New Peoples Army campaign in Central Luzon, urban disorder in the Manila area and large scale Muslim uprisings in the South, given the small size of the armed forces and their limited logistics capability.

Since declaring martial law, President Marcos has put less emphasis on the threat from insurgent groups (which he claimed had led to his action) and on the measures to control that threat and more emphasis on the reforms necessary to build what he calls "the New Society," a phrase that is thrust into public consciousness by the government through all available media. The result has been a series of general orders, decrees and letters of instruction including an order to clean up "our surroundings"; an order calling on all citizens including elected local officials to avoid ostentatious displays of wealth and extravagance; a letter of instruction forbidding foreign travel except on government business (we were told that this order had resulted in a daily saving of $200,000 in foreign exchange and an estimated annual foreign exchange saving of $73 million); a letter of instruction raising the wages of sugar workers; a letter of instruction ordering the seizure and destruction of "one armed bandits"; a letter of instruction ordering the dismissal of all employees in the Department of Finance who had been recommended for dismissal; a letter of instruction banning certain films—including films glorifying crime and pornographic films—from public exhibition; a letter of instruction ordering that all government officials who are facing charges or are obviously undesirable tender their resignations; a letter of instruction ordering the removal of all illegal construction; a decree enacting into law the Government's Integrated Reorganization Plan; a decree setting forth the grounds for dismissing government officials and employees; a decree requiring all persons to file sworn statements of the true value of real property owned; a series of letters of instruction taking over the assets and management of various civilian corporations; and a large number of decrees enacting into law various pieces of legislation—including those relating to the economy—on which the Congress had not acted.

Philippine officials said that President Marcos has long wanted to implement this elaborate program of reforms but that he had been prevented from doing so by a "corrupt Congress" and an "irresponsible press." It is generally accepted in the Philippines that the few hundred wealthy families, referred to as the oligarchs, have dominated the economy and politics of the islands since the colonial period and

that heretofore the Philippine Congress, bureaucracy and press have been dominated by them and operated primarily for their benefit.

Opposition figures, as well as many independent observers to whom we talked, pointed out that the government party has enjoyed a majority in both houses of the Philippine Congress and must therefore bear a considerable measure of responsibility for its performance. They also observed that the President has long been identified with the very interests he now criticizes. It is for these reasons, they said, that they were profoundly skeptical about the sincerity of the President's motives in proclaiming a "New Society," for they suspected that he had chosen the role of social revolutionary out of political expediency.

Whatever his motivations, President Marcos has moved swiftly since declaring martial law, not only in the areas of law and order and governmental reform but also in shaping and completing a new constitution. A Constitutional Convention has been at work since June 1971. The delegates to the Convention were popularly elected and, although they were supposedly nonpolitical (members of Congress were not eligible), they generally reflected existing vested interests and political factions. As time passed, President Marcos was able to bring the Convention more and more under his control.

Following the November 1971 Senatorial elections (in which the government party won only two of eight seats), the President reportedly intensified his efforts to dominate the Convention and to bring about the adoption of a parliamentary system. The latter was finally approved in July 1972, and in August 1972 President Marcos succeeded in defeating the so-called anti-dynasty provision which would have barred him or Mrs. Marcos from ever becoming Prime Minister.

A national referendum on the new constitution was, at the time of our visit, scheduled for January 15, 1973. Virtually all observers to whom we talked believed that setting the date so soon would mean that few voters would have any clear notion of what the new constitution would mean. Even some government officials whose primary interest appeared to be the selling of the President's program, expressed concern about the need for additional media outlets through which to publicize the new constitution.

The most important changes in the new constitution are these:

A. The present system of government with a Senate and House and popularly elected President is abolished. In its place a parliamentary system is established with a unicameral legislature whose members are elected for 6-year terms and who elect both the President, who is the symbolic head of state without any real power, and the Prime Minister, who is the head of government.

B. The Prime Minister's powers are broad. He may dissolve the National Assembly at any time for a popular vote of confidence "on fundamental issues," he appoints and may remove cabinet members and deputy ministers and he appoints members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts.

C. Upon the ratification of the new constitution, an interim national assembly is to be established which will continue until the interim assembly calls an election for the regular national assembly and the members of the regular assembly take office. The interim assembly will not convene until called into session by the Prime Minister. The interim assembly is to be composed of the incumbent President and Vice

President of the Philippines, those who have served as President of the Constitutional Convention, the members of the Senate and House who have expressed in writing within 30 days of ratification their "option" to serve in the interim assembly, and the delegates to the constitutional convention who, in effect, support tbe new constitution.

D. The incumbent President will continue to exercise both his powers and prerogatives under the old constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under the new constitution until he calls on the interim assembly to elect an interim President and Prime Minister.

E. All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts of the present administration are confirmed as legal and binding even after martial law is lifted and even after the new constitution is approved, and all laws in force at the time the new constitution is ratified remain operative.

While the decision to adopt the parliamentary system was made before the declaration of martial law, the provisions for interim arrangements were not written into the draft until afterwards. After the declaration of martial law, it appeared that there would be no way in which the interim arrangements could be publicly debated. Indeed, the Philippine public did not even know of the existence of the interim arrangements until after the final draft constitution had been approved and was at last published in a government newspaper.

A group appointed by the Senate to study the draft of the new constitution had, however, recommended a number of changes including, they felt most importantly, the fixing in the interim provisions of a date for regular assembly elections. These proposals were not accepted. Hence, even after the new constitution is approved and ratified, President Marcos will be able, if he wishes, to continue martial law in force, refrain from convening even the interim assembly and meanwhile exercise all of the powers he had under the old constitution as President and all of the powers the new constitution confers on the Prime Minister.

Ratification of the constitution will also legitimatize all of the acts and decrees issued by President Marcos under martial law. Thus, after the new constitution comes into force tbere will be nothing to prevent President Marcos from continuing to rule by decree and there will be no legislative body in session, none in prospect, and no way in whieh one can be convened without his consent.

Under these circumstances, how long will martial law be retained? President Marcos has said publicly that he hopes to lift it before the end of 1973 when his term as President expires. Most observers believe, however, that martial law will be retained for from 3 to 5 years.

We were told that for the time being the President was fully supported by the Philippine Armed Forces and had at least the acquiescence, if not the positive support, of the people. Yet at the time of our visit all the people knew about President Marcos' plans was what he had chosen to tell them in the controlled media and what he had chosen to tell them had to do mainly with law and order and the broad outlines of the "New Society." These points were, as noted above, generally popular. What the popular reaction will be to the transition provisions of the constitution and the unlimited term of the Prime Minister is much more uncertain.

Most knowledgeable observers believe that if President Marcos is to succeed in the gamble he has taken he must deliver tangible economic benefits to a population traditionally burdened with an unusually uneven distribution of wealth and more recently plagued by unemployment and inflation. Yet many of the moves which the President has taken and plans to take toward those ends directly threaten the interests of the oligarchy. Their financial interests will be affected by tax reform and the assumption of corporate control over utilities. Their hopes of displacing the American companies are being dashed. And their power to defend their interests in the same ways that they have in the past has been sharply curtailed, for their private armies have been disarmed, the bureaucracy is being purged of those alleged to be beholden to them, and they will no longer be able to influence public opinion through their own newspapers or radio and television stations. In the case of newspapers, for example, the former owners are being forced to sell a majority of their shares to buyers selected by the Government.

Some say that the oligarchs will fight back. One senior Philippine official told us that they were already doing so by seeking to assassinate the President and by withholding support for his programs. Yet the oligarchs find themselves in a difficult situation. Many observers believe that if President Marcos should be removed from the scene—or if he fails because of his inability to carry off his vast scheme of socio-economic-political-engineering—the aftermath will be either a military dictatorship or, more likely, chaos. One representative of the oligarchy said to us: "We stand to lose whether Marcos wins or loses. But if he loses we lose everything. Perhaps if he is sincere and if we can work with him and if he succeeds, maybe we won't lose so much."

X. The Philippines: The Economic Situation

Certainly the Philippine economy will require strong governmental action in many areas not only to implement President Marcos' reforms but also to deal with pre-existing weaknesses. Financial problems began to be acute in the Philippines in 1969. At that time, the Philippine Government consulted with the IMF. The result was a comprehensive stabilization program, begun in 1970, under which the exchange rate was adjusted (there was a further devaluation in April 1972), the budget deficit reduced, import restrictions imposed on non-essential goods, and monetary expansion slowed.

There was a substantial recovery in 1971. GNP rose 6.5%, the budget deficit was reversed, and by the end of FY 1971 there was a revenue surplus of 539 million pesos compared to a deficit of about one billion pesos in FY 1969. But a drop in world prices for coconut products and copper, less demand for logs and lumber and rising import prices resulted in a drop of 18% in the terms of trade and a $42 million trade deficit. Inflation continued, and in 1971 consumer prices rose 23%. The agricultural sector did not meet the growth rates projected in the Four Year Development Plan, although the manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities and transport sectors did.

During the first half of 1972, the economic picture was mixed. In real terms, GNP increased by 6.5% in FY 1972. But the floods in July and August resulted in a sharp setback; exports declined by 12% in

the first half of 1972, compared to the first half of 1971, while imports increased by 10.5%, resulting in a $115 million trade deficit; sugar output was 11% below last year; inflation, which had been stopped, began increasing and reached a rate of about 5%; and the budget deficit began to climb toward the 500 million peso level.

Nevertheless, many economists with whom we spoke believe that the Philippines has an impressive potential for economic growth. American observers attributed many of the past bottlenecks to institutional and governmental inefficiencies and noted that many of the most significant martial law decrees have been in the economic area. For the most part, these decrees have been based on pre-existing reform legislation developed by the Government's highly regarded "technocrats"—young, mostly American trained economists and management specialists—but blocked by the Congress or, as several observers put it, by the oligarchy working through the Congress.

Even if these reform measures have the desired effect, it is generally agreed that the Philippines' greatest need will continue to be greater public and private investment. Public infrastructure in the Philippines has been much neglected (90% of the Philippine GNP is produced in the private sector), and the Government hopes to reduce the private hold in this area and to invest increased taxes in infrastructure projects. Increased private investment for the creation of additional jobs and exports is considered to be essential and is being actively encouraged by a newly created Board of Investment. According to Embassy economists, the Philippines have the resources, the manpower and the domestic market to justify the faith of foreign investors. In their view, and in the view of the business community, what is needed now is some guarantee of political stability.

Of great importance to the Philippine Government at this point is the confidence of the New York financial and corporate community. As of January 31, 1972, the Philippine external debt amounted to $2.1 billion. The United States holds approximately 45% of this debt, Japan about 21%, the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank about 12.5% and West Germany 6%.

U.S. direct investment in the Philippines as of December 1970 was estimated by the Department of Commerce at $710 million, and we were told that half of the top 1,000 Philippine corporations have some U.S. equity and that the top 200 Philippine corporations, which account for 30% of retail sales, are at least 40% U.S. owned. During the period 1971–73, $262 million in investment was planned by resident U.S. firms, according to an Embassy survey, and another $140 million was identified as potential investment not covered by the survey. In a recently published survey, the Philippine Government estimated that, as of December 30, 1970, U.S. investors accounted for 79.2% of total foreign equity investment, Chinese investors for 4.4%, Spanish for 4.1% and all others for smaller percentages; the Japanese share was estimated at 1.1%. The Japanese percentage will grow quickly, however. Of the $611 million registered by the Board of Investments as foreign financing of projects as of March 1972, Japanese investment totaled $301.9 million and U.S. investment $160.6 million.

An ordinance appended to the old Philippine constitution—known as the Parity Amendment—gave U.S. citizens equal opportunity with Philippine citizens to participate in the development of national re-

sources and the operation of public utilities until July 3, 1974. The new draft constitution states that the rights and privileges granted to U.S. citizens and corporations under this ordinance, the result of the Laurel-Langley Treaty, will expire, as the ordinance provides, on July 3, 1974. The position of the U.S. Government is that it does not seek to have the Parity Amendment continued after its expiration date. Apparently, the United States would agree, however, to negotiate a regular treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. But because of the special economic relationship the United States has had with the Philippines, we were told that such a routine treaty would not be considered sufficient by the Philippine Government for they would undoubtedly want any treaty to provide continued preferential treatment for Philippine exports to the United States and assurances with regard to the U.S. quota for imports of sugar from the Philippines, provisions that would not be consonant with U.S. efforts to develop a generalized scheme of preferences under which developed countries extend tariff preferences to developing countries on an equal basis.

The concerns of U.S. businessmen are not with the Parity Amendment, since that is a dead issue, but with recent judicial interpretations of constitutional laws. There are three decisions concerned, none of which has yet been followed by decisions of the Executive or Legislative Branches. The first is the Quasha case in which the Supreme Court ruled that under the Parity Amendment in the old constitution U.S. citizens and corporations could not own "private agricultural lands" except in cases of hereditary succession. The effect of this ruling is to cloud the titles to private agricultural land acquired by American citizens and corporations since 1946 and to raise the probability that the last previous Filipino owner might have some claim to recover the land. The position of the Philippine Government, however, is that American-owned land titles should be valid as against private claimants. Most Philippine officials approve of this ruling and expect it to stand. If the ruling does stand, the questions that remain to be resolved will be the procedure to be followed in order to effect an orderly transfer of these lands to Philippine concerns, and the period of time in which this transfer will be required to be made.

The second case is the Philippine Cold Stores case in which the court interpreted retail trade as any sale made to an end user whether the end user was a factory or an individual. If this ruling stands, and many Philippine officials oppose it on the ground that it will have a negative effect as far as attracting foreign investment is concerned, changes in distribution arrangements will be required after 1974 when the Parity Amendment expires.

The third case, also opposed by many officials on the same ground as the previously mentioned case, is the Luzon Stevedoring case in which the court held that there can be no foreign representation on Boards of Directors after 1974. The draft of the new constitution would permit such representation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility in proportion to the share of their capital in the utility which, under the new provisions, is limited to 40%.

The proposed new Philippine constitution includes a number of other provisions affecting American investors. It provides that the National Assembly may reserve to citizens of the Philippines or

wholly Philippine-owned corporations "certain traditional areas of investments when the national interest so dictates," that at least 60% of the capital of any public utility must be owned by Philippine citizens (it had been feared for some time that no foreign participation might be allowed); that at least 60% of the capital of any corporation involved in the exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of Philippine natural resources must be owned by Philippine citizens (again, a more lenient provision regarding foreign investment than many had anticipated); and that the ownership and management of mass media and the governing body of every entity engaged in commercial telecommunications shall be limited to Philippine citizens or wholly Philippine-owned corporations.

Taken in sum, however, the proposed new constitution is considered to be as favorable to the position of American investors as it could reasonably have been expected to be. It should not lead to any capital flight. In fact, we were told that there has been no capital flight since martial law was declared but, on the contrary, some capital inflow. Ford and GM are forging ahead with new plants, and a syndicate of 16 American banks (who are contributing $25 million), and 13 Japanese and European banks (who are contributing another $25 million), has recently established a Development Bank of the Philippines.

XI. The Philippines: Foreign Assistance

The Philippines received $1.26 billion in official U.S. development assistance, less repayments and interest, between 1946 and the end of FY 1971. AID officials in the Philippines see three distinct phases in the aid program. In the first of these phases, the period 1946–1952, American assistance was primarily concerned with the repair of war damage and the physical rehabilitation of the country. In the second phase, from 1952 to about 1965, the emphasis was on developing government agencies and educational institutions and on training administrative and technical personnel. In the third and present phase, which began about 1965, the emphasis has been on assisting national programs in agricultural production, rural electrification, family planning and nutrition and rural development. (Washington officials characterize the period since 1970 as a fourth phase—that in which there has been an emphasis on multilateral aid.)

In 1969, again because of the serious economic problems that had arisen, the Philippine Government asked the IBRD to establish a consultative group. We were told that the Philippine Government originally regarded the group as an instrument that would be subject to Philippine direction and would concern itself primarily with the short term foreign exchange needs of the Philippines but that early in 1971 the Philippine Government abandoned this view. The IBRD position, that the consultative group would be concerned with long term development matters, thus prevailed and the group was formally established in May 1971. Its members are Australia, Japan, Spain and the United States. Eight other countries have the status of observers, and there are three participating international agencies—the Asian Development Bank, the IMF and the U.N. Development Fund.

The group was never intended to be construed as a consortium in which members would be expected to make formal pledges of assist-

ance levels. Nevertheless, the contributions made by the group in the first year, FY 1971, totaled $230.9 million, far more than the $200 million estimated by the IBRD as a desirable target of official annual assistance. Of the $230.9 million, the U.S. contributed $54.9 million in loans ($34.9 million in P.L. 480 loans) and $10 million in grants for technical assistance including family planning; Japan $65 million in loans and $20 million in grants; the IBRD $47.5 million; the ADB $23.6 million; and West Germany $3.9 million. Other members of the group contributed $6 million in long term credits. For FY 1972, the consultative group made commitments of over $235 million in concessional aid. The U.S. committed about $73 million, Japan $76 million, the IBRD $55 million, the Asian Development Bank $25 million and the UNDP $6 million.

For FY 1973, the IBRD, Japan and the U.S. have "indicated" a contribution level of about $75 million each. The planned U.S. contribution consists of $35 million for P.L. 480 Title I commodities, $20 million for development loans, $10 million for technical assistance and $10 million for P.L. 480 Title II commodities. (These amounts do not include the more than $50 million of FY 1973 funds made available for disaster relief.)

Total U.S. concessional aid of $73.1 million in FY 1972 was divided in the following way: $10.5 million for technical assistance grants—$6.3 million for family planning, $4 million for agriculture, public safety and provincial development and $2 million for narcotics—$6.1 million for Food For Peace grants under P.L. 480, $34.9 million for P.L. 480 dollar sales, $1.6 million for regional projects and $20 million for a development loan for rural electrification.

As far as individual programs are concerned, the AID Mission is enthusiastic about the family planning program. They believe that the chances are excellent for bringing the current population growth rate of about 3% to below 2% within 5 to 7 years and say that, should this result be achieved, it would be the most spectacular reduction in the population growth rate achieved in any country. U.S. grant assistance to the program increased from $1.4 million in 1969 to $5 million in 1970 and 1971 and should be about $6 million in 1972, making the program the largest AID supported effort in the population field in the world.

AID is still involved in a residual public safety program. In FY 1973, $530,000 in technical assistance funds was programmed for use in the seven municipalities in the greater Manila area to establish training facilities, improve police communications and modernize records and identification systems. (On the day this project was to have been announced martial law was declared. The announcement was not made and the project has not yet begun.) The AID Mission is projecting about a $500,000 annual level for technical assistance in the public safety field over the next few years.

AID supported internal security projects have involved a U.S. dollar input of $2.87 million in the period FY 1969 through FY 1972. (The major portion of U.S. assistance in the internal security area, of course, takes the form of support for the Philippine Constabulary as a part of the Military Assistance Program.) The AID projects have included providing technical advice and material assistance to eight city police departments; providing transportation and communications equipment; establishing and equipping nine regional police training

academies; training fifty Philippine police officials at the International Police Academy in Washington; establishing thirty Law Enforcement Communications Systems networks; providing 712 cities and municipalities with a dependable rapid communications capability; establishing a uniform crime reporting system; developing police eligibility and promotional examinations; and providing support for the National Computer Center. In connection with the provision of technical advice and assistance to eight city police departments, a Regional Public Safety Advisor was assigned to each of three regions.

The AID Mission has, in Fiscal Years 1970, 1971 and 1972, acquired approximately $20 million worth of excess property. Most of the excess property has gone to AID financed projects but some has gone to Philippine Government financed projects. In FY 1973, as of November 11, $3.6 million worth of additional excess property had been acquired. For non-AID financed projects, there are no dollar costs to AID. All costs are paid by the recipients.

The rural electrification loan program is the outgrowth of the 1966 communique, issued at the conclusion of President Marcos' visit to President Johnson in Washington, in which it was agreed that the United States would help start a rural electrification program. In 1968 there was a $3 million loan to finance two pilot cooperatives, and in 1971 the United States agreed to a $20 million loan.

As far as future AID projects are concerned, the principal question now being considered is whether or not to support a large land reform program in the Philippines. On October 21, President Marcos wrote in his own hand and signed Presidential Decree Number 27, known as the "Farmers Emancipation Act." The Act gives a tenant the right to own five hectares of the land he tills if it is not irrigated, or three hectares if it is; limits landowners to seven hectares; sets the value of land to be sold to tenants at two and a half times the average harvest of the last three normal crop years; and requires the tenant to buy the land in 15 equal annual installments plus 6% annual interest. The decree will benefit some 715,000 tenants on 1.5 million hectares of private rice and corn lands. About 100,000 landlords may be involved, perhaps 1,000 of whom are large landowners. According to the Department of Agricultural Reform, the program will cost 7 billion pesos (equivalent to approximately $1 billion). The decree does not pertain to permanent crops (coconut, cocoa and coffee) or to sugar lands, the crop in which the largest land holdings—and landholders—are involved.

Philippine officials are hoping for foreign assistance for the land reform program. Indeed, they expect it and have some basis for their expectations. A leading American land reform expert has visited the Philippines twice in recent months under private foundation sponsorship, worked with the AID and Philippine officials who were developing the land reform program and later reportedly told President Marcos that he believed that the United States would pick up the cost if the right kind of land reform program were developed. (The same expert apparently suggested several significant changes in Decree No. 27, including a "zero retention" feature providing that no present landlord could retain *any* land which AID believes will be adopted by President Marcos.) Present Embassy thinking is that a consortium should provide the assistance with the United States providing a share. AID

officials in Manila believe that President Marcos would not be able to finance a truly significant program with Philippine resources unless the United States were to provide substantial help. Some Philippine officials to whom we talked said, however, that they did not see why the Philippines could not finance the program itself as no foreign exchange or imported commodities or equipment was involved.

AID Mission officials believe that the program is important because it would be more symbolic of radical change than anything else that President Marcos could do. In this sense, the land reform program obviously has a high political content. In fact, land reform is considered a "must" by those in the Philippine Government who believe that it is essential for President Marcos to deliver something tangible to the people very soon in order to retain their support.

The AID staff has been reduced from 94 Americans in July 1971 to 76 in late 1972. Despite these reductions, the Mission is the second largest in the world in terms of personnel.

XII. The Philippines: The U.S. Military Presence

The Subic Bay Naval Base complex is the largest naval support base in the Pacific. It occupies more than 36,000 acres of land, employs more than 17,000 "direct hire" Filipinos and 13,000 Philippine contract workers and had, at the time of our visit, 5,357 Naval personnel assigned. There are eight major commands and 35 to 40 smaller units and detachments on the base. The plant property investment at Subic Bay is $236.4 million with an estimated replacement value of $372.94 million. Operating costs are $86.3 million a year.

U.S. Air Force installations in the Philippines are Clark Air Base and three other locations—John Hay Air Base, Wallace Air Station at Poro Point and Camp O'Donnell, north of Clark. The Clark Air Base covers almost 130,000 acres, representing a capital investment of $150.6 million. The most recent figures showed a permanent total base population of 41,980—8,659 military personnel, 13,831 dependents, 798 U.S. civilians and 18,692 Filipino employees. There are normally 42 U.S. aircraft assigned to Clark including [deleted] F–4's.

In addition, a squadron of Philippine F–5's has been located at Clark for some months. Base officials told us that they were pleased to have the opportunity to assist the Filipinos. They did not seem concerned about the problems which could arise as a result of the use of a U.S. base for counter-insurgency operations. Officials in Washington were unable to say whether the F–5's have already been used for such purposes or whether they would be in the future.

Camp O'Donnell is a communications site used by the Air Force, Navy and State Department. John Hay has a radio relay facility for the Defense Communications System, a Voice of America transmitter, [deleted] and an assigned strength of 39 U.S. military personnel. Wallace is an air defense installation, is the drone launch site for the "Combat Sage" missile evaluation program and has an assigned strength of 240 U.S. military personnel. As a result of a 1956 renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement, the Philippines have title to all the bases.

There are now, in all, about 16,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the Philippines—9,500 Air Force, 5,000 Navy, 1,500 Marine Corps

and a few Army personnel. Before the Vietnam war, there were 13,800, and the peak figure since has been 27,000. Embassy officials told us that when an Indochina agreement is reached they expect the U.S. force level to return to the pre-Vietnam figure.

There were 13 U.S. military training exercises in the Philippines during Fiscal Year 1972 and 1973, each involving between six and 147 personnel. These were a school building exercise sponsored by AID in which 36 schools were built; two engineering exercises; a disaster assistance exercise in which food was distributed, 305,000 persons were inoculated against cholera and typhoid, 29,000 patients were treated and 2,933 were rescued; a communications-electronics exercise in which supply and maintenance personnel worked with communications equipment not found in U.S. channels: and seven civic action exercises. The civic action exercises involved dental, medical, veterinary and engineering projects; "community relations training"; "techniques needed to overcome deep-seated superstitions"; and "identification of different mores and traditions." Most of the exercises were carried out in conjunction with the Philippine Armed Forces so that they, too, received a training benefit from these exercises. The General Accounting Office considers that these exercises are therefore a form of military assistance which should be listed and described to Congress in the same way as other forms of military assistance.

In addition to providing bases and other installations, the Philippine Government facilitates U.S. military operations in other less tangible ways. Among these is the dedication of approximately two-thirds of the air routes in the Philippine flight information region for U.S. military use. This permission affords us considerable freedom in air operations and has been particularly valuable in connection with the routing of B–52 missions to and from Indochina. Similarly, the Philippines allows the United States Government the use of a large proportion of its internationally assigned radio frequencies. The Embassy estimates that the United States has an investment of over $200 million in radio antennas in the islands. In addition the Philippines is a major terminal for U.S. military telecommunications in the entire Pacific. In order to enable the U.S. military to move personnel between its various installations in the Philippines, the Philippine Government also allows the operation of what is, in effect, an internal U.S. military airline. Finally, U.S. authorities note that nowhere in the world are we able to use our military bases with less restrictions than we do in the Philippines.

The Philippines obviously derive both direct and indirect benefits from the U.S. presence. The U.S. Government is, for example, the second largest employer in the Philippines after the Philippine Government. While many Philippine officials believe the bases could be reduced in size, there does not appear to be any doubt that they want the United States to stay even though there are some psychological and political costs involved.

The 1947 Military Bases Agreement does not expire until 1991. At Philippine request, however, a working group has been meeting sporadically since February 1971 to consider certain revisions in the agreement which would make it similar to U.S. base agreements with other countries. The major issue remaining, we were told, was the question

of criminal jurisdiction. The working group has not met since January 1972. A meeting in the spring was cancelled after the student demonstrations that occurred at the time of the mining of Haiphong, and the Philippine Government's attention was then diverted by the flood emergency last summer.

XIII. The Philippines: U.S. Military Assistance

The reasons for continuing to give the Philippines security assistance (from FY 1946 through FY 1971, the Philippines received $631.7 million in military assistance) are, according to CINCPAC and the MAAG in the Philippines, first of all [deleted], second to protect U.S. bases and facilities, third to improve internal security and fourth to improve the logistics system of the Philippine Armed Forces. [Deleted.] Neither State nor Defense Department representatives acknowledge any relationship between security assistance, or any other aspect of U.S. assistance to the Philippines, and base rights. To us this seems to be a clear case of a distinction without a difference. Avoiding stating the link has led to tortuous attempts to justify the military assistance program as other than a *quid pro quo* for base rights. That is what the program has been and no one with whom we talked contended otherwise.

Grant military assistance levels were $15.9 million in FY 1970, $17 million in FY 1971 and $14 million in FY 1972. The original request for FY 1973 was $20.8 million—$14.9 million (or 72%) in investment (or, "I") costs, $4.96 million (or 24%) in operating (or, "O") costs and the rest for training, handling and transportation. In the period FY 1946 through FY 1970 annual grant aid averaged $23.1 million.

The major items to be funded under the "I" costs in FY 1973 were four C–119s (these have since been dropped for reasons explained below), [deleted] UH–1H helicopters, [deleted] patrol boats, [deleted] landing craft, [deleted] vehicles and [deleted] weapons. Two-thirds of the "I" costs, according to the MAAG, was shortfall that had been moved from previous years when the percentage of grant aid that had to be devoted to "O" costs was far higher—it reached 85% in FY 1970—because of inadequate funding by the Philippine Government of its own defense budget. Most of the "O" cost will go to spare parts and training ammunition. Of the $20.8 million requested for FY 1973, about 13% will go to the Philippine Constabulary and the rest to the Army, Navy and Air Force.

By a Presidential Determination of August 29, the Philippines was [deleted] on the grounds that [deleted]. We met no one in the Philippines, however, who seeemed to believe there was any serious possibility that President Marcos would carry out such a plan.

From 1969 through October 1972, the Philippines have also received a total of $20.46 million (at acquisition cost) in excess defense articles under the various service and Defense Department excess programs. Of this total, $8.8 million was received in FY 1971, most of it under the MAP redistributable program.

Thus, the security assistance program in the Philippines has many components. As recipients, Philippine Government officials who deal with these matters look at total receipts. Those officials provided us with a chart, for example, showing that in FY 1972, when grant military assistance authorized and appropriated by the Congress amounted

to only [deleted]* million, they had received a total of [deleted]* million in security assistance divided as follows:

MAP grant aid	[Deleted]*
Long supply and excess	
Public Law 480	
MAP military projects fund**	
FMS cost differential	
Plus 6 vessels and [deleted]* received under special loan/base arrangements	[Deleted]*
Total	[Deleted]*

Philippine officials are disturbed by the unpredictable nature of MAP receipts and deliveries which, according to their chart, shows an overall pattern of diminishing grant assistance from a peak of [deleted]* million in FY 1966 to [deleted]* million in FY 1972. Furthermore, even that trend is inconsistent: for example, receipts and deliveries dropped from [deleted]* in FY 1969 to [deleted]* in FY 1970, then rose again to [deleted]* in FY 1971 and dropped in FY 1972 to [deleted].* They have, therefore, concluded that the Philippines will [deleted].* In a briefing on this question, they said that they thought the reasons for this fluctuation were [deleted].* Furthermore, they noted that information on military assistance program allocations was not made available before FY 1972 which had made it impossible to know how much money had been appropriated in past years and how much of the material received in a given year had been funded in a previous year.

According to CINCPAC, Philippine defense expenditures in this fiscal year represent 2.2% of GNP (not 1% as the Congressional Presentation Document states) and the defense budget of $169.2 million is 11.6% of the government budget (not 8.2% which is the figure in the Congressional Presentation Document). Defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP have risen from 1.3% in FY 1970, and the Philippine defense budget has more than doubled between FY 1970 and FY 1973. In FY 1973 the Philippines is providing 83% of its defense resources, the U.S. 12% and Japan, in reparations payments, 5%.

The MAAG's estimates of Philippine armed forces strength was Army [deleted]; Constabulary [deleted]; Navy and Marines [deleted]; and Air Force [deleted] for a total of [deleted]. (CINCPAC's estimate is [deleted], and the Department of Defense's estimate is [deleted]). The Military Assistance Program supports all the Army and Constabulary units, the marine brigade, [deleted] of the [deleted] Philippine naval craft and [deleted] of the [deleted] Philippine Air Force aircraft.

According to the Defense Department, the Philippine Air Force has [deleted] aircraft of which [deleted] are fighters, [deleted] are helicopters and [deleted] are old C–47 transports.

The principal weaknesses of the Philippine Armed Forces are considered by MAAG officials to be a lack of [deleted].

When the United States offered four C–119 transports under the FY 1973 Military Assistance Program, the Filipinos asked for C–130's instead. When the United States was unable or unwilling to provide

*Deletions made because figures were provided in confidential briefing by Philippine Armed Forces.

**The Military Projects Fund receipts are derived from the sale of surplus U.S. military property originally provided to the Philippine Armed Forces; under an agreement reached in 1966, linked to the dispatch of an engineering task force to Vietnam, the Philippines

them (although, as some Filipino officials noted, we subsequently provided more than 30 to South Vietnam), the Filipinos obtained them by securing an $8.8 million loan and an $8.8 million guarantee from the Export Import Bank and buying the planes (one new and three used) directly from Lockheed. A condition of the Bank's participation was that the planes not be used for military purposes. Nevertheless, the C–119's have been dropped from the Military Assistance Program.

XIV. Concluding Comments

Unless some unexpected spark ignites Korean resistance (as it has on occasion in the past), the prospects for the future in Korea seem to be for a continuation of the trend toward what is, in effect, a personal dictatorship; for a continuation of the North-South talks which, although they should have some effect in reducing tensions, are unlikely to bring political reunification any closer; for increasing indepedence from the United States in both foreign and domestic policy; for continued pressure against any reduction of U.S. forces or military assistance levels; and for a continuation of economic growth.

In the Philippines, the future is far less clear. President Marcos probably will have a limited length of time—perhaps a year at most—to show some tangible evidence of progress toward the "New Society." His chances of success are considered no better than even; there will undoubtedly be opposition to the new constitution, a continuing threat of assassination, a resumption of insurgent activity, and increasing opposition from the oligarchy whom he will have to push hard if he is to achieve the reforms he has promised. If he does not bear down on the oligarchy and instead compromises his objectives, the people may not be willing to concede him continuing unlimited powers. President Marcos' actions thus far seem designed to reassure foreign investors so that he can obtain the additional capital inputs which will be required to produce more jobs and foreign exchange. Even so, prospects for economic progress seem less certain in the Philippines than in Korea. There will undoubtedly be Philippine pressure on the United States for more economic assistance, especially to support the new land reform program, and for continuing military assistance at least at present levels.

Whatever their motivations, the steps which Presidents Park and Marcos have taken to enhance and perpetuate their power have profoundly affected the future political outlook of their countries. In the case of Korea, President Park has now obtained the power he sought. He can be removed only by his own agreement, by death or by revolution. Those who wish to oppose his one-man rule will have virtually no option but to seek his removal by extra-legal means. While in the past it was true of the Korean political system that the consent of the governed was not always freely given, at least it was required. It is no longer even required today, for the only support which President Park needs is that of the Korean CIA and the Army.

Although President Marcos' ultimate source of support is also the Army, he lacks President Park's efficient apparatus for internal control and repression. Furthermore, he is dealing both with insurgents as well as with a populace that has long been accustomed to vigorous political activity. Thus, having restructured the Philippine Government as a vehicle for personal rule, challenged the tra-

ditional ruling classes, and countered the insurgents with a promised revolution of his own, President Marcos has created a situation in which a loss of momentum on his part could result in political and economic chaos surpassing anything the Philippines has yet experienced.

* * *

While the United States was vaguely critical of developments in Korea, it was altogether uncritical of what occurred in the Philippines. The distinction in American eyes appeared to be that while President Marcos' martial law measures were constitutional and deemed warranted (although not in terms of the alleged communist threat) those taken by President Park were unconstitutional and considered unnecessary.

We were told by U.S. officials that in neither Korea nor the Philippines was there anything the United States could have done to deter the actions taken, that at most we might have won minor concessions in the name of democratic process but at the cost of associating ourselves with the eventual authoritarian outcome and that if the United States had intervened we would have incurred added responsibility at a time when American public sentiment seems to favor a reduced U.S. role in Asia. This argument may be accurate, realistic and logical, but the fact of the matter is that, without having taken a position either for or against the preservation of democratic process, the United States is today as closely associated with both regimes in their new authoritarian forms as it was before. We saw no evidence of any diminished sense of U.S. responsibility for either government. Indeed, insofar as material aid is concerned, it would appear that in the coming year the Congress will be asked to do more for both countries.

We found few, if any, Americans who took the position that the demise of individual rights and democratic institutions would adversely affect U.S. interests. In the first place, these democratic institutions were considered to be severely deficient. In the second place, whatever U.S. interests were—or are—they apparently are not thought to be related to the preservation of democratic processes. Even in the Philippines, our own colonial step-child and "showcase of democracy" in Asia, the United States appears to have adopted a new pragmatism, perhaps because there was no other choice, turning away from the evangelical hopes and assumptions with which it has tended to look at political evolution. Thus, U.S. officials appear prepared to accept that the strengthening of presidential authority will enhance President Park's ability to negotiate with the North and enable President Marcos to introduce needed stability; that these objectives are in our interest; and that detente and stability (and more F-5's for Vietnam), in Korea, and military bases and a familiar government in the Philippines, are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best.

At the same time, there is some apprehension on the part of American officials about the future. One official in Korea, for example, expressed the belief that by his actions President Park had "sown the seeds of his own destruction." Another in the Philippines stated that if President Marcos obtained the power he sought "the only alternative his opponents will have will be to go to the hills." It would be ironic

indeed if President Park's apparent effort to confront the North with a mirror image of its own authoritarian unity provoked internal disorders which the North would then be able to exploit or if the constitutional changes made possible by President Marcos' declaration of martial law produced conditions which transformed the imagined threat into a reality or brought about greater political chaos than that which he supposedly acted to correct.

* * *

There is no easy basis for judgments on such questions as the amount of military assistance Korea requires in order to deter an attack, the rate at which U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Korea, the equivalent worth in military assistance of our bases in the Philippines or the extent to which the United States should underwrite a Philippine land reform program. But, in considering our future policies in these two countries, if we need no longer be concerned with the nature of their internal political systems, perhaps we can analyze our interests on a more objective basis. To do so, certain policy assumptions regarding both Korea and the Philippines, which have been handed down intact from year to year, will have to be re-examined. Our force deployment under the Mutual Security Treaty with Korea is a case in point. The principal justification for continuing to deploy forces in Korea at present levels seems to be our treaty commitment. As a general proposition, there appears to be a certain bureaucratic inertia which makes it more convenient to invent justifications for maintaining existing commitments and present force levels than to re-examine or reduce them, if for no other reason than to avoid disturbing relations with the recipients. In the specific case of Korea, however, there is an added problem. It would appear that since 1966 our desire first to obtain, then to increase and more recently to retain Korean participation in the war in Vietnam has kept us psychologically and politically in debt to the Koreans.

With the U.S. involvement in Vietnam soon to be terminated, with the opening of North-South talks, and with the end of our illusions about Korean democracy, it should be possible to take a fresh look at our residual interest in Korea. Our basic objective would appear to be to avoid tension or conflict on the Korean peninsula which would disturb the present apparent equilibrium in the North Pacific area where the interests of the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the United States converge. To date we have sought to accomplish this objective by maintaining a military balance backed by a U.S. deterrent presence. This policy has been expensive and has carried with it the danger of an automatic U.S. involvement in another Asian war.

The North-South talks may offer the United States a way out of this expensive and potentially dangerous commitment—or at least a means of reducing the cost and the risk. Yet at the same time we seem to have no clear concept of how far the South Koreans are prepared to go in these talks, or at what speed, or indeed how far we would like to see them go. To our own calculations on this point must be added the feelings of the Japanese with regard to Korean security and possible re-unification, for developments in Korea have an important bearing on Japanese defense decisions.

If the United States is now in position to re-examine its programs and posture in Korea, basic questions such as these should be addressed: why does South Korea, with a more prosperous economy,

KOREA THROUGH THE EYES OF WESTERNERS

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THE POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS

Edward Reynolds Wright

When I was first offered the challenging assignment of examining such an elusive and provocative aspect of Korean society as its politics, I was reluctant. I thought that undertaking such a task might be considered presumptuous of me, since I, after all, am a foreigner in Korea. However, I gained courage by recalling more illustrious personages than I who have dared to evaluate cultures other than their own. Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic work, Democracy in America, saw more lucidly than most Americans the contemporary realities of and future prospects for the American system. More recently Britisher Dennis Brogan has been a profound observer of America in the mid-twentieth century. An American, Edwin Reischauer, has given the West a perceptive view of contemporary Japan and Japanese culture. In recent years, many Korean scholars have taught their fellow countrymen and westerners much about the West--the relevant writers are so multitudinous that I dare not mention any for fear of glaring omissions. Mind you, I am not putting myself on the same high plane as those I have mentioned above by name or inference, but rather I consider myself as drawing strength from their significant endeavors.

Introductory Comments. By way of introduction, I would suggest that the political process in Korea is highly centralized and personalized, and that the people are quite authority conscious. The nitty-gritty of political life and accomplishment is largely in terms of one's place and status in the social and political hierarchy and, relatedly, in terms of the direct personal influence one can exert on superiors and subordinates. These tactical

principles seem to be operative on all levels of society and indeed can be considered to constitute the essential social fabric of the Korean people.

If one were to take a conceptual approach to the study of Korean politics, that of "integration" would be the most logical and useful one. We must raise this question: To what extent is the nation homogeneous and unified in social, cultural, economic and political ways? In Korea there are a single race, a single language, common cultural assumptions, and there is no minority group of significant size. This is in contrast to the situations in such other developing nation-states as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others, which have populations with diverse social, cultural and/or racial compositions. In my view, Korea provides an ideal focus for a case study, not of a society which is struggling for social, cultural, economic and political identity and unity, but of one where the internal struggle for influence and power takes place on an integrative foundation already well formed.

In the years following the Second World War, western-derived liberal democratic ideas have had a phenomenal impact on the leaders of Korea, as on those of other developing nations throughout the world. Public proclamations of these leaders have spoken of a new era for their nations within a democratic political framework. At least in Korea, however, traditional elements were still strong, and these same leaders were faced with barriers to progress in the form of traditional social and political patterns. The resultant inner struggle between liberal western ideas and traditional Korean behavior has provided the basic setting for the post-war Korean political scene. To date, there has been no clear-cut resolution of this struggle. While the western democratic perspective has made inroads into the Korean political consciousness, it is equally clear that traditional factors still contribute significantly to Korean political behavior.

Differences in Korean and Western Politics. Firstly, I should offer a working definition of what I mean by politics. For our present purposes I would define politics as the power relationships which exist within a society and which culminate in the formulation and execution of public policy. The variables in the politics of different societies are based on

differing degrees of formalization of power relationships and on differing procedures in making of public policy.

Two crucial differences in the politics of Korea and my own country, the United States, are related to (1) the degree of centralization of power and (2) the degree of authority consciousness and dependency on the part of the masses of the people.

Politics in Korea is highly centralized and in my own country greatly decentralized, with perhaps the major exception of foreign policy formulation. Korea is not overburdened with the slowness of a federal system in which political power is divided geographically, or by a structural separation of powers in which powers are delineated according to function with inbuilt institutional checks and balances.

The Korean situation provides a prime example in the non-totalitarian world of a country where public policy can be quickly and efficiently implemented. The examples are many. The Seoul-Pusan expressway was completed in little over two years, a task that would have been impossible in the United States where the carrying out of public policy is often frustrated by unenlightened public opinion and a multitude of obstacles rooted in slow and cumbersome democratic structures and procedures. In Seoul decision to build a badly needed subway system was made rationally and effectively; construction was begun quickly, and progress has been little short of spectacular. I cannot help but think of at least one American city, Atlanta, Georgia, where the struggle of city leaders to gain public approval of a rapid transit system took at least 10 years. Even now, two years after that decision was popularly approved in a referendum, little progress has been made toward construction of the system. Resistance in the United States to the obvious need for better public transportation systems is based on irrational but traditional local government boundaries; inequitable tax burdens in neighboring governmental units, and others.

Korea has a sparkling record in comparison with other nations which are attempting to establish an industrial and technological base for society. The Koreans have flung themselves with vigor and determination into the process of economic development. Many nations classified as "developing" or "underdeveloped" are finding the task considerably more taxing and

difficult. I should point out parenthetically that I do not necessarily place technologically derived values above those of traditional agrarian existence; I merely suggest that for purely pragmatic reasons of survival in today's competitive and unstable international order, a new nation-state is compelled to progress consciously and rapidly is the transition from old to new. Without such adaptation, national entities run the considerable risk of being swallowed up or at least substantially dominated by more aggressive and powerful neighbors. Korea's economic developmental pace has been little short of phenomenal, and, given the present degree of political stability and military preparedness, there seems little likelihood of imposition of outside political or military domination.

While praise for Korea is certainly in order on the above counts, we should also look at the other side of the coin. There is the danger that procedural efficiency, as evidenced in Korea, can result in arbitrarily and incautiously planned public policy. Westerners are as, or more, concerned about procedures as about goals, and feel that public policy in Korea does not always receive sufficient deliberation and planning before implementation. Many examples can be given. The city of Taegu was expanded many miles into the countryside in the mid-1960's before it was realized that such expansion was impractical in terms of the city government's inability to service such an enlarged area. The city limits were then summarily redrawn, roughly along the original lines. To cite another example, public apartments, called "Citizens' Apartments," were built by the Seoul city government before it was realized that in the process of sub-contracting the construction of some units turned out to be of less than the best quality. Contractors in question were then required to strengthen the undergirdings of the buildings. To give another instance, last month reforestation laws were decreed to preserve and enhance the greenery in the Korean countryside; stringent penalties were to be imposed for plucking branches and small trees. The law was rescinded before it could be put into effect because it was found that villagers direly needed this source of fuel. One more example: the size of envelops for domestic mail has been reduced because the government received a sorting machine which cannot handle standard international envelop sizes.

It seems relevant in this regard to refer to the western concept of "rule of law", a principle which westerners feel is little recognized in Korea. Stated as simply as possible, "rule of law" means that no person is exempt from the law, including public officials, and that laws are formulated in accordance with the express wished and interests of the largest possible proportion of the citizenry. On a theoretical level, a Korean scholar and government official has explicated this point with reference to the Korean scene much more lucidly than I can do. He has pointed out that "the rule of law has never been a desirable goal of politics in Korea." This is because traditionally in Korea "Law" was seen as "an agency of rigid political regimentation... The rule of law advocated by the Legalists, as popularly understood in the Korean political tradition, was little different from a rule of punishment or a rule by autocratic decree." The same author is quick to point out that this idea of law is a corruption of both the western view as well as the proper Korean perspective which is derived from the Chinese Confucian tradition. According to the latter, the Confucian-derived concept of Li refers to a "moral expression of the Way of the Universe." "When both the ruler and the ruled act according to Li, harmony prevails." So this idea of Li, rather than law (Fa), was basic to the Yi dynasty Korean political tradition. The writer continues that Li "is a moral expression of the Way of the Universe. When both the ruler and the ruled act according to Li, harmony prevails. The virtuous live by it. When a society is ordered by law or by the threat of punitive sanctions, its members evade it with impunity and feel no shame. But when a society is ordered by Li, its members not only behave properly but also know shame. Li and law are thus mutually exclusive." In practice, Li becomes an unrealizable ideal, "more ficticiously ideal than politically real." And "the importance of countervailing forces as a prerequisite for stability was never admitted by the Confucianists... The Confucian political theory in Korea failed to progress beyond the level of an oversimplified ideology." And the judicial function, which is highly institutionalized in the west for insuring that the law is equitably implemented, is hardly necessary if the ruler is "truly virtuous and benevolent." In traditional Korea "the executive or the administrative function of government.. was primary and the judicial was secondary. When the judiciary becomes predominant, it

signifies a failure of government by virtue." (Hahm, Pyong-Choon, The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Seoul, Hollym Publishers and Royal Asiatic Society, pp. 15-30).

The crucial problem, of course, is in determining when the guiding principle of Li is operative and when it is not. The Western tradition is inherently suspicious of rulers, and to most westerners it can never be assumed that a ruler will act with absolutely honorable intentions. Rulers have more responsibility than private citizens and therefore need more institutional and procedural checks upon their actions. Again, while being impressed by the effectiveness and efficiency with which public policy is implemented in Korea, most westerners would like to see less arbitrariness and more caution and consistency in governmental procedures which culminate in concrete policy decisions.

I now would move on to my second major impression of Korean politics - - the high degree of authority consciousness inherent in the system. To me, one of the most perceptive Western commentators on Asian culture is Paul Mus, who has the following to say about the social significance of Confucianism:

> In the Confucian society the ritual order, good direction, conformity to the past, that is to say to the cosmic structure, in the families and in the State, regulate the order of the seasons, the sun and the rain; thus understood, this society is an immense and perpetual incantation of the universe. Man does not act. He officiates. Good or evil. Certainly evil if he is not enlightened; the classical books and canons were his code: one finds in them notably the quota of ground necessary for each person to have in the collective structure so that the Empire could rest in peace. (Paul Mus, Viet-Nam: Sociologie d'une Guerre. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952, p. 247).

There seems to be a large degree of acceptance of events in Korean society--social, personal, political, economic-- with relatively little questioning. In a study in which I participated in 1969 related to urban transitional patterns in the city of Taegu, I interviewed a number of citizens concerning their perceptions of political decision-making on matters related to city development projects. I might share with you some of their more provocative views and reactions. A provincial government official suggested that the "intellectual level of the ordinary citizen is

not so high." "The ordinary citizen has little long-range perception." and he is quite dependent on centralized authority. He concluded that "local initiative" tends to be a concept fairly alien to most Koreans. A community leader from the private sector agreed with this evaluation, giving the opinion that the people were "trained and educated in this way." They accept the Confucian dictum that "the people should follow established leadership without question, and should not be concerned about the knowledge necessary for the exercise of leadership (民可使由之, 不可使知之)". In Korea, he said, there is no real concept of the government as "servant of the people," though "lip service is paid to such an idea." In traditional terms it is "Government high, people low." A university professor suggested that most people comprehend the idea of city planning and development but feel uninvolved and do not take an active part. He pointed out that there is usually some resistance to city projects but only when a project intrudes upon some individual's or groups's particular interests such as property holdings. In the same study, a professional respondent from the private sector felt that voluntary associations should be encouraged to help citizens become more participatory in local affairs. He cited as an example the desirability of strengthening mothers' clubs in schools for improvement of school facilities and programs. The people, he said, have little experience in voluntary associations and groups. He indicated a major barrier to establishment and healthy functioning of such associations--" the government is often suspicious of such groups." A government official suggested that one why to encourage more citizen participation would be to establish an elective system for city mayor and provincial governor.

In summary with regard to this survey and to this point in my presentation, a substantial number of community leaders whom I interviewed felt that the city government was largely paternalistic in its treatment of citizens. The same respondents, however, tended to agree that the masses of citizens were quite dependent on authority and as yet unaccustomed to local initiative in community development programs. From this study it was found that civic leaders' perceptions of the community power structure in Taegu point to a high degree of strucutural and procedural centralization, and to dependency consciousness on the part of the masses of the people. (A City in Transition: Urbanization in Taegu, Korea, Seoul, Hollym Corporation, 1971).

I shall summarize my random comments by characterizing the Korean political system from my admittedly alien and limited perspective as hierarchical, personalized and authority-oriented. As a nearly eight-year observer of the local political scene, I hereby conclude that Korean politics is sometimes lucid and sometimes perplexing; sometimes encouraging and sometimes frustrating; always interesting and never dull.

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* Korean As Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners *

Comment on: "THE POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS" BY

PROFESSOR EDWARD REYNOLDS WRIGHT

Willard D. Keim

It is a pleasure to comment on the paper by professor Edward Wright. Before doing so, I must enter a disclaimer as to my qualifications as an expert on Korean politics. Unlike other participants in this seminar, my own observations have been very brief, scareely more than half a year. Naturally, on the basis of such a short period of time, I can do no more than offer comments that will be in the nature of hypotheses.

Professor Wright has illustrated the efficiency with which many decisions can be made and carried out in the Korean political system. These illustrations could be multiplied to provide other instances, both positive and negative. It may be well, however, to stress the notion of "checks and balances," which may puzzle the observer of politics in the United States. The philosophical notion behind this organizational technique is the proposition that it is unwise to lodge the executive, judicial, and legislative roles in the same hands. In American experience, the Articles of Confederation, which had preceded the Constitution, had been viewed by many leaders as too weak, so that the Constitution was an attempt to both strengthen the Federal government and at the same time to preserve certain features of the checks and balances that were regarded by Americans as essential to the system: As James Madison expressed so well in his Federalist Paper Number 10, the system was intended "to break factions," whether majority factions or minority factions.

Such a system is a constant frustration to those who intend to reform the workings of the government -- the effort to pass a Civil Rights Bill in Congress in 1959 and 1960 was a painful process, and it was finally sneaked before the Senate as an amendment to a bill shifting land from Fort Crowder, Missouri, to a local school district. But not only the formal "checks and balances" of the national system are pertinent to an understanding of the American system, it is also essential to understand innumerable state and local formal and informal balances of power. Edward Banfield discusses at some length a several year effort to provide Chicago with enlarged hospital facilities, an effort that at the time of his analysis had temporarily foundered on the distribution of power within that complicated urban environment.[1]

For all its shortcomings, however, there is some evidence that Americans are rather comfortable within this system -- it defines their "expectations." It enables them after long experience to predict the activities of others and to adjust to them. Thus, rather than to provide the Republican party with an overwhelming victory in the national elections of 1972, they split their tickets, voting for a Republican president, while at the same time they were providing him with a Democratic Senate and House of Representatives. With accumulating experience, sophistication, and resources, it is not surprising to see even erstwhile rebels against the system becoming reconciled to it, as has Bobby Seale and the Black Panthers, who are presently conducting an effective campaign for the mayor's office of Berkeley.

Such a system of "checks and balances" owes much to European thinkers, such as John Locke and Montesquieu, and to European experience; America's growing pain were suffered in large degree by Europe. Such a system, which contains many of the liberal attitudes that Americans often advocate for other societies is not easily transferred. It does not jibe with the traditions and experience of many peoples in the world. In particular, it is unlikely that a "checks and balance" system will be comfortable for bureaucracies and administrations motivated by strong desires to catch up economically with the developed nations.

1. Edward C. Banfield and Martin Meyerson, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest, 1955.

In the United States, an opposition party is part of the checks and balances. In some European nations, several opposition parties may exist to baffle the government, However, one finds different historical modes of dealing with opposition in an Eastern political environment. The idea of a sustained loyal opposition is particularly difficult to locate historically. In part, this may stem from the nature of the political and economic arena -- the competition is for very scarce resources, in the form of goods and prestige. But possibly, it is more the result of the different cultural adjustments that have prevailed in Asia. Thus, in Vietnam, cooptation is an acceptable pattern, whereby the opposition is brought into essentially subordinate positions in order to provide them with "inexpensive but real incentives to cooperate." [2] Although such a pattern is not unknown in the West, it would seem more of a norm in the East.

Professor Wright makes some cogent points concerning the concept of "the rule of law." He has suggested, convincingly, the tension between the Legalists and the Confucian attitude toward law, a tension that may be puzzling to students of legal attitudes in the Far East. This is but one important example of differing political concepts between Korea and the West. To extend this idea, for all its possible comparability to the ideas in the Declaration of Independence, the "Mandate of Heaven" principle is probably quite different. The notion seems to imply that a ruler is entitled to rule so long as things go well in the society. He is secure from internal displacement so long as he seems to be ruling in accordance with the guiding principle of Li. In the United States and the United Kingdom, of course, a ruler may be displaced whether or not he has governed well, according to judgements of the citizenry that may be far less vital in extent and depth than a judgement, say, that Prime Minister Harold Wilson had lost the "mandate of heaven." Whereas the notion of legitimacy in the United States inheres in the system itself, the "Mandate of Heaven" emphasizes a legitimacy that finds its locus in the ruler as a person. This is a crucial difference, and it supports Dr. Wright's comments on the "rule of law." It is not suggested that traditional concepts such as the "Mandate of Heaven" exercise a large and conscious hold on the Korean citizen, but Korea's tradition is

2. Jerry Mark Silverman, "South Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (January, 1973), 37-38.

a different one, and it would not be surprising if it worked to produce subtle differences in citizen expectations and behavior.

It is interesting that Professor Wright has chosen a quotation from Paul Mus, an authority on Vietnam, to illustrate some points that I agree are pertinent as well to Korea. Much work remains to be done on the history and politics of both these countries, so that it may be too early to suggest a comparative study. However, Vietnam, like Korea, has been heavily influenced by China. It has also a number of other experiences in common with Korea -- in short, there is just enough similarity between the two cultures to point up their differences in a most interesting light. I find Dr. Wright's assessments of authority consciousness most interesting. My first inclination was to disagree with the conclusions from his observations on the basis of my own. However, my experience to date has been largely among an academic community, which, as any survey analyst will agree, does not provide a corss-section of a population.

On reconsideration, therefore, it becomes difficult to take issue with the points raised concerning authority consciousness in Korea. My own tentative conclusions, therefore, would probably be consonent with those of the paper. It is possible that Koreans are similar in some ways to the subjects, as opposed to participants, discussed and defined in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their The Civic Culture.

In speaking of authority, I think one ought to be very careful in the use of the concept and related ideas. A distinction must be made between authority and some commonsense definitions of "power." Authority is formal power. In particular, it is" ... the expected and legitimate possession of power." Naked power, which is one common notion of the term "power," is nonauthoritativepower openly exercized. Where a current political ideology is not commonly accepted, naked power may be exercised.[3] This kind of power was distrusted and eschewed (when possible) by the people of traditional Korea, for it" ... turned egos that ought to overlap and interlock with each other" into a dyadic subject-object relationship. Such power was a corruption

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3. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 133-141.

of interpersonal decency.[4] In any discussion of authority, it is well to keep such distinctions in mind.

These comments on authority also relate to another idea, namely, the importance of personal relationships in the Korean perception of authority. In formal personal contact, there seems to be a tendency to play down potential conflict, challenge, tension, and confrontation. Thus, in one survey of civil servants, respondents hesitated in answer to a question for fear remarks might be taken as a personal offense by others.[5] There is probably much more heed paid in Korea to matters of personal relationship (or "humanness") in authority relationship and "politics" than to "issues" or "interests" per se.

It may be appropriate to add another aspect of Korea's situation in the world that must make some difference to the political consciousness of its citizens. The United States, which is presently highly developed economically if not socially, is a superpower that deals from a position of general preponderence with most other nations in the world. Although American intervention in the Vietnamese conflict generated intense and conflictual emotions among the American public, there was probably very little feeling of personal insecurity generated by the progress of the war. Even the People's Republic of China, while it may affect peripheral American interests in Asia, cannot effectively threaten the United States with its present military capabilities.

Korea, however, is in a different position. It has a sense of being manipulated, as indicated by a remark of Min Kwan-Shik: "... in the fifties, Korea's role in the world was an entirely passive one."[6] The PRC, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States are all involved in some way with the fate of the Korean peninsula, and all these nations are more powerful in goods and numbers of people than Korean. The experience of Korea in a hostile world of great power national interests was a theme that appeared

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4. Hahm Pyong-choon, "Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Reexamination of Traditional Factors," unpublished manuscript. 1972.

5. Bark Dong Suh, "Policy Making in the Korean Executive Branch," in Koh Byung Chul, editor, Aspects of Administrative Development, Kalamazoo, Mich., 1967

6. "Korea's Changing Role in Asia," Korea Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 (February, 1973), 41-47.

saliently in the announcements of martial law last year. There is little doubt that for those who consider politics from time to time, and even among persons who do not expend much thought to politics, the position of Korea in the world must appear to be uncertain, unpredictable, and probably insecure. Unlike some other smaller nations, Korea does not reside in a protective shadow of a stalemated and well-defined great power sphere, a situation of "military crystallization" as it is called by Raymond Aron. Korea occupies a position in the center of spheres of influence that are still fluid and rather indefinite. Thus, while there are good cultural reasons for the subject-consciousness among Koreans, the nature of the international political situation must affect the attitude toward government in the direction of being at least uncomfortable in the face of possible disunity and instability. This adds to the final assessment in Professor Wright's paper: like him, I have found the Korean political scene frustrating, interesting, perplexing, and probably somewhat less lucid than my colleague.

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* Korean As Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners *

THE ECONOMIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS THROUGH KORLAN BUSINESSMEN'S EFFORTS

Lee H. Burns

Being with you today is both a pleasure and an honor to participate in this worthwhile Dialogue Conference entitled Koreans as Seen through the Eyes of Westerners. My topic is the Ecohomic Consciousness of Koreans as measured in terms of the Korean businessmen's activity.

I should like to preface my remarks by saying that for nearly seven(7) years I have had the distinct pleasure of a close association with the Korean business and Government leaders of your country. This splendid opportunity has been brought about by my responsibilities as the Director of Operations-Korea for the International Executive Service Corps which is a private nonprofit organization bringing management and technical assistance through non-salaried volunteers to some 56 different countries throughout the developing world. It can be said without any qualification that I represent the only foreigner who for nearly seven years has had the opportunity on a daily basis of meeting Korean business leaders, middle management, and supervisors both in their offices as well as in their plants and on the production line. In all my contacts, there is indeed less of a difference than similarity between the Korean businessmen and the international entrepreneur since the aspirations of the Korean business leaders possess the same business aspirations of the international business leaders. The goal of developing an enterprise as a responsible entrepreneur is to better put forward the principles of business achievements. The lines of communication between the Korean consumers and the Korean business leaders

must be kept open and must be on an understandable basis in order for the Nation to benefit in its entirety. With these remarks, I should like to discuss in some depth pertinent points that I believe constitute a ready reference to the Economic Consciousness of Koreans in terms of the Korean businessmen's activity. The development, the improvement as well as the understanding of the businessmen's problems and his challenges should be fully understood by the layman so that there can be an appreciation of the businessmen as an important element in the further development of this outstanding Nation.

Achieving Now What Pride Prevented Previously

For over a year after my arrival in Korea in June, 1966 to negotiate the Country Agreement with your Government inviting my organization to Korea, I was constantly made aware by the Korean businessmen with whom I came in contact that "In Korea, we do things differently." I later found that as my time in Korea progressed less and less was this statement brought to my attention, and today I find that the businessmen rarely are making this statement in their communication with foreigners. It is a my belief, and I am sure well founded that this is a manifestation of the development and growth of the business community. No longer is the businessman using an excuse to not want to undertake the modernization of business practices through modern management concepts. It was a defense mechanism for the Korean businessmen to counter any suggestion of managerial or technical improvements by merely saying "Well, that's all well and good, but in Korea, you must remember this is done differently." With that statement, he was prepared then to build a wall about him to shield him in his thinking from any outside influence that might interfere with his way of doing business.

Attention to Detail Developing

Every nation has characteristics both on positive and on negative sides. One of the important characteristics from the standpoint of an Economic Consciousness of developing one's nation is attention to detail. There

are many different ways in which a product can be developed. The Korean businessman is conscious of the need for quality products, but unfortunately, he believes, that he can inspect quality into the products. By that I mean having a number of inspectors at the end of the assembly line to determine whether the product meets the specification. It has been proven worldwide that inspection must be throughout the manufacturing process. In addition, there must be both quality raw material and workmanship as well as quality component parts. Attention to detail by the Korean businessmen throughout the different facets of the business community is greatly lacking. Unless each minute part that becomes the whole is of the highest quality, then the final product will not represent quality. Often times, it is easy to plaster over and paint over poor workmanship in order to make the appearance meet the quality standards. Yet beneath the paint lies the work of carelessness. Attention to detail is an important trait that must be constantly developed in the United States as well as any developing country. There are no exceptions.

Apathetic Attitude Toward Progress

I should like to point out that by and large the Korean business community has expressed an enthusiastic and an eager response to meeting international standards of managerial and technical improvement. Yet, there still exists today a sizable segment of the Korean business community that is led by men who are apathetic toward progress. What was good for my father is good enough for me. This tragic and stagnant attitude is one of the most dangerous attitudes which can affect adversely the development of a business community for growth and prosperity. It does not mean that the Korean businessmen must embrace every managerial and technical innovation which is foreign. However, it does imply that each business leader should compel himself to constantly be on the look-out for new ideas, new methods, and new thinking which will allow him to maintain an up-to-date approach to his business field.

Maintaining Balance between National Cultural Consideration and International Business Methods.

What I am about to discuss with you now is a subject of which I have been exceedingly interested ever since I first lived in Japan and now in Korea. There are few nations within East Asia who have been able to attain goals and aspirations in such a degree of magnitude as Japan. I am fully aware that during the Korean War, Japan was able to capitalize on supplying the economic needs of the Korean War. I also recognize that the aerial destruction of Japan during World War II resulted in the need for complete new equipment for the damaged factories as was the case in Germany. This new equipment when installed up-dated the entire production capacity of the companies and thereby gave Japan an advantage over those countries throughout East Asia that were not required to replace equipment. I also realize that Japan, since the Meiji Restoration of 1867, has been constantly aware of and striving for modernization of its manufacturing facilities. All these factors then must be considered when one observes the outstanding ability put forth by Japan to maintain a balance between national cultural heritage and new international business procedures. By that I mean the Japanese businessman has the ability to maintain his cultural identity away from the office. On his return to the office he exemplifies a modern international business approach. Using this than as a background, I wish to address myself to the hope that Korea can little by little develop a balance between the Korean national cultural heritage and international business practices without sacrificing Korea's true cultural heritage. Quite frankly, to me, this would be a most difficult undertaking and I strongly doubt if many American businessmen placed in a similar situation as the Korean businessman could hope to achieve such a balance without exerting a great deal of strain.

Woman's Place in the Business Community

This is a subject that I am convinced has had too little attention. As a modern nation develops the tempo of the day to day business activities increases. There is a demand for greater reliance upon secretaries as well as typists. The day when a business can be carried on only on a face to face basis is rapidly disappearing. The need for quicker response to business questions and to business activities demands that executive type secretaries and skilled typists become more and more a part of the entrepreneur's top management team. I am not suggesting that a business leader has secretaries and typists unless he has a need for their clerical services other than serving coffee. However, more and more, correspondence will be required in the future as well as more and more coordination when the business leader is away from his desk. All this can be accomplished well by well-trained women executive secretaries and women typists. Korea has few natural resources but one of its natural resources are its people. And there is no natural resources in any nation that can equal a population that is intelligent, skilled, eager, and willing to do a good day's work. Such is the case of the women in Korea who have aspirations for executive secretarial duties as well as being typists. The business community's lack of using this outstanding natural resource must not continue if Korea is to maintain its position as an effective exporting country.

Upgrading and Intergrading the MBA Graduate into Korean Business

In order to maintain a constant supply of intelligent and skilled potential business leaders, every nation must utilize effectively the products of the graduate schools of business. Without this constant input into the Korean business community of Masters in Business Administration who have completed sucessfully comprehensive business courses, Korea will find its supply of potential business leaders exhausted. This holds true also for Koreans who have graduated from a Graduate Schools of Business abroad. The lack of fully utilizing their talents in Korea is a national economic loss. The business students who possess a high degree of intelligence and

an above average degree of exposures to modern business practices are not integrated into companies usually. Needless to say, this represents a lack of foresight on the part of the personnel policy of these companies. Why should a MBA graduate start at the bottom while his contemporaries who did not undertake Graduate School of Business courses are in positions with far greater responsibility? Until the business community can support the graduate schools of business in Korea by placing their worthy graduates, there will be an imbalance of the proper utilization of this important source of future Korean business leaders.

Don't Compromise with Excellence

Excellence in business or excellence in any endeavour should be part of the Economic Consciousness of every Korean. To undertake effectively a business task and/or assignment requires the full effort on the part of the one responsible for the task. Personal gain in the business field must not by the primarily compelling force in doing business, but the thought of doing the best possible job as a member of a team. Korean business community would do well to be exemplified by "Don't compromise with excellence". The idea of team cooperation in Korean business is not as strong as it might be. Accomplishing that which is best for the company by exerting their greatest effort should result in personal satisfaction and not always monetary gain.

Time means Money.

All of you have undoubtedly heard the phrase "Time means money". There are some Korean businessmen who do not make the most of their time in terms of an economic contribution to the community. Often times, this is brought about by the lack of planning on a day to day, week to week, and/or month to month basis. Although not so much the case now, but several years ago, it was quite impossible to establish an appointment with a Korean businessman for more than one or two days in advance of the date. Now, the situation has improved greatly and is improving constantly to where the

majority of the Korean businessmen are begining to realize the importance of programmed time.

Discussing with you this afternoon the subject of the Economic Consciousness of Koreans through Korean Businessmen's Efforts has been rewarding to me as I hope it has been for you. In closing, I wish to emphasize that it is not my contention that all these issues raised today are ones that could or should be immediately resolved now but rather over the course of the future. In Korea, there is the opportunity and the capability to equal the standards and thereby meet the challenges of the demanding international business community. If your business leaders can stimulate their thoughts in terms of some of these issues, there contribution will be Korea's gain.

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* Korean As Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners *

Comment on: "THE ECONOMIC CONCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS"

Delmer Skillingstad

Mr. Lee Burns has, in his presentation, discussed the economic consciousness of Koreans primarily from the businessman's point of view. I would make some comments on his remarks, but then also take off on a different tack for some of my own comments and observations. I do not intend to document any of the statements which I make. They are merely the observations of a foreigner who has resided in Korea and dealt with Koreans on a daily basis for some twelve years.

Over the past decade we have, of course, seen the employment of modern business methods by Korean businessmen in their relationships with the international business and financial community. Not all of the lessons have been well-learned, however, Mr. Burns mentioned the need for "Quality Control". This is a necessity not only in dealing with the foreign market, but with the domestic market as well. Koreans are extremely good craftsmen. They are not good production line technicians. What do I mean by this? According to the Confucian Ethic an artist is a suitable and acceptable person in the social strata, though he works with his hands he produces an object of beauty and worth, one of a kind, unique in its own sphere. The production line worker is not an artist, nor is the person who mass produces a single item. This person has no social status because there is no pride of labor or dignity attached to manual work. Men accept this kind of work because it is an economic necessity, but they are not, for the most part, happy in their work, nor do they take pride in the outcome of their labor. What is the upshot of this situation? First, because the ordinary Korean is intelligent and suprisingly well mechanically inclined, for what is

basically a product of an agrarian culture. He can produce a very good model, on a one on one basis, of almost any product for which he has the materials and adequate plans. However, the production models almost never meet the agreed on specifications because of the lack of quality control, which is a management defect; but also because of the lack of pride in the artifact which the worker himself must have. This latter is a cultural defect. No amount of control or inspection will produce a constantly good product until the worker has acquired a sense of responsibility and a pride in what he is doing. This comes from a realization of his own worth as a productive individual as well as an awareness that he is contributing to the well-being of himself his family and his country by his efforts. This latter will have to come about by a change in the thinking of the people as a whole. This is not an easy thing. With the present stress by the Government on Science, Technology and Industrialization to the detriment, or at least benign neglect, of the philosophical and cultural values, a change in the mode of thinking is being impressed on the populace from on top.

Towards the end of his presentation, Mr. Burns mentions the idea that time is money. This may be catching on in the international business community, that is to say, with those Korean businessmen who deal with foreign businessmen; however, it has certainly not caught on in the Government bureaucracy. If one is ever made aware of the fact that Korea as a developing country, is still a labor intensive, rather than a machine intensive nation it is in dealing with almost any of the Government offices. They all appear to be over-staffed with people who seem to have nothing to do but obstruct progress. The responsibilities of these petty officials are so fractured that to obtain the permission for the simplest thing almost involves the inspecting and dojonging of the request by several--I almost said, innumerable--people. And should one of the petty officials be absent from his chair, which is not infrequent, the process must stop because no one else except the highest person in the office, who also is more often than not absent, or cannot be disturbed, can substitute for the absent official. The people who work in these offices seem to have no realization whatever, that the petitioners might be busy, have other important affairs, or indeed have a right to the service that they are

requesting of their Government. To me this is one of the greatest wastes of time and thus waste of productive employment in the Korean economic world. At one time in history, I am sure there was a definite need for the dojang system; but, I feel that the time has come put some productive measures into the government bureaucracy for the good of all the people. I do not like to make suggestions that would put people out of work, but I do suggest that a good deal of dead wood be gotten rid of. I do not believe that at this time Korea should be installing a log of computers and other sophisticated office machines and thereby put many people out of work; but I do suggest that they streamline their office procedures, and especially their lines of authority in order to permit the people that remain in these offices to function efficiently and with the idea of service to the petitioners.

Many of the characteristics that I have discussed above of the Economic awareness or the lack of same by the Korean people, and so far we have not really talked about the people in general but only a couple of sectors, business and government, are really the result of the dynamics of History. There is very little long-range planning in the operation of a Korean Business enterprise. Most look for the quick profit rather than attempting to establish a good product and name for long range, and by this I mean several years in the future, development and profit. The cost of capital is too expensive to think in terms of years and also the political climate, both from inside and from external forces have always forced the Korean to think in terms of making the most profit the quickest possible way here and now,; and the idea of establishing a reputation that would bring in profits and make one's product marketable over a long period of time never even enterred the picture. If we consider the Korean People as a unit represented by their Government. Then there can be no doubt as to their Economic awareness. We are all aware of the "five year" plans for economic development; and the fact that most of the rather restrictive measures imposed by the government have economic implications. But, let us consider the individual Korean, or the family unit, do they have an acute economic awareness? I think that the answer is a decided "yes". The amount of money that a family will spend on the education of their

children, especially, but not exclusively, in favor of the eldest son, is itself a manifestation of this. Education is not cheap in Korea, as most all of you here know. Koreans sacrifice a great deal to get their children into the best schools and to obtain for them the best of tutors--and in this lies a great deal of the non-official costs of educating a child. Education is, however, the stepping-stone to upward mobility in the economic-social world of the country. Koreans will even sacrifice title to land which they hold dear in order to obtain this educational advantage for their children. Then on the success of this child the entire family will base its hopes for a better financial future. This fact is even further borne out by the fact that the favored child will be encouraged, indeed, even forced, to specialise in a field of study that will bring an almost immediate economic benefit to him and the family. This without regard to the individual child's natural talents or personal inclinations. Thus we find the departments of the Commerce Colleges perennially have a large ratio of applicants to spaces available. This is true also of the medical colleges,, whereas the biology and life-science departments which would teach much of the same material and should appeal to students with the same inclinations, have very few applicants because, at the present time in Korea, people see no immediate financial prospects for graduates of these departments. I will not spell out in this paper the method of saving--that is, making preparation, economically, for the future--that is common to the Korean household today. If time allows, I will make some comments on this also. Suffice it to say that to the present most of the savings put aside by a Korean Household is in the category of discretionary financial assets, and these mostly in bank deposits or short term loans. Contractual type savings, such as insurance premiums and principal psyments on Mortgage debts are relatively few or even an unknown method of saving.

I trust that I have not been too negative in my presentation. I was my intention simply to present the facts as I see them.

Thank you.

KOREA CHRISTIAN ACADEMY
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Document No. 3

*Korean As Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners*

THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE

Alexandre Guillemoz

I have been asked to speak about " 한국인의 종교의식 or "한국인의 종교심성"expressions which might be translated respectively as "the religious consciousness of the Korean people" and "the religious spirit of the Korean people." Personally, I prefer the latter phrase because I do not believe that a religious consciousness can have a reality of its own, divorced from a psychological or moral consciousness. On the contrary, in Korea we are dealing with "a set of concepts and intellectual patterns which are intcgrated within each individual and are interconnected on the basis of both logic and belief."(1)

1. The Religious Groups of South Korea

1.0. Before discussiong the religious spirit of the Korean people, I should first mention the religions which are found here.

1.1. The 1973 Korean yearbook published by the Haptong which I have rounded off here for the sake of convenience:

Religions	Followers
Protestants	3,500,000
Catholics	800,000
Buddhists	7,200,000
Confucianists	4,400,000
Ch'ŏn-do-gyo	700,000
Buddhists Wŏn	700,000
Other Religions	1,600,000
Total	18,900,000

(1) Definition of the French 'mentalité' according to G. Bouthoul. We have translated here "mentalité" as "spirit".

2. Problems of Terminology

2.0. The greatest difficulty which is encountered in studying Korean folk religion is to know precisely what is meant by the various terms which are used to describe it. Because of this terminological problem, I would like to take a critical look at those terms which have been employed in past years: shamanism, demon, superstition, and sorcerer. Then we will try to find terms which are more adequate for speaking of these beliefs.

2.0. The Terms "Shaman" and "Shamanism."

In the opening pages of his work entitled Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Mircea Eliade presents shamanism as " a religious phenomenon of Siberia and central Asia. The word comes to us (he says) through the Russian, from the Tungusic Saman." (1) Later he specifies that "any ecstatic cannot be considered a shaman; the shaman specializes in a trance during which his soul is believed to leave his body and ascend to the sky or descend to the underworld." (2)

These definitions are excellent and delineate precisely both the concept of the shaman and the geographical area in which he is found. They also demonstrate that the Korean mudang is not to be confused with the shaman. No mudang enters into a trance, "ascends to the sky" or "descends to the underworld." Instead, it is the god who descends as is indicated by the Korean expression " 신 내린다 " Since the first god who presents himself is not always the one which is sought, the mudang is often required to put up with several of them, one after another, before the one which she wishes to contact finally arrives. Unlike the shaman, the mudang does not go to look for the gods; but instead, she received them and submits to them. It is they who descend to meet the mudang. The mudang then enters into a trance which is usually controlled but which may sometimes become a genuine case of possession. However, this is a psychological phenomenon and does not fit Eliade's concept since the mudang becomes the servant, not the manipulator of the gods.

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(1) Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Willard Trask, trans., (New York: Bollingen, 1964), p. 4

(2) Ibid., p.5.

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(1) Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Willard Trask, trans., (New York: Bollingen, 1964), p. 4

(2) Ibid., p.5.

To return to the work of Eliade, one finds by the end of his chapters not only an enlargement of the geographical area in which shamanism is to be found, including North and South America, all of Asia, and Oceania, but a similar enlargement of the concept of the shaman to the point where he becomes a sort of magician, sorcerer, or medium. As a result of this conceptual extension, it is not surprising to find shamanism everywhere, and at last one no longer knows just what is the subject under discussion. Therefore, it is methodologically necessary to consider Siberian and Central Asiatic shamanism distinct from Korean folk religion as long as their degree of similarity has not been established.

Such a study would require not only a profound knowledge of Korean folk religion, and of the Korean, Tungus, Buryat, and Yakut languages, but also of the Russian language as well since it is in that language that the observations on shamans have been published.

This does not mean that one should deny the presence of common traits such as the tree, bells, and drums, nor other similarities between Korean folk religion and shamanism. Rather, it is a matter of methodology. Since the presence or absence of a historical connection cannot be demonstrated due to a lack of historical records, we must state that at present they are different.

It is also necessary to do away with a number of terms which have been borrowed from Christian theology.

2.2. Terms Borrowed From Christian Theology

First of all, as for the word "demon," there are neither demons nor devils in Korean folk religion. Instead, there are gods and wandering spirits. As Yim Suk-Jay has put it, "these gods are neither good nor bad, but rather they are well or badly treated." (1) If neglected, they become angry, but they can be placated as soon as someone hastens to make an offering to them. In view of their large number, these Gods are much closer to the Latin deus and Greek theos than the Jewish Yahweh is to those latter two terms. Greek religion and Korean folk religion are both polytheistic.

The term superstition is to be avoided also. While no one would wish to deny the presence of superstition in Korean folk religion, neither would anyone wish to attest to its absence from other religions. Unfortunately, folk religion is usually designated in Korean by the term 미신 (迷 信)

(1) Yim Suk-Jay, "Introduction an Mouisme," Revue de Coŕee IV, No. 2 (1972), Korean National Commission for UNESCO, SEOUL, p.14.

or superstition, and that explains its absence from the statistical tables.

By the same token, the use of the term "sorcerer" to designate the priestess of this religion, the mudang, is also to be avoided. There is nothing underhanded about their practice, and ths name mudang does not mean "deceiving crowd" as Hulbert claimed in The Passing of Korea. (1) This error comes from a misunderstanding of which Chinese character designates the mu in Mudang, (巫堂) This character is written as (巫 and not as 誣) . It is this latter character which means" false" or "false accusation." This mistranslation can be found even today in the work of Paul S. Crane entitled Korean Patterns. (2)

2.3. Korean Folk Religion

In Korean, folk religion does not have the title of Kyo 교,(教) which signifies teaching, and which is used to designate other religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, and "Confucianism". Despite its lack of teachings or doctrines, however, it still deserves to be called a religion. The Latin religio is derived from religare which means "to bind" or "to attach," and the prefix re indicates a prior promise. Thus, the original meaning of the term religion," a contractual obligation with a divine being," seems to fit Korean folk religion completely, since Korean folk religion also exhibits a contractual obligation with divine beings. Moreover, its polytheism resembles that of Greek religion but is distinguished from it both the absence of a divine hierarchy and by the lack of any coordinated activity on the part of the gods. Each god is in charge of his own particular type of activity and he acts independently within his area of responsibility. For this phenomenon where the gods exist simply side by side, Yim Suk-Jay has appropriately coined the term "parallelotheism". (1)

This religion is "folk" or "popular" not only because it is shared by the majority of the Korean people, but also because it has been officially ignored, if not openly persecuted, by the literati and rulers of the country since the twelfth century.

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(1) Homer B. Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, (New York; Doublsday, 1966), p. 413.

(2) Paul S. Crane, Korean Patterns, (Seoul R.A.S. Taewon, 1972). p. 132.

(1) Yim Suk-Jay, Introduction an Mouisme in Revue de Coree, IV No. 2 (1972), Korean National Commission for UNESCO, SEOUL, p.15.

This religion is properly Korean because it was here prior to Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, or Christianity.

According to the San-kouo-tche (三国誌), the peoples of the Three Han believed in "spirits," and had "parts of villages set aside" (Fr. "bourgades réservées) where a large tree was set, and upon which were hung small bells and drums as a form of worshipping the gods.(1) One can find clearly these same three elements in Korea today.

Korean scholars designate this religion by the term 무속 (巫俗), but this expression is unknown among the believers and among the Mudangs themselves. When asked to what religion they belong, they will answer that they are Buddhists since they listen to the mudang and she, moreover, gives the same response. In fact, they follow none of the teachings of Buddha but look upon Buddhism as part of their cultural heritage and regard it as respectable. Proof of this is offered by the images of Buddha which are often found on the altars set up in the houses of mudangs. By the same token, Buddhist temples invariably contain a small shrine dedicated to the god of the mountain (산신, 山神), The extreme tolerance of monks towards local gods permits this peaceful coexistence between all of the gods. The need for social recognition and the desire to escape persecution has led the believers of this religion to adopt a Buddhist façade, but the actual contents of their beliefs remain intact.

Thus, we are led to recognize the existence of this religion despite the fact that there is no popular Korean term for it. Furthermore, it cannot be called an "ism" because it has neither explicit doctrine nor sacred texts. It is not organized, in the sense of being a social group with an established hierarchy, and has no political representation, although there is an association to which the professionals of this religion may belong. With very few exceptions, it has no permanent places and sheltered places of assembly, institutions for the formation of trained personnel, a press or any other audio-visual means of propogation. However, it still exists and does not seem to be on the verge of disappearing because, more than any other religion, it is in accordance with the traditions and the spirit of the Korean people.

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(1) According to Li Ogg Histoire de la Corée P.U.F., Q.S.J. Paris 1969, p.21.

3. The Religious Spirit of the Korean People

3.0. I would now like to review some of the more informative facts regarding this religious spirit which I have obtained in during interviews and in the course of my fieldwork.

3.1. Ceremonies called Kosa(고사) are generally conducted by professionals, and may be held indoors in the Spring for the benefit of an entire family. More commonly, the kosa is celebrated in order to obtain good fortune for those who have it offered: during the dedication of a building, for a good catch at sea, or even for sucess at university enterance examinations.

The day before the entrance examination for Seoul National University, the candidates gather for a convocation and to have a look at the classroom in which they are to take the examination. On this occasion, it is traditional for the students of Seoul National University to organize a small gathering for the students of their own respective high schools, during which they encourage their juniors to succeed. This year, some former students of a high school in Seoul offered a sacrifice for their schoolmates. These students formed in a circle in front of two pictures, each representing the head of a pig. The organizer of this ceremony, a student, wore a yellow cap (suggestive of Taoism?) made a speech, performed a deep bow,(큰절) and offered a tray of 떡 (glutionous rice cakes whose stickiness symbolizes success). Then, they set fire to the two pictures just as the mudangs do (소지).

This ceremony was not a parody. All of the candidates from that high school participated, in silence and with their heads uncovered. The student who was holding one of the pictures said to me: "We are offering a kosa, in order that the candidates from our high school may succeed."
On the eve of such a difficult test, when their whole future was at stake, these candidates and their elder schoolmates had spontaneously drawn from the magic widespread in Korean society a rite for obtaining good luck. Confronted with examinations or with some deep personal suffering, Korean people are led to draw unselfconsciously from the backround of magic which their society provides. It is not a question of censuring individuals, but rather it is a mater of establishing that this magical behavior is embeded in the makeup of Korean society.

In France, mothers go to burn one or more candies before the statue of the Virgin Mary or of a saint on the day before the national entrance examinations to the universities. There too we are confronted with the same type of magical behavior.

3.2. This search for the blessings of fortune mainfests itself in a grand ceremony which is held in the spring or in the autumn along the Southeastern coast of Korea, and which is kn wn as Pyol-sin-koot (별신굿) a cermeny dedicated to several gods. This ceremony follows the sacrifice offered to the protecting god of the village. The village community gathers together around a group of mudangs for several days. It is held every 2,3,4, or 5 years, and is the occasion of a genuine feast for the villagers. The food and drink, songs, dances, music, jokes, decorations, and money offering for the gods are the delight of the men, and especially of the wommen for whom this represents a rare opportunity of amusement. On this happy occasion they laugh and they cry, but a serious tone would be out of place. It is a community celebration full of the love of life, despite all their worries, cares, and fears. The villagers amuse themselves, and the gods also in the hope that this will render the latter more amenable to their requests. This is but another instance of that love of life "in this earth and in that wind" which characterized the Korean religious spirit.

3.3. The desire for good fortune in the wo'ld of the living is not at all alien to korean followers of other religions. Consider the mother who goes to mass every day at seven o'clock in the morning to insure the health and well-being of her family; whereas the meaning of Christianity and the message of Christian prayers is supposed to be represented by the words of Christ at Gethsemen; "Let not My will, but Thine be done"(Matthew 26:39).

To the contrary, followers of Korean folk religion are trying to achieve their own ends, to fulfill their own disires, and to persuade the gods. To paraphrase the words of Christ, "Let my will and not Thine be done." Morecver, the Gods themselves are do not seem to have any particularly specific will of their own. They are "neither good nor bad, but are will or badly treated. Thus, the most important thing is that one should say his prayers sincerely, with all of his heart and should offer sacrifices and money to show the gods that they are not being ingnored nor abandonned.

The Korean gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but because of strictly utilitarian interests on the part of the worshipper. The purpose of the rite is not to praise the god, but to earn his favor in order that the wishes of the supplicant may be acheived. In sum, as Yim Suk-Jay has put it, Korean folk religion is "a method of utilizing divine power in order to control the events of everyday life."(1)

3.4. This same type of strictly utilitarian relationship can also be found in the Korean practice of put'ak (부탁, 付託) or requesting favors. One who is approached in that way finds himself surrounded by affectionate attention, gifts, and various social invitations. This "custom" has its economic causes no doubt in that those who wield a certain degree of power are insufficiently compensated. However, economic causes alone are inadequate to explain the existence of this "custom". Rather, it is an aspect of a much larger phenomenon regarding interpersonal obligations which are aimed at establishing or maintaining an amicable social relationship with those who are useful or might be useful to you. It is not so much bribery, although that is sometimes the result, as it is a matter of creating social ties, or a certain atmosphere, in order to contribute to the conclusion of a contract, or for the obtaining of official approval, or in order to succeed in a particular enterprise that one wishes to undertake, But when the individual whose favors are requested has lost his power, he is abandonned, and he is no longer worth anything. Thus, the individual himself is not the object of one's attentions, but rather it is the power that he is able to wield.

Like the gods, these men are honored for the sake of the services which they can render. Thus, the same spirit manifests itself in the religious domain and in the domain of professional relations.

3.5. In Korean folk religion, there is no notion of release from sin, or of repentence or atonement for one's faults. Nor is there any method of purification, of spiritual uplifting or any notion of spiritualism. Instead, there is a deep concern for the blessings of this world,

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(1) Yim Suk-Jay, Introduction an Mouisme, in Revue de Coree IB No. 2 (1972) Korean National Commission for UNESCO p. 15.

3.6. Unlike Buddhism, there is no renunciation of the illusions of the world, the cause of all sufferings and distress. Although there is as in Buddhism, an attempt to suppress such suffering, it is aimed in an entirely different direction. For Buddhism, it is a matter of suppressing suffering in order to achieve the cessation of desires, the source of all suffering. For Korean folk religion, on the other hand, it is a matter of satisfying those desires which, when achieved, will bring about the cessation of the suffering which their non-satisfaction had caused. That is why one should not confuse Buddhism with Korean folk religion. Their ends are very different, and we are justified in saying that if the their 7,200,000 Koreans who enter Buddhist temples to give money and bow before the image of Buddha, they does not mean that they are actually Buddhists, in the strict sense of the term. In fact, one gets the impression that Korean folk beliefs have crept into the substance Buddhism and have emptied it of its original doctrine completely, while adopting certain aspects of its outward appearance. The same thing seems to have happened with Taoism; whereas Jesus, on the other hand, has been assimilated in a rather negative way, as a Kwi-shin(귀신), or wandering spirit.

3.5. If one looks at the life of Jesus from the point of view of a mudang, one would note that he died early (33 years of age), of a violent death (crucifixion), forsaken and abandonned, that He was not married, or briefly, that He had not achieved anything in his life. Evidently. this led him to return to earth to satisfy His soul and to start a cult. Thus, it is not surprising to see His disciples speaking of him, propagating His cult, His story, His songs, and His images. There is no fundamental opposition between the gods of the mudang and Jesus kwi-sin (귀신), and there is today only a surface opposition. Today, Jesus kwi-sin may be viewed in a rather negative way but He has His place in the Korean pantheon. Tomorrow, He may very well be regarded favorably, and placed on the altar of the mudang, next to Buddha and the other gods. The opposition is not total, and proof of this can be seen in the behavior of the Korean who has himself baptized and then becomes religious, because the mudang had predicted that he would become a Christian.

3.6. We have looked at the religious attitude of Koreans when then are trying to obtain or preserve their good fortune, or that of their family or village. But we have yet to more mention the more critical and dramatic phases of one's life: birth, marriage, sickness, and death.

3.6.1. Giving birth is surrounded by a certain number of prohibitions (against visiting), and devotions (to the god or goddess of fertility. Sam-sin (삼신) Great importance is attached to the time of one's birth because the signs of the year, month, day, and hour of one's birth determine his fate (p'al-ja, 팔자, 八字), It is a fundamental cultural idea which few people are willing to ignore, especially at the time of choosing a spouse.

3.6.2. Prior to marriage, the two families consult a fortune teller(Chom-chaeng-i, 점쟁이) in order to find out if the birth dates of the future spouses are auspicious and in order to determine a favorable date for the celebration of the wedding. Since the years of the tiger and the horse are inauspicious, girls born in those years experience difficulty in finding a husband, and certain parents will officially register these children as having been born in the following year. This is a Korean way of believing in fate or destiny, and yet trying to change it by deceit or trickery. In other words, one can also have his own say in the determination of his future.

These fortune tellers are not only consulted for marriages, but for all of the other critical times in life. Even Christians have recourse to them during the more difficult moments of their lives. One expects from them a hope, an explanation, and this expectation, like almost all expections which are strong enough, will be satisfied. I know a person who had attended a American uhivessity and whose sole confort for some weeks had been the answers which a fortune teller had been able to provide him about a family problem. Thus it is not a matter of education, but rather the way in which Korean society responds to the mental stress.

3.6.3. The mudang may also be consulted in order to determine the causes of an illness. Formerly, they were frequently consulted for smallpox, which is regarded as a sort of special sickness. A complete magical

pharmacopia still exists. For example, there is a cross made on a person's fingernails for getting rid of styes which form on the eyelids, and also packets of salt sewn to the inside of clothing in order to ward off dangerous spirits. Sometimes the mudang may be called upon for the health of a weak infant. These practices take place among mothers who have been taught at primary school, high school, and even at the university that it is all superstition and falsehood. Faced with a difficult situation, such as the sickness of an infant, they tend to refer to the attitudes of their own mothers, and as their own mothers had done before them, they too call upon the mudang. We find there an instance of one of the most important elements of the Korean religious spirit: the refering back to a tradition which is looked upon as efficacious.

Faced with the sickness of a close relative, every attempt is made to save him. Formerly, traditional methods were tried before finally going to a hospital, a practice which was sometimes catastrophic. But now a days when the most modern means appear to be ineffective, back to tradition they will turn. Such was the case of a famous Christian family in Chŏn-ju(전주) when their mother became gravely ill. First they tried medecine, then the priest, and finally the mudang. Everything was tried.

3.6.4. In the country, when an old man dies, it is an occasion for bringing together the entire family. Except for certain moments when cries and lamentations fill the air a holiday atmosphere prevails. In such a case, death is regarded not as dramtic but as a natural thing. These funerals exhibit a touch of Korean realism as well as well as that love of life which characterizes all community gatherings.

In the case of an accidental death or a suicide, there is held a ceremony or kut as it is called along the a ceremony is held which is known as a ceremony or kut is held, which is known along the Southeast coast as an o-kwi-kut (오귀굿). Its purpose is to help the wandering soul reach the next world, to refrain from coming back to trouble the living, and to furnish him with all that he needs for his departure (e.g., clothing, money). These ceremony takes place before the entire village, and except for the close relatives, the occasion is not a sad one but rather one of enjoyable entertainment for the villagers.

3.7. By way of a conclusion, we can say that the Korean religious spirit from the point of view of folk religion, is characterized by:

(1) a lack of spiritual concerns, which differentiated it from Christianity. Its concern is to realize the desires of the individual, the group, and the family.

(2) a refusal to renounce the illusions of this world, which differentiates it from Buddhism. Its concern is to satisfy these desires, not to deny them.

(3) the search for good fortune in the world of the living, that which expresses the joy of living in this earth and on that wind. But fortune is fickle, incessantly brought into question by the realities of everyday life, such as examinations, worries, sicknesses, failures, thefts, Also, the Koreans may try to rationalize and explainsuch events with the idea of destiny or fate. But sometimes one is free to alter this fate to his own advantage whether it be earning the favor of men (put'ak) or of the gods (kut), according to a tradition which is ancient and time-honored.

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* Korean as Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners *

Document No. 7

Comment on: M. Alexandre Guillemoz, The Religious Consciousness of Koreans

Edward W. Poitras

1. At the beginning I must disavow any professional competence to deal with the subject of Korean religion. Although my field of concentration involves religious and theological issues, and although I have had considerable exposure to Korean life, I have never had the occasion to analyze Korean religious phenomena: I am reacting as a layman in this field. M. Guillemoz, However, is deeply involved in the direct study of Korean popular religion, which he distinguishes from Shamanism. Although he refrains from the claim that Korean popular religion is the dominant or controlling religious force in Korean life, it appears that he thinks form of religion is the key to interpreting the Korean religious consciousness. It is certainly relevant that he states in the first sentence of his paper that he prefers the term " 심성 " to " 의식 " and uses the word "la mentalité" in his title. This suggests to me that he sees the older, more indigenous, less formal and more nearly unconscious side of religion as being more significant than the formal, organized, "conscious" religions.

2. Within a very short compass, M. Guillemoz has given a clear description of Korean popular religion (and given it an admirable title, "the K.P.C."), (= la religion populaire coréenne)and has at the same time pointed out some of the common misunderstandings and confusions surrounding it. It does not seem as though M. Guillemoz is contending that the Korean popular religion is the only important element in Korean religious consciousness, though this is the only side of Korean religion which he analyzes. Several problems

suggest themselves in trying to evaluate the relative importance of the R.P.C. First, as M. Guillemoz points out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deal with popular religion statistically: it is treated as a "superstition," and is not formally organized. Second, he suggests that only the popular religion is truly Korean, since it antedates Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and Christianity in Korea. But while durability might well suggest its importance, one could ask whether sheer venerability establishes the centrality of the popular religion. It could well be that its power over the Korean religious mind has been seriously eroded by the later importations. Third, toward the end of section 2.3, M. Guillemoz suggests that this vague congeries of religions customs not only still exists, but is a part of all the other religious in Korea. I think this is an undeniable statement, but the problem seems to be how to evaluate the relative importance and influence of the popular religion, both within the other religions and beyond them. There is wide disagreement on this subject in Korea today, mostly because of the difficulty of providing data upon which judgments in this field could be made.

3. One of the most thorny problems in dealing with religions, especially the Korean popular religion, is the attitude of the person who approaches them. M. Guillemoz points out that the powers-that-be have traditionally treated the popular religious practices with desdain. It is my observation that educated persons frequently prefer to ignore the very existence of popular religious practices, even when they are clearly visible. These rites and beliefs are seen as an embarrassment, to be ignored in the hope that they will thereby obligingly disappear.

In very recent years there has been a revival of interest in things Korean. Foreigners have long shown an antiquarian and often sentimental interest in things quaint and exotic, among them religious phenomena. But now there is a burst of Korean concern about Korean culture. The boom is being fed by a deep-seated search for Korean self-identity and self-assertion, often sailing ambiguously under the flag of "nationalism." Even recent government policy seeks to promote traditional Korean culture, so the former sense of shame and reticence about popular religion and folk culture is now giving way to a new appreciation of Korean values. Whereas Westerners once

found themselves trying to defend traditional Korean cultural forms in the face of Korean indifference or hostility, now they sometimes feel a need to caution against uncritical, wholesale "Koreanization."

4. During the last ten years or so Christian theologians and other thinkers in Korea have been much concerned with the issue of "indigenization." This debate has paralleled the trend toward "Koreanization" in politics and other fields. Among the questions which have been debated two are particularly relevant to the discussion here.

A. There has been a search for possible correlations and points of contact between traditional Christian theological formulations and native Korean religious ideas and forms. This is the attempt to make a latter-day arrival on the religious scene truly at home in the Korean setting. In this vein a theologian like Dr. Yun Sungbum has tried to develop similarities between, for exanyde, the Tangun mythology and Christian Trinitarianism. He has also worked out an attempt at a Korean theology based upon Confucian thought.

Aside from the obvious fact that newly imported cultural forms interact with those already present, each changing in the process, we could well ask whether a process of "indigenization" is really possible at all. Even the term "indigenous" seems ambiguous, since it might be difficult indeed to isolate something in, let us say, the religious sphere which cannot be related to similar forms in other cultures. But in any case, that which is (even relatively) "indigenous" is de facto indigenous by virute of its roots in the land. Later cultural importations can be made to conform to indigenous forms, but can hardly be made to spring from a land into which they were brought.

From the point of view of a Western foreigner in Korea, it is fascinating -- sometimes exhilarating, sometimes disturbing--to see contemporary Korean thinkers self-consciously trying to make over the welter of cultural imports into something more nearly "Korean." The motives and needs for such an attempt deserve careful analysis.

B. The second issue raised by the indigenization debate has been the question of the extent and desirability of the influence of "shamanism" or the R.P.C. upon Christianity and other religions in Korea. Many Christian leaders are pointing out ways in which such influences can be found. M. Guillemoz has shown one problem area, namely the search in popular religion for favor from the gods and spirits, a manipulative tendency which goes against the traditional stance of monotheistic religion. There is wide disagreement over how such religious "misunderstandings" should be handled. In some extreme cases, pastors, especially in the countryside, are quite willing to appeal directly to the popular religious mind in order to cultivate support for their religious program. They are willing, even eager, to allow popular religion to influence and modify their religion. This is clearly a syncretistic tendency. At the other extreme, there are those who feel no compromise is possible between the types of religious belief and phenomena. The popular beliefs, after all, as M. Guillemoz has pointed out, are polytheistic, utilitarian, manipulative of the gods, and utterly worldly, while Christianity and Buddhism at least have convictions which cannot be reconciled with such practices.

So the debate continues. It is a Korean debate, with very little of it yet available in foreign languages, yet it could be of great interest to foreign students of Korea and of religion.

5. In reading M. Guillemoz's study I am reminded of a quite different, yet related religious phenomenon in the West. It has been analyzed for the United States by such scholars as will Herberg and Robert N. Bellah, and refers to the "religion" which is really not a religion, variously termed the "national" or "civil" or "American cultural" religion. It is not official, not considered to be a religion as such, yet it operates culturally very much as though it were a religion. It would be the "popular religion" of the people of the United States, going beyond the burning of candles and other "superstitious, rites. It centers in the national life, is associated with events in the history of the nation, refers to great national heroes, especially Lincoln, and prescribes a number of beliefs which, though recently much eroded, still exert a strong influence: "the American way of life," "freedom," "democracy" and the like. It is perhaps worthwhile to

compare this American phenomenon to the Korean, to see where the similarities and differences lie. It is also instructive to consider way in which the formal, organized religions, despite their inner integrity and strength, are adapted to and influenced by both kinds of national cultural forces.

6. Finally, it is fascinating to be confronted with the analysis in paragraph 3.5. The Jesus-spirit (kwi-sin) idea is entirely plausible within the framework of the religious patterns of the R.P.C. This phenomenon suggests to me the possibility that cross-cultural misunderstandings can a times be merely amusing, but at ther times a more serious impediment to our comprehension than we realize. The Westerner, at times perhaps wise in his judgments, may sometimes fall into equally bizarre caricatures of things Korean if he is not observant, cautious and understanding.

KOREA CHRISTIAN ACADEMY
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Document No. 4

* Korean As Seen Through
The Eyes of Westerners *

A FOREIGN VIEW OF KOREAN CULTURE AND ART

Richard Rutt

It is only within the lifetime of my own generation that westerners have begun to distinguish the peculiarly Korean qualities of Korean art. The simple reason for this is that Korea was little studied by earlier generations: Korea was taken to be a poorer neighbour of China and Japan, and only a scholar or a man who had lived in the Orient had much idea even of the differences between China and Japan. 'Oriental culture' was phrase much use, and it is still used.

We now believe that we have a better idea of the differences between the cultures of the three most important East Asian nations. In fact those of us who are primarily interested in Korea have gone so far in specializing that we are in danger of failing to see Korea in her East Asian context, and simply regarding Korea in a vacuum. Korean scholars, in their quest for national self-realization after the period of Japanese political domination, have encouraged this trend. One of the most urgent tasks in most fields of Koreanology is to restate the East Asian context of Korean culture, and to improve our definitions of Korean cultural concepts in relation to that context. In no field is this more apparent than in literature; and there are many signs that the rising generation of students is grappling with the task.

Until that task is fulfilled, however, anyone who makes generalized statements about Korean culture is liable to say about Korea things that could well be said of the whole of East Asia. It is important to bear this in mind in relation to what I say in the rest of this paper. Sometimes I can and will make specific comparisons and contrasts between Korean and

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Chinese or Japanese culture. Where I do not, it is fair to assume that I am either unsure of the truth in this respect or that what I say about Korea is applicable to other East Asian cultures.

Certainly the fact about Korean culture that impresses me more than all others is not peculiarly Korean, because it stems from the Chinese tradition that formed the sophisticated culture of Japan and Korea, and doubtless also of Vietnam. It is the great contrast between European and East Asian culture that is typified by Korea's preference for analogy rather than analysis. The west once like to think analogically, and christian theology has never been able completely to avoid analogy; but since aristotle the west has tended to analytical thinking. Without that tendency the technological development of the west would not have happened in the way it did, and the disparity between eastern and western thinking would have been obscured; also the christian church would have appeared much less foreign to the Orient.

To state, however, that the west thinks analytically and the east analogically would be altogether too much of a simplification. This gulf divides not only Korea from England, but also China from India. It is the reason why mahayana buddhism north and east of the Himalayas became so different from the buddhism of India, and underlies the divisions between Chiness and Indians living in South-east Asian multi-racial communities today. Indian logic has a tradition independent of the Graeco-arabic tradition of Europe, but it is still in opposition to the logic of China.

The effect of analogical thinking on culture could be profitably studied in a number of fields, but I shall restrict myself here to a few considerations of its role in Korean literature and painting. Here the effect of playing down analysis is most clearly shown by the comparative absence of its contrapositive, synthesis. Form is a weak element in Korean literature. Traditional literature adopted rigid forms, such as the Chinese shih, but developed them in a way that often left nothing but the mechanical framework of the form. Thus some highly esteemed Korean poems when rendered into English show very little logical form: form has become absorbed into style, and comparatively divorced from meaning. In prose writing this effect is even more striking. Old compositions in Korean and Chinese are

long enough to demand paragraphing when translated into English, but they defy logical paragraphing. The writer's style has been exercised in his composition of sentences, his thought has been expressed more often than not by analogy, and the shape of his work is hard to discern. In fiction Korea finds it hard to show anything remotely comparable to the exquisits sense of form of a novel by Jane Austen. The picaresque anecdote is balanced by the loose construction of the European picaresque romance, and Korean traditional fiction, like Chinese traditional fiction, tends to be episodic in construction. (There is one remarkable exception to this general lack of form, Kuun-mong, 'The Nine Cloud Dream', which, for this reason, deserves the careful attention of western critics.)

Modern Korean literature shows the same tendencies. Traditional literature in the vernacular had few stanza forms. Only one of these has survived in modern poetry, the sijo; and it is not insignificant that the sijo is an elastic form. Otherwise, modern Korean poetry has joyfully accepted the western idea of 'free verse' and thus justified its jettisoning of form. The development is natural: free verse is congenial both to the Korean language and to the Korean approach to literature. Likewise, modern Korean fiction, though it has benefited from the stimulus of contact with western writing, has not adopted western forms. The novel lags behind the development of the short story in modern Korean literature, partly for economic reasons (it has been difficult to publish and market long novels), partly for typogcaphic reasons (it is not easy to read long works written in Chinese or Korean in the same way that it is easy to read long works written in European languages, because the Oriental method of writing is not visually adapted to prolonged concentration), but partly also because the shape of the estern novel demands a concern about form which does not appeal to the Korean writer. Even the short story is rarely conceived as a story with a shape. Frequently it even lacks any sense of development, but has rather more of the impressionistic quality that is distinctive of the shih.

This reluctance to analyse exhaustively (and I must insist that I do not mean that Koreans never analyse or are unable to analyse, for neither of these things would be true) leads to another quality common in much

Korean writing: it leaves more for the audience to supply than much of western writing does. It is comparable to the famous effect of the yobaek, the white spaces in an oriental watercolour. Indeed a good shih ought to leave a sense of haunting or mysterious uncompleted statement. The effect is sought and achieved in many of the best sijo, and most obvious in the preference of sijo writers for avoiding a statement in the last line, substituting a question for a statement. A translator realizes that often he had better translate a negative question as a positive statement, a positive question as a negative statement. It will then sound better to the foreign reader; but a great deal will have been sacrificed, because the vacant space surrounding the question will have been inhibited by the statement form, the undefined will have been defined, an analysis implied which the Korean poet left unresolved,

Of course these points must not be pressed too far. The same qualities can be found in some western writers, and some Korean writers are highly logical, Yet one has only to read a large number of essays by Koreans of varying degrees of skill to realize that the generalization is worth making; one has only to attempt translation of a modicum of Korean literature to realize that the major problem one faces is the diffuseness of meaning, so acceptable in the Korean context, so unacceptable in the context of western culture. And here lies most of the answer to the problem of why the west has considered the east more mystical than itself when it is clear to anyone who has lived both sides of the world that the Orient has no prerogatives in the matter.

Preferring analogy means a preference for deduction rather than induction, and therefore means that originality in art is not so highly valued as it is in the west. There is no need to labour this point; it has been insisted on ad nauseam. It is worth noting in passing that the west sometimes admires originality too much, and values newness too highly. It must certainly be remembered that the great names of East Asian art are as much the names of innovators as Chaucer, Shakespeare and the rest of the west's culture heroes are the names of innovators. Ch'usa is an obvious example, the greatest and also the most original calligrapher of the Yi dynasty. In poetry one has only to recall the inimitability of Tu Fu to understand that originality plays a role in Oriental appreciation.

Nevertheless, it is not usual to stint praise for those who perform well without originality, and on the whole any seeking for originality has traditionally been discouraged. I think that westerners have judged this aspect of oriental culture too harshly. It contributes to stability of standards as well as to fossilization of styles; but the reader of traditional criticism soon realizes that it was not always such a dead hand as it has appeared.

The counteraction has come from the insistence of the critics on the necessity of experience to validate a man's writing or painting. Merely derivative work has always been recognized for what it is, and condemned as such. What is odd to the western critic is the unity of art and morals implied by the critical method of the orient. Very rarely does the Korean or Chinese critic risk an adverse judgement of another's work unless he is willing to have it accepted in a moral sense. The westerner finds this the more difficult to understand in that the morality of the content of a work of art seems sometimes to have no bearing on the question. In particular, sexual amorality is implied in poetry and stories written by men who were regarded as paragons of virtue. The moral aspects that inflamed the Korean critic, and still sometimes do, were matters less readily accessible to the basically christian mind of the west. Loyalty to the state and the clan, faithfulness of wife or disciple are often the key to moral problems that could rend Korea, but which seem meaningless to the west. Hence Anglo-saxons find the factional disputes of the Korean court hard to believe, and misunderstand the source of the power in Korean folk literature. They cannot believe that the disputes about the rites of mourning could have been taken seriously, and they cannot see that to the traditional Korean audience the illogicalities of Ch'unhyang chon would be of no significance, because attention was focussed on Ch'unhyang's fidelity, not on the love story.

So criticism plays a role in Korean culture quite different from its role in western art. It has to be less virulent. The book reviews in the Korean-language press tell one little or nothing about a book's quality. To say a book was less than good would be to vilify the author's character; to praise it would usually be too fulsome. So we have notices of publication

more often than we have criticism. Criticism exists, and is still remarkably efficient; but it is the criticism of the grapevine and the bush telegraph. It works better than one would have expected if one had experience only of the western world. Its drawback is that sometimes a valuable work goes unnoticed for too long -- but that can happen in the west too.

There is another quality of Korean consciousness of art that I find hard to relate to what I have already said, but which impresses me deeply: the quality of Korean concentration of attention. By this I mean the Korean's apparent lack of concern for the setting of a work of art. Art exhibitions are startling in their usual lack of careful presentation. It is enough that the work of art is presented, even if the room is gloomy or dirty. The westerner has been trained to perfect the setting of a treasure, the oriental cares less for the context of beauty; he can apparently concentrate on the lovely thing itself. Koreans often seem less aware than westerners of ugliness, though they are unquestionably no less sensitive to beauty. The right way to understand this may be by application of s_n buddhist principles. I do not lean the deliberately shocking scatology of some son parables, but the practice of concentration involved in son training that leads a man to concenrate the forces of his mind, just as t'aekkwondo trans the concentration of the strength of the body; so that a man can abstract his attention from just so much of his surroundings as he wants to, can tolerate squalidity, vulgarity, sometimes filth, without contamination of his delight in the isolated beauty that he finds. Could this be the reason why modern architecture everywhere is in a bad patch? It must surely be one of the reasons why gardening never became an important art in this country.

Abilty to concentrate and lack of concern about the setting must be allied to the fact that, in general, Korea has not developed grandiose art. It would be easy to adduce economic reasons for this, but to do so would not entirely answer the question why the East Asian cultures have not ordinarily been attracted to monumental forms. The buddha of Sokkuram is not only the largest Korean buddha, but is hard to match in size. The sculptors of Silla were capable of making large statues, but did not often

make them. Buildings were sometimes extensive, but not often, and history's accounts of large buildings usually imply that the builders were profligate, whether they Ch'in Shih-huang and his A-fang-kung or the playboy kings of Koryo. I have already mentioned some of the factors which inhibited Korea from producing lengthy literary works. The P'alman taejanggyong is one of the most significant printing achievements in history, yet it stands alone. There is a preference for works of art of a size that can be appreciated by the use of a single attention-span. What appear to be the long books of East Asia are really compendia: the histories, even the Confucian classics for the most part.

Surely this is an offshoot of the East Asian preference for the concrete rather than the abstract. Most of the words now in use for the discussion of abstract principles by Korean scholars are neologisms with a history of less than a century. Confucian thought used only a handful of abstract terms; buddhism, born in dialectical India, came to China with a huge vocabulary of the abstract, and the East Asian genius quickly learned to express buddhism in its own way, by which the concrete symbols of son parabolists are made to express the inexpressible, and abstract rationalization is bypassed. The I ching is a catena of concrete images used as counters for more than one sort of abstract thinking, and Korean poets rarely moralized for long, even when their meaning was most moral. They suggested a concrete image of a problem, or proposed a situation that emblemized the abstract. I know that some western writers and artists have preferred this way of thought, that it is the natural means of expression of the Old Testament; I know also that Koreans were capable of abstract thought, as all the involutions of the sŏngni-hak abundantly show. Tonghak, however, that typically and purely Korean system, dealt in the abstract through concrete images, and it is the western, or western-trained, thinker who brings his analytical and synthetical techniques to bear on Korean culture and describes the essence of Korean thought and culture in abstract terms.

In most of what I am saying I am implying, as I said I would, that what the westerner sees most in Korean culture and art is its East Asian qualities. A Korean traditional landscape painting looks much like a Chinese or Japanese one, a Korean book looks like a Chinese one, a Korean

book looks like a Chinese one, a Korean poem translated into English shows little that seems fresh to an English reader who has previously read Chinese verse in translation but not Korean. What can we foreigners distinguish as typically Korean qualities?

The answer must be impressionistic, and to that extent unreliable, but a consensus appears in the writings of westerners who deal with various aspects of Korean culture.

Spontaneity is a word frequently used. Korean culture seems rarely to have lost all touch with life. The nineteenth century produced vapid art, both in painting and literature, but Korea nowhere shows the opulent straining for effect of Ch'ing art-- the absurd ingenuity of the famous jade-carving of grasshoppers on a cabbage. Nor has Korea ever produced the mannered excesses of Japanese art. There has never been a Korean fin-de-siecle; decadence in art has accompanied economic and political decadence, whereas in nineteenth-century England and eighteenth-century China and ninth-century Japan it accompanied political stability.

Are the reasons for the spontaneous simplicity of the Korean approach to art to be found entirely in material causes? Is it all just the natural outcome of being a small agricultural nation without a middle class to produce a bourgeois culture? I doubt it. These things are certainly major influences, but had there not been a single-minded absorption of buddhism and then confucianism, there must have been some development of elaborate sophistication such as neighbouring states produced. Whatever the reason, the Korean aristocrat's art retains closeness to the life and atmosphere of the country people which, in spite of the vanity and display that undeniably occurred, give a tone of directness and rugged honesty to the whole culture of the nation. The international recognition of Korean culture therefore had to wait until the west had recovered from its initial delight in the exotic qualities of Japanese and Chinese work. Only recently have western critics begun to distinguish the good from the inferior in oriental art; and only when they could do that were they ready to value Korean art at its true worth. Eyes jaded by famille rose are ready to delight in the kingfisher hues of Koryo.

One final question ought to attract our attention here. If we leave aside the questions of the impact of western culture on Korea in our quest for the real soul of Korean culture, we who are Christians must still ask what relationship traditional Korean cultural forms can build with Christian cultural forms. We have not seen much yet. Korean Christian poetry has been little more than Korean writing about christian topics, and the result has often shown a lack of artistic confidence, because the poet feels more at home with the traditional oriental images than he does with the christian-biblical vocabulary. Painting has produced Christ in Korean dress, but not a Korean Christ. The transition must be difficult, and similar points can be made about other cultures which met Christianity when it was nearly two thousand years old.

There ought to be a way forward for a christian expression of Korean culture by building on the features which I have suggested are typical of the culture. The preference for restricted size is readily assimilable by the christian sense of humility; the liking for concrete expression is (as I have already insisted) the mode of the Bible; spontaneity is the only true vehicle for the distincively christian virtue of love; concentration on the 'still point' is a christian way of prayer; a sense of moral values in all acts is, despite the doctrine of moral theologians distinguishing 'indifferent actions', an idea latent in the New Testament. I can see that an unself-conscious infusion of christian attitudes could make itself part of a natural development of Korean culture, without diluting christianity or diminishing the essentially Korean character of the culture. As a Christian I should expect no more and no less, because the main aim of Christ's coming was liberation.

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* Korean As Seen Through
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Document No. 8

Comment on: THE KOREAN CONSCIOUSNESS OF CULTURE AND ART

Michael Engelhard

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's a difficult thing for me to comment on Bishop Rutt's talk. How a layman as I am can dare to comment on the deep founded observations of an expert who really knows about East Asia. I am here only two and a half years and that is, even if you concentrate on it, a time too short to know a totally foreign culture. And then, the only part of Asia I know a bit is Korea itself; I don't know China, I don't know Japan, and what I know about the culture of these great countries is really not too much. So I really find myself at a loss when commenting Bishop Rutt's talk.

Please take my comment as one of a European with quite an experience in European culture, and who, during the time he was in East Asia, rather interested looked into Korean culture. Let me begin with an anecdote: A man is working in my house whose name is Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee asked me one morning if I would be interested in buying an old Korean chest. Of course, I was, and so he made an arangement with the family of a friend of his, and we, my wife and me, went there. The furniture in the house was half Korean, half Western, just this sort of thing a Westerner usually finds terrible. Now, in a dark small floor, filled up with a lot of old furniture and textiles, there were two Korean "Ot-Chang". I looked at them and I decided: I wouldn't buy them and I wouldn't take them even if they were given as a present to me. But then my wife felt ashamed and she said: Look, the people are looking for some money, be so kind and buy it. And so, I bought it. The things were brought to my house and I was frightened. Both "Ot-Changs"

were black, black with dirt, some parts of wood and the bronze-works on them were missing. But then, because of curiosity, I tried to clean a small part of it, and then a wonderful redish wood appeared from behind the dirt. I cleaned these two "Ot-Changs" on two weekends from morning till night, and then the most wonderful thing appeared. My "Ot-Changs" are truly among the most beautiful I have ever seen in Korea. But they certainly were not cleaned for more than a hundred years. I don't think that is due to son ideas, but due to the fact, that Korean people very often do not see the beauty of their cultural heritage. Only highest educated people are able to remark the beauty of an old Silla pottery. The most beautiful Korean things I have seen in museums and in the homes of foreigners. In Korean homes things like that generally are not to be found.

In this country, there is a cultural property preservation law, which is very necessary. It is necessary because the beautiful things of Korean culture are bought by foreigners and not by Koreans.

Two weeks ago, I visited Haein-Sa, one of the most remarkable temples in Korea. The main hall of this temple was renovated. I got something like a headache when I looked at this sort of renovation. This sort of renovation has also nothing to do with son ideals, I think neither. It can be only due to the fact that the people who are responsible for it have lost the artistic abilities of their forefathers. Then, in Haein-Sa, there is this wonderful court formed by the two long stretched buildings and the two small buildings containing the eighty thousand wooden printing blocks. It is, I think, one of the most venerable sites of the spirit of Korea. These old buildings have a natural beauty, dignified by age. At the small buildings, you see from the inside of the court two terrible red fire extinguishing equipments hanging there. I can only say, that my attention was unduly attracted by these firy red spots.

In Bopju-Sa, there are two things making me mad. This beautiful architectural complex is killed by a cement buddha, which seems to be the main attraction of the temple nowadays. This buddha is distorting, even

killing the artistic proportions of the architectural complex. If you go through the temple, you find between the nice Korean buildings a small concrete building which is obviously thought to store garden equipments and other things like that. It is killing the harmony of forms and proportions, definitely. Koreans don't see it. Now - it may be that the Korean visitors are so concentrating upon the beauties of the temple that they don't even remark this concrete building. But, why then this terrible cement buddha is such an attraction that it is shown in nearly every book on Korea?

Another example, In Seoul, the architectural complex I admire most, is that of Kyongbok-Palace. Near this Palace, now the new National Museum was erected. There it is, the five story pagoda of Bopju-Sa at it's top. The Kyongbok-Palace seems to be annex of the National Museum. Why? You cannot say that the Koreans originally didn't have the sense of harmony, because this sense of harmony is testified by things like Bopju-Sa, Haein-Sa, and the Kyongbok-Palace. In my view, these old Koreans, on the contrary, had a fantastic sense of harmony and proportions. This sense of proportion and of harmony I find in each great work of Korean art: in old Silla vases, in Koryo-Celadon, in Korean architecture, in Korean schlpture, like the Soqul am sculpture. Now, harmony is synthesis, and because of this personal experience with Korean culture, I dare contradict Bishop Rutt's statement on the weakness of Korean "form".

The question of form is closely related to the problem of dimensions. The Korean forms of art have, in their best products, a great sensitivity of dimensions. That means, they are in one way or the other related to human measures. Gigantomania was never a characteristic of Korean form. I think both, the sense of form and the sense for dimensions are getting lost in this country. Look at Seoul City, at Pusan City, and Teagu City, look at the National Museum, look at the plans in Yo-I-Do Island.

Some words about "form" in general. As far as I know, there is no European concept of form. The French still pretend that Shakespeare is formless. The British, on their side, pretend that Goethe's "Faust" is

formless. The Germans, on their side, pretend that Dostojewskie's novels are formless. The French pretend Nietzsche's philosophical works to be without form. All these judgements on literary forms are, as far as I can see, not to the point. Of course, Shakespeare is not formless, and of course Goethe is not formless, and of course Nietzsche is not formless, and of course Dostojewsky is not formless.

If the works of these masters of form are judged as formless, that is not due to their work, but to a narrow definition of the term of form. I think, the same applies to the European judging on Asian form. It's the European term of form - if anything like that is existing - with which Asian form is measured. Most naturally, this measure cannot fit to Asian art at all. My basic esthetic experience in Asia is, that I, as a European, have not to change, but to broaden my categories. Very often, a decisive difference in Asian painting and in European painting is seen in the fact, that in Asian painting there is always, or nearly always, left some white space on the paper or the silk. That is "yobaek". Now, of course, that is a striking difference if you compare the paintings which, since at least the beginning of the 15th century in Europe, is oil painting. But in the meanwhile, I came to the conclusion, that it is not justified to compare European oil painting with Asian water colour painting. It's very much more adequate to the thing, to compare European drawings or water colour paintings to the Asian sort of painting. Since around the year of 1500, the art of drawing and of water colour paintings are independent arts in Europe. And if you look at the water colours by, for example, Albrecht Dürer done at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century, you will find quite a lot of "Yobaek" in them. If you look at the drawings of Dürer, Rembrandt, Michelangelo, Wakeau, Ingres, Delacroix, etc., you will find quite a lot of "Yobaek". I think, that is due to the technique of painting and drawing. With the old technique of oil painting you were forced to fill the whole piece, because otherwise the colour would spring off after a certain while. Now, if you compare European water colours and Asian water colours, you will find quite a lot of similarities, but also of differences.

"KOREA AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF WESTERNERS"

April 12-14, 1973
Korea Christian Academy

List of Western Participants

Mr. Max J. Baumgartner	Representative Director, Siemens Electrical Engineering C., Ltd.
Dr. Walter Breuer	Director, Goethe Institut
Rev. Luigi Bressan	Attaché and Charge d'Affaires, Apostolic Nunciature
Mr. Heinz-Willy Brunen	Chancellor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Lee H. Burns	Director of Operations - Korea, International Executive Service Corps
Mr. Daniel Cadrin	Student of Theology&Philosophy Department Dominican College Ottawa, Canada
Mr. Michael Engelhard	First Secretary (Cultural and Press Affairs), Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Miss Nichola Geiger	Former President, Friend's World College
Prother. Josef Gossenreiter	Professor, Dept. of German Literature and Language, Sogang University
Mr. Alexandre Guillemaz	Lecturer, Psychology, Seoul National University
Mr. Wolfgang H.H. Gust	District Manager, Lufthansa for the Republic of Korea
Sister Janis Hilburn	Professor, Dept. of English Education, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Mr. Roger L. Janelli	Student, Korean Language Institute, Yonsei University
Dr. Willard Keim	Professor, Political Science, Yonsei University (Univ. of Pennsylvania)
Dr. Samuel Moffett	Associate President, The Presbyterian Theological Seminary
Mrs. Tenn Payne	Professor, History, Ewha Womans University
Dr. Edward Poitras	Professor, Methodist Theological Seminary
Rt. Rev. Richard Rutt	Diocese of Tae-jon, Anglican Church
Miss Giesburg Sigrid	Staff Member of Catholic Girl's Student Center
Rev. Delmer Skillingstad	Treasurer, Sogang University
Prof. Betmar Teggemann	Lecturer for German Language and Literature, Seoul National University

Dr. Horace G. Underwood	Director of Yonsei University Library
Mr. James Wade	Ministry of Information Culture Office
Mr. B. F. Wideman	Fulbright Fellow
Dr. Edward Wright	Executive Director The Korean-American Educational Commission

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List of Korean Participants

Kwak, [illegible]-Jin	Cultural Advisor, American Embassy
Ko, Kyung Shik	Editor of Foreign News, The Orient Press
Ko, Byung Ik	Dean of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Seoul National University
Kim, Kyu	Professor, Journalism, Sogang University
Kim, Kyung-rae	Managing Editor, The Kyungyang Shinmun
Kim, Kyu Taek	Secretary General, UNESCO
Kim, Sung Shik	Professor, Western History, Korea University
Kim, Jin Man	Professor, English Literature, Korea University
Kim, Chum Kon	Professor, Interatinal Relations, Kyung Hee University
Moon, Ik Hwan	Chief Translator, Korea Bible Society
Moon, Hee Shuk	Professor, O.T. Theology, Presbyterian Theological Seminary
Min, Hee Chik	Professor, French Literature, Ewha Womans University
Baik, Sung Gil	Chief, Publication, UNESCO
Suh, David Kwang Sun	Professor, Theology, Ewha Womans University
Suh, Kyung Soo	Professor, Philosophy of Buddism, Dong Kuk University
Song, Young Ja	Professor, French Literature, Sogang University
Yoon, Tae Lim	Professor, Psychology, Yonsei University
Lee, Kwang Kyu	Professor, Anthropology, Seoul National University
Lhi, Ki Yong	Professor, Philosophy of Buddism Kock Min College
Lee, Doo Hyun	Professor, Korean Literature, Seoul National University
Lee, In Ho	Asiatic Research Center, Korea University
Lee, Hai Young	Professor, Sociology, Seoul National University
Lee, Hang Nyung	President, Hong Ik University,
Lim, Don Hee	Anthropology
Chang, Wi Don	Special Assistant to the President
Chon, Sook Hee	Publisher, Monthly Crosscurrent
Chung, Kwang Mo	Acting Editor, Political News, Han Kuk Il Bo
Chung, Won Shik	Professor, Educational Psychology, Seoul National University
Chung, Hee Kyung	Principal, Ewha Girls' High School
Cha, In Suck	Professor, Political Science, Han Yang University
Han, Wan Sang	Professor, Sociology, Seoul National University

"서구인이 본 한국인"

착석자 명단

(가나다순)

1973. 4. 12 - 14
크리스챤 아카데미

곽 소 진	미대사관 문화담당
고 명 식	동양통신 외신제2부장 (통역)
고 병 익	서울대학교 문리대 학장
김 규	서강대교수, 신문학
김 경 래	경향신문 편집국장
김 규 택	유네스코 사무총장
김 성 식	고려대교수, 서양사
김 점 곤	경희대교수, 국제정치학
김 진 만	고려대교수, 영문학
문 익 환	성서공회 번역실장
문 희 석	장로회신학대학 교수, 목사
민 희 식	이화여대교수, 불문학
백 승 길	유네스코 출판부장
서 광 선	이화여대교수, 신학
서 경 수	동국대교수, 불교철학
송 영 자	서강대교수, 불어불문학
윤 태 림	연세대교수, 심리학
이 광 규	서울대교수, 인류학
이 기 영	전국민대학장, 불교철학
이 두 현	서울대교수, 국문학
이 인 호	고려대. 아세아문제연구소
이 해 영	서울대교수, 사회학
이 항 녕	동익대총장, 법철학
임 돈 희	
작 위 돈	청와대 정치담당특별보좌관
전 숙 희	동서문화사 대표
정 광 모	한국일보 정치부 차장

정 운 식	서울대교수, 교육심리학
정 희 경	이화여고 교장
차 인 석	한양대교수, 정치학
한 완 상	서울대교수, 사회학

초청 언론 기관 (무순)

경향신문	유 수 동
대한일보	정 준 극
동아일보	이 용 수
서울신문	황 석 현
신아일보	박 찬 순
조선일보	이 춘 우
중앙일보	공 종 원
한국일보	안 종 학
동양통신	노 정 선
합동통신	이 원 재
코리아 헤랄드	Roy Whang
코리아 타임스	서 경 희
기독교 방송	조 남 선
극동방송	황 성 일
교학연합신보	김 형 기
크리스챤 신문	임 무 본
복음신보	변 순 재
주간종교	설 창 규
해외공노관	서 지 든

One difference certainly is the size of a picuture. Nearly all European pictures are painted in a rectangular size, which is not too far from a square. Asian paintings generally have a different size; they are either very much higher than broad, or very much broader than high. What does this mean? In my view, it means, that Asians have a totally different view on time and space compared with that of the Europeans. The European artists want, in principle, that you get the idea of the picture at one glance. The Asian painter, however, wants you to take time, you should go with him from the source of the river through mountains and valleys till it enters the sea. He wants you to go up the mountains from the very bottom of the valley to the highest peak and the clouds. The onlooker is supposed to spend time to get the idea of the picture.

The European artist is concentrating all his artistic abilities on "composition", that is, in subordinating each detail under the idea of the whole. This whole can be every thing - a simple shoe as painted by Van Gogh, a religious scene as painted by the European painters from the early Middle Ages till the Barock time, or a landscape, or whatever elde. That is, the picture represents a detail of the world. In concentrating on the very essence of this detail, this detail becomes a symbol of the intended artistic reality, and everything needed for this goal is in the picture itself. Every thing not needed for this purpose is excluded.

If I look at a typical great Oriental painting, I have the impression that our categories of composition are not adequate to judge upon it. The Oriental painter is not concentrating on a certain detail of the world which he wants to condense into a symbol of the whole, but he is concentrated on the whole itself, to put it a bit paradoxically.
An Oriental painting, as far as I do understand it, intends to give you the idea of the whole by other means.
There are two possibilities: the first one is to show in the picture the whole world, hence the high or the long size of the pictures. In such a picture, you can see mountains, the sea, rivers, water-falls, villages, lakes with fishers upon them, forests, in short: the world. As I pointed

out, you need time to go through such a picture to get acquainted with the immeasurable spaces in it. The unlimited space and beauty of the world is represented in the picture itself.
The second way is, to represent also details of the world, like birds and butterflies and bamboos and plumtree branches etcetera, etcetera. But I have not once seen a picture, where there is a whole plumtree represented. There are only branches coming from the side of the picture into the picture. You get the idea of the whole by going outside the picture. You have to prolong the lines and indications of the picture to get the world in it. It seems to me quite significant that these Oriental pictures, very often, have been compared to European pictures of a similar size, not so far apart from a square. But there is quite another artistic intention behind it. These details are not symbols in the European sense, but they are real details pointing to the immensity of the world. Becasue of this detail character of this sort of Oriental painting, they can be added together nearly indefinitely, in screens, etcetera, etc.

This means, the differences in European and Oriental arts are differences in the outlook to the world. It is clear, that both require different artistic categories. For eyes accustomed to European art, Oriental art necessarlly seems to be "episodic". But I think, this category is not to the point. So I have my doubts also, if this term "episodic" can be applied to Oriental literature. I have read a 17th century Chinese novel of about 1000 pages, three quarters of which were already cut. Now I think a novel like this is comparable to "world pictures" of Oriental paintings. The sijos, however, seem to me comparable to the plumtree and bamboo pictures. The long "episodic" novel has the idea of containing the whole world. Everything is equally important, which, of course, leads to an episodic texture of a novel. You find a very similar technique in one of the masterpieces of German literature, in "Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre" by Goethe. In a sense, the total of humanity and nature is thought to be included in such a work of art. On the contrary, a Sijo or a Japanese Haiku is thought to be extended to the whole world. The world is behind, outside the poem itself.

Please look at these remarks as at those of an interested and open-minded layman who loves art and beauty in all its forms.

There is one question left, that is, what the Koreans think to be Korean. I have to admit, that I couldn't find out what Koreans themselves think to be the essence of Korean culture. There are quite different opinions upon what is to be kept alive, which values, which traditions should be maintained, which achievements of Korean culture should be praised, etcetera. But I think, this is the most important question Korean intellectuals are confronted with. This country is to face industrialisation with all the technical facilities invented in the West, with all the social consequences of industrialisation.

The question is how to adapt to these necessities, how to maintain Korean culture or something which is worthwile to be called Korean culture. There are some people who look upon Chiness characters, upon Chiness painting, upon Confucianism, as upon foreign imports. They maintain, you will find Korea only in the folk arts, in Shamanism, etcetera. There are others who pretend Shamanism to be blind superstition and who neglect it totally. There are others who think the social values of filial piety, of familiy relationships, etcetera, the very essence of Korean customs. Whatever it may be, it has to find its expression in the works of art and literature in Korea. But, for example, what is modern Korean architecture? There are things like the new National Museum, the Samil-Building and the French Embassy, the one reconstructed a misunderstood Korean tradition, the other a quite good modern building with no Korean features at all, the third a courageous effort to combine modern techniques with Korean forms. The present Government stresses Korean values. On the other hand, it is propagating puritanistic, christian western morals. The family is the basic unit of the Korean society. The Government, however, forbids the people to make presents and to buy flowers for the occasion of a marriage. But how the Korean people can maintain the consciousness of the importance of founding a family if the symbols of this importance are taken away from the people?

There seems to be quite an incertainty about what is Korean culture. I, as a foreigner, certainly cannot give a solution to this problem. But I think Korea should stop to think of Chinese influences as of foreign imports. If you would take away from German culture the influences coming from Italy, from France, from the Netherlands, not too much would be left, and yet, of course, there is a German culture. The same applies to Korea and to any other country in the world. So, the Koreans should look on the Chinese elements in their cultural tradition as at Korean elements. They are Korean, they have been modelled in accordance with the Korean national character and culture.

Where the great culture of East Asia has gone? In mainland China, the communitct have taken over, appreciating only some parts of their great cultural heritage. Japan has already been westernized to a remarkable extent, not to speak of the fact that, within the East-Asian context, the Japanese development is quite different from that in the continent. Taiwan is an artificial state with nearly no historical roots. Vietnam is a country devastated by war and ideology. So, who can take over the huge task of keeping alive the great artistic, philosophical, moral and literary traditions of the Far East? Are the great achievements of the culture of this part of the world only to survive in museums and in the works of art historians? I cannot answer the question how to manage modern society with Oriental philosophy. But, from what I know, I think it would be the most catastrophic loss in the history of culture of mankind, if this East-Asian tradition would die. Couldn't it be that it is the cultural historical mission of Korea to keep alive East-Asian culture, thus preserving it for the total of mankind?
I said? to keep alive.
The living life is changing every thing at any time.
Culture takes place where there is change.
" und von Gestalt zu Gestalt führrt's die lebendige Zeit."
And from form to form it is led by the living time, as the German poet Schiller has put it.

So it is not the question of painting like the painters of Yi-dinasty, it is not the question of thinking like Confucius, it is not the question of making Socul am sculptures.
It is the question of taking over this more than four thousand year old burden and to draw the very essence out of it, developing creatively something which rightly could be called modern Korean culture.